Viewing and reviewing the Thai economic crisis: Culture and context by Thomas, Marie-Clare
Durham E-Theses
Viewing and reviewing the Thai economic crisis:
Culture and context
Thomas, Marie-Clare
How to cite:
Thomas, Marie-Clare (2005) Viewing and reviewing the Thai economic crisis: Culture and context, Durham
theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2386/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
VIEWING AND REVIEWING 
THE THAI ECONOMIC 
CRISIS: CULTURE AND 
CONTEXT 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the 
author or the university to which It was 
submitted. No quotation from It, or 
information derived from it may be published 
without the prior written consent of the author 
or university, and any information derived 
from It should be acknowledged. 
MARIE-CLARE THOMAS 
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY 
COLLEGE OF ST HILD & ST BEDE 
2005 
-0 1 JUN 2006 
For many, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is seen as an inconsiderate 
dictatorial institution forced upon the struggling emerging economies of this world, 
yet influenced by Washington. The 1997 economic crisis in Thailand, of which the 
key feature was the collapse of the Thai Baht on July 2nd 1997, is often argued to not 
only have been caused by the IMF through its extensive liberalisation conditions 
recommended in the 1980s, but further exacerbated by a complex strategy of 
mismatched policies forced upon the Thai economy after the crisis itself. 
This research provides an in-depth analysis of the IMF-policy prescription process, to 
clarify why IMP-policies did not stimulate a quicker economic recovery in Thailand, 
and why in many cases the policies they prescribed in the aftermath of the crisis have 
not come into fruition. This research also offers an understanding of the necessities 
required for efficient and effective post-crisis recoveries, on a larger scale, not simply 
in Thailand. Most controversially of all, this research explores the extent of 
governmental twisting and manipulation of prescribed policies as they infiltrate both 
the political and cultural economies, a key issue for global development agencies for 
future policy promotion. 
The Thai banking sector is used as an industry case-study to analyse how IMF 
policies were channelled to the grass roots of a sector, and how efficiently; 
demonstrating the complexities of this process: informational, cultural and political. 
Whilst this project focuses solely on the experience in Thailand, this research aims to 
illustrate the complexity of policy implementation, and demonstrate that barriers and 
constraints to policy execution arise in many different guises. This research does not, 
however, seek to offer a panacea for the execution of recovery policies for global 
institutions. From one perspective this research may suggest that in fact no such thing 
exists, as a key lesson to be learnt from any crisis experience is that the local 
specificities necessitate tailor-made solutions requiring acute attention to be paid to 
the local culture and the political system. Thus one of the main outcomes of this 
research is to demonstrate whether the problems of crisis recovery lie in the reform 
policies themselves, or their domestic implementation, based on the experiences of 
the Thai banking sector. 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1: IMF Policy Efficiency in Thailand- A Case Study of the Banking Sector 
"For too long the IMF has gone about its business, dictating economic policy to any 
country unfortunate enough to need its money, without any inclination to engage in open 
debate about what it does, how it makes decisions, and whose interests it is serving." 
Masina, P. (2002) 
"The IMF paid no attention to local criticism of the [reform] package" 
Phongpaichit (2000:40) 
These citations in many ways capture the widely accepted view of the role of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as an inconsiderate dictatorial institution forced 
upon the struggling emerging economies of this world, yet influenced by Washington. 
The extent to which this was the case in the experience of Thailand will be under 
investigation, and a central focus, of this research. 
The crisis in Thailand, of which the key feature was the collapse of the Thai Baht on 
July 2nd 1997, is often argued to not only have been caused by the IMF through its 
extensive liberalisation conditions recommended in the 1980s, but further exacerbated 
by a complex strategy of mismatched policies forced upon the Thai economy after the 
crisis itself. According to Joseph Stiglitz "today, the IMF agrees that the fiscal 
policies ... it pushed were excessively contractionary, but it does not own up to the 
mistakes of monetary policy" (Stiglitz, 2002) . Criticism of the IMF' s intervention 
was widespread in the wake of the Thai experience "with growing evidence of the 
IMF failure, and with growing pressure from business nationalism, and populism, 
criticism of the IMF strategy spread even to some staunch supporters of 
liberalisation" (Phongpaichit, 2000:47). 
In the domestic press at the time, doubts were cast over the whole IMF set-up, as it 
became popular opinion that the IMF did not have sufficient local understanding of 
the Thai political, economic, and indeed, cultural systems and as a result did not 
design appropriate policies and forecasts. These beliefs were held at high political 
levels demonstrated by Virabhangse Ramangkura, a former finance minister, who said 
at the time"/ doubt the US has a true understanding of the local economy" (ibid.:48), 
and the commerce minister, Supachai Panitchapakdi, who simply observed "The IMF 
was wrong"(ibid.:48). 
Taking the financial sector as an example, it is argued that the policies prescribed 
from the outset of the crisis to the current day were inappropriate. However was it 
simply a case that "misunderstanding or ignorance of cultural factors led to normal 
financial prudential policies being suspended in a kind of oriental zero-gravity, where 
an inscrutable 'other' logic applied'' (Dean, 1999), and that the IMF policies were 
somehow distorted and manipulated once implemented into the Thai financial system? 
To explore the issues surrounding IMF policies, such as whether they were 
sufficiently flexible and suitable, I will take the Thai banking sector as a case study to 
analyse how IMF policies were channelled to the grass roots of a sector, and how 
efficiently. I intend to demonstrate the complexities of this process, informational, 
cultural and political, and evaluate the impact of extending policies designed by 
2 
international institutions in a foreign framework, and whether distortion, or policy re-
working occurs. 
Much Western literature regarding the crisis in Thailand and indeed the rest of Asia 
concentrates heavily on the bigger picture of IMF involvement, the various crisis 
causes and global implications. By comparison, little attention has been paid to the 
aftermath of the crisis and assessed why recovery has been slower than expected. 
Instead of taking a very general approach to policy reform I intend to develop a 
critical analysis of key banking policies as they channel from the top government 
level, right through to their implications on both domestic and international 
institutions and corporations operating in Bangkok today. 
Is it really the case that the IMF was wrong? The assessment of the IMF's paper 
"Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring- Lessons from Asia" (IMF, 1999) implies 
that careful consideration was paid to the tailoring of policies required. Phrases such 
as "strategies must be adapted to fit countries' circumstances" (ibid.:5) and the 
emphasis on "careful tailoring of the reform and resolution strategies for each 
country" (ibid.:7) suggest that the IMF didn't simply apply a traditional solution and 
'hope for the best', despite inferences from senior Thai officials that this was to some 
extent the case. However the role of the IMF is not simply about buzzwords. Their 
commitment to Thailand was often questioned, especially as Lawrence Summers, the 
US deputy treasury secretary justified "Thailand is not on our border" (Phongpaichit, 
2000:40), implying that IMF crisis policy is somehow conditional on proximity to 
Washington. 
Were the problems in the Thai experience derived from a lack ofunderstanding of the 
situation from the hegemonic Western point of view, or was it that the IMF were 
naive in assuming that their policies would remain coherent upon entering the Thai 
arena? Whilst the conclusions I deduce are not representative of all policies 
implemented during the reform, in my thesis I suggest that overhauling a country's 
economic system is not a matter of 'pushing the right buttons' but requires a thorough 
assessment of a range of complex variables that influence and impinge on the flow of 
information and policy acceptance. 
My research is directed by the following key questions: 
• To what extent did the IMF prescribe suitable, tailor-made policies for the 
Thai recovery, and what mistakes have been made? 
• What was the process of policy implementation - how did the IMF channel its 
policies to the grass roots of the Thai economy, specifically the banking sector? 
• To what extent have banking policies prescribed by the IMF been 
implemented directly and efficiently by the Thai government, and what have 
been the biggest obstacles to their implementation? 
• What have been the consequences of re-worked banking policies within 
Thailand, in economic, political and social guises? 
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In an effort to shed new light on these questions, my analysis will rely on interviews 
with prominent individuals involved in these processes, as well as a range of 
secondary sources. 
In answering these questions, I intend to provide an in-depth analysis of the IMF-
policy prescription process, to clarify why IMF-policies did not stimulate a quicker 
economic recovery in Thailand, and why in many cases the policies they prescribed in 
the aftermath of the crisis have not come into fruition. The lessons to be learnt from 
these answers are seminal to understanding the necessities required for efficient and 
effective post-crisis recoveries, on a larger scale, not simply in Thailand. These 
answers, most controversially of all, will explore the extent of governmental twisting 
and manipulation of prescribed policies as they infiltrate both the political and cultural 
economies, a key issue for global development agencies for future policy promotion. 
Whilst this project focuses solely on the experience in Thailand, this research aims to 
illustrate the complexity of policy implementation, and demonstrate that barriers and 
constraints to policy execution arise in many different guises. This research does not, 
however, seek to offer a panacea for the execution of recovery policies for global 
institutions. From one perspective this research may suggest that in fact no such thing 
exists, as a key lesson to be learnt from any crisis experience is that the local 
specificities necessitate tailor-made solutions requiring acute attention to be paid to 
the local culture and the political system. Thus one of the main outcomes of my 
research will be to demonstrate whether the problems of crisis recovery lie in the 
reform policies themselves, or their domestic implementation, based on the 
experiences of the Thai banking sector. 
This analysis will unfold considering the impact of programme design, information 
flows, political and bureaucratic issues and the role of culture, as impediments to the 
efficient implementation of the IMF policies proposed in the wake of the Asian crisis 
in 1997. 
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THE FALL OF A TIGER: 
CONTEXTUALISING THE 
CRISIS 
"Thailand's financial crisis was at least three years old before it dramatically 
received global attention with the de facto devaluation of the Baht on 2 July 1997'' 
(Bullard, 1998:505). The crisis in Thailand, much like International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) intervention, began long before 1997. For many, the problems originated 
during the import-substitution era of the 1980s, prompting the entrance of the IMF in 
Thailand. Others look to the export-orientated programmes implemented in the wake 
of the second oil crisis in 1984; the IMF programmes which initiated the famous 
'Asian Miracle'. The debates surrounding the events in Thailand in the last few 
decades are far from exhausted. The Asian crisis is one of the most documented 
events in Asian history and new material concerning the crisis is produced regularly. 
Nevertheless, there are vital gaps concerning the micro-scale impacts of the crisis and 
the reforms that were subsequently initiated. This research endeavours to fill some of 
these gaps, by critically analysing the efficiency and effectiveness of implementing 
post-crisis reforms in the Thai economy. 
It is vital, however, that an appreciation of the crisis and its history is grasped before 
being able to fully understand the context of this research. Indeed the crisis has been 
analysed from many different perspectives, and by many different academic 
disciplines. It would be foolish to attempt to condense the whole crisis history and its 
preceding boom into a chapter for the purpose of this research. Instead this chapter 
will describe three key areas, which are critical to understanding the forthcoming 
research discussion: the ideas and role of the Washington Consensus, then more 
specifically the role of the IMF in Thailand, and finally a micro-scale focus on the 
evolution of the Thai banking sector from the 1990s. 
Many writers have provided detailed accounts of the crisis, and provide much fuller 
descriptions than one could manage in an introductory chapter such as this (Bello, 
1992, Bird, 1999, Dixon, 2001, Haggard, 2000, Kuankachorn, 1998, Phongpaichit, 
1996, 1998,2000, Vichyanand, 1998, Wade, 1998b, Warr, 2005, Winters, 1999). 
2.1: The Keystone ofthe IMF: The Washington Consensus 
The IMF-led reform in Thailand during the 1980s and 1990s was grounded in "Anglo-
American liberalism" (Berger, 1998:8) more commonly referred to as the Washington 
Consensus 1• This embraced ''financial sector liberalisation, privatisation of state-
owned enterprises, fiscal discipline and trade, exchange rate and foreign investment 
deregulation" (Jayasuriya, 2001:381). The rationale behind these policies stems from 
19th century economics; Joseph Stiglitz states "the Washington Consensus 
policies ... were based on a simplistic model of the market economy, the competitive 
equilibrium model, in which Adam Smith 's invisible hand works, and works perfectly" 
(Stiglitz, 2002:74). The root of this theory is that markets are efficient and do not 
require state intervention. This school of thought was reinforced with the collapse of 
Communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. 
The concept of free-market capitalism, which underpins the Washington Consensus, 
and indeed the programmes of the IMF and the World Bank, is that by opening up a 
country to the much bigger global market, a country can reap vast benefits. These are 
primarily of specialisation, which increases efficiency, and of comparative advantage, 
1 Coined by economist John Williamson in 1989 
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which states that a country is better off if it concentrates on a key activity in which it 
has a competitive advantage. There a plethora of economic models which evaluate 
the net benefits of free trade and globalising markets. The downfall of these models 
and in many respects the entire theory, is that they are rarely realistic. We do not live 
in perfectly competitive societies where markets determine resource allocation 
accurately and efficiently. Labour markets are not perfectly flexible. Skills are not 
always transferable. Even in 'free market economies', tariffs, preferential trade 
relationships, and market imperfections exist. In more advanced countries these are 
often more subtle than tangible tariff barriers, but agricultural subsidy schemes, such 
as the European Common Agricultural Policy, are perfect examples of how imperfect 
developed markets really are (Grant, 1997). Perfect markets do not exist. 
Karl Polanyi famously elaborates on these key flaws in his book The Great 
Transformation (1944). Stiglitz writes in his forward, in the 2001 edition of the book, 
that " .. . Polanyi exposes the myth of the free market: there never was a truly free, self-
regulating market system. In their transformations, the governments of today 's 
industrialized countries took an active role, not only in protecting their industries 
through tariffs, but also in promoting new technologies" (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]:xiii). 
This explains the weaknesses in the Washington Consensus models, as it exposes the 
gap between the theory of free markets and the practice of market economics. 
The Asian crisis was important in demonstrating these flaws in practice, as Jayasuriya 
explains: 
"the Asian economic crisis has exposed a deep ideological fracture within 
the dominant multilateral policy paradigm commonly referred to as the 
Washington consensus. Why has Asia been so critical? Because quite simply 
the Asian economic miracle was seen to be the outcome of pursuing the 
kinds of policies advocated by proponents of the Washington consensus. The 
crisis has badly fractured this consensus because it has raised doubts about 
the presumed benefits of one of its key elements- financial liberalisation-
and undermined earlier orthodox analysis of the origins of the miracle" 
(Jayasuriya, 2001). 
What is also interesting in the Asian experience, as will be discussed shortly, is that 
the Thai government implemented many policies which did not conform to the theory 
of the Washington Consensus model. In many ways this was the key to the Asian 
success of the 1990s, as "the [Asian] countries had been successful not only in spite 
of the fact that they had followed most of the dictates of the Washington Consensus, 
but because they had not" (Stiglitz, 2002:91). 
It is therefore clear there is much controversy surrounding Washington Consensus 
policies, and the policies of the IMF. Indeed "there would be less debate about the 
future of the Fund and its role in developing countries and emerging economies if its 
programmes had been perceived as successful in the past" (Bird, 2001). 
However the argument then remains whether the crises in IMP-supported countries 
are a consequence of the Washington Consensus policies, or the inability of the 
domestic economies to appropriately apply them. Higgott argues "while the purist 
free market position may be asserted with less ideological fervour now than several 
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years ago, it remains an article of faith in the policy communities and in most of the 
scholarly economics community of the western world. The real problem, they argue, 
is to be found in the flawed banking systems of the emerging markets, not in the 
workings of the international capital markets" (Higgott, 1999). Stiglitz reaffirms this 
view when he writes that ''financial market liberalization unaccompanied by an 
appropriate regulatory structure is an almost certain recipe for economic instability" 
(Stiglitz, 2002:84), as do Eichengreen and Mussa (Nairn, 2000:30). 
There are important lessons to be learnt from the Asian crisis. For example, one 
cannot discredit Thailand's success of the 1980-90s simply because of the crash in 
1997. The growth and rapid transition undertaken by the Thai economy is dramatic 
evidence of what can be achieved with appropriate motivation and direction. Indeed 
because of the crisis one cannot annul the foundations of the Washington Consensus, 
as in many cases they were a success. Stiglitz emphasises this: 
"the East Asian crisis is not a refutation of the East Asian miracle. The more 
dogmatic version of the Washington Consensus does not provide the right 
framework for understanding both the successes of the East Asian 
economies and their current troubles. Responses to East Asia's crisis 
grounded in this view of the world are likely to be, at best badly flawed, and 
at worst, counterproductive" (Stiglitz cited in: Nairn, 2000). 
Developing this further, on a bigger scale, one cannot discredit the claims that 
globalising markets provides a more efficient means for allocating global resources. 
While the crisis is an important lesson for the vital steps required for successful 
liberalisation, one cannot deny the benefits Thailand reaped upon opening up their 
economy. As Higgott describes: 
"globalisation needs to be understood as a multi-faceted process that is both 
material (real) across the economic domains and ideational (offering 
competing normative discourses of knowledge of how the global economic 
and political orders might function). But this is a developing, contingent and, 
as events in the global economy since the second half of 1997 attest, by no 
means irreversible process" (Higgott, 1999). 
In the wake of the crisis, especially due to its global-scale impacts, policy theorists 
and economists have called for a review of the current policy paradigm. Calls are 
being made for a new 'Post-Washington Consensus', which will be looked at in the 
concluding chapter, and high profile names are offering alternative ideas, for example 
Nobel laureates James Tobin and Milton Friedman (Nairn, 2000). 
However, the purpose of this summary has been to introduce the essential 
assumptions behind the IMF's policies, that of the Washington Consensus. It is true 
that the suitability of this model and its policies have suffered serious criticism, and 
this will be elaborated on in Chapter 4. This summary has demonstrated that the 
Asian crisis played a vital role in reassessing the role of the IMF and the neo-liberal, 
market-friendly school of thought, although neither can be completely discredited as a 
result. This current debate, like many issues in this research, is elaborated on in a 
wealth of literature; better dealing with all the related perspectives than could be 
achieved here (Bello, 2000, 2001, Bird, 2001, Ghosh, 2002, Goldstein, 2001, 
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MacEwan, 2002, Mittelman, 2001, Rikowski, 2001, Soederberg, 2001, Tobin, 2004, 
Truman, 2001 ). 
2.2: From recession and boom, to bust: the role of the IMF in Thailand 
The early 1980's represented an era of poor economic performance for Thailand. 
Dominated by a pivotal private sector calling for increased import-substitution, the 
Thai economy was sluggish, characterised by low growth, large-scale unemployment 
whilst simultaneously the largest companies reported flat profits or bankruptcy. The 
Bangkok Post summarised the views from a conference with the observations that 
"Thailand's future does not look rosy with the economy in the worst shape it has ever 
been in" (BP, 1985). Stuck in a state of stagnant recession, the IMF was drafted in to 
help in 1984 once the economy had suffered further in the wake of the second global 
oil crisis. The aims of its programmes were to facilitate structural adjustment and to 
re-stabilise the economy. In contrast to the existing Thai model, "the Bank made its 
loans conditional on a package of 'export push' reforms"(Phongpaichit, 1996:65), 
with key features being opening up to trade liberalisation and devaluing the Baht, both 
typical of market-friendly thinking. In the November of 1984, the Baht was devalued 
by 14.8 percent (ibid:66). 
Following the devaluation Thailand moved into a second phase of industrialisation, 
dominated by export-orientated growth. This new focus was to become the beginning 
of Thailand's contribution to the 'Asian Miracle'. According to Barber, "there is 
widespread agreement that the world's most successful developing countries have 
been those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and some of its 
East Asian neighbors in the 1980s" (Barber, 1995:243). This new economic 
programme was supported by the technocrats of the IMF and the World Bank and in 
many ways replicated the policies popular in the late seventies; before the booms in 
Korea, Japan and Taiwan, the President of the World Bank at that time had stated 
"special efforts must be made in many countries to turn their manufacturing away 
from the relatively small markets associated with import substitution toward the much 
larger opportunities flowing from export promotion" (McNamara, 1975). Further 
evidence ofthe faith in East Asia upheld by the World Bank was publicly documented 
in the 1993 World Bank Report: The East Asian Miracle. 
It has been suggested that the range of measures implemented by the government 
demonstrated complete commitment to the programme: 
"the reduction of import taxes for materials used in exports, the abolition of 
several export taxes, the establishment of special credit facilities for 
exporters, the promulgation of investment incentives favouring enterprises 
that exported all or most of their output, and the active solicitation of 
foreign investment by, among other things, allowing 100 per cent foreign 
ownership in promoted enterprises that exported 100 per cent of their 
outpuf' (Phongpaichit, 1995: 151 ). 
The impact of these policies was immense. According to the World Bank, between 
1985-1995 Thailand grew at 10 percent per annum, earning it the title of the fastest 
growing economy in the world. 
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The IMF and the World Bank continued to play an influential role in the global 
perception of the Thai economy and the 'Asian miracle', helping Thailand to appear 
'successful'. Not only were they active in shaping both the short-term and long-term 
strategies but they financially backed these projects with five structural adjustment 
loans issued throughout the 1980s. The sense that the Thai economy had come of age 
was further justified as the World Bank formally acknowledged Thailand to be the 
fifth Asian tiger in 1991, sharing this title with Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. 
Further World Bank and IMF authority was exerted in the early 1990s, with 
increasing pressure for greater liberalisation and the further deregulation of the Thai 
economy. After the military coup of 1991, Anand Panyarachun took control of the 
country. A former diplomat, Anand was a key supporter of the technocrats who had 
embraced the IMF's export-orientated policies of the 1980s. As a result the Thai 
economy continued to conform to IMF recommendations and in May 1990 the Anand 
government accepted the IMF's Article VIII, removing controls on foreign exchange 
for current account transactions (Drysdale, 2002). Even when the first elected Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai came to power in 1994, there was continued pressure for 
further deregulation and liberalisation in the Thai economic system. The extent of 
this 'opening-up' incited one newspaper to report "in relative terms, Thailand is even 
more generous than Japan, an economic superpower, in the liberalisation of its 
financial sector" (TN, 1997(70)). 
While on the surface it may have appeared that Thailand was an exemplar of the 
Washington Consensus, the IMF and the World Bank did little to ensure a complete 
liberalisation and deregulation of the Thai economy. It was clear early in the 1990s 
that Thailand was not an archetypal economy for the Washington Consensus model; 
the model which the IMF and World Bank so forcefully advocated. There were 
several flaws in the programme of reform employed, which paved the way for the 
crisis of 1997. These are well documented, and thus warrant no repetition here 
(Dixon, 2001, Lauridsen, 1998, Nukul Commission, 1998, Phongpaichit, 1998, 2000, 
Santiprabhob, 2003, Vichyanand, 2000, 1998, Wade, 1998a). What is surprising is 
that the IMF and the World Bank kept so quiet over policies adopted by successive 
Thai governments which so blatantly contradicted much of what the IMF and the 
World Bank preached. The two cornerstone policies to suffer such controversy were 
the maintenance of high interest rates, in excess of 20 percent at times, and the fixing 
of the Baht to the dollar at 25 Baht = $1 2• 
It was not until July 1997 that the IMF and the World Bank played such public roles 
in Thailand as they did in 1991. The crisis came upon Thailand, as it did Asia and the 
rest of the world, by surprise. Walden Bello best describes the attitudes of the Thai 
technocrats to the IMF as "not unlike that of a player approaching the coach with a 
quizzical look that said: 'What happened? But I was just following your 
instructions"' (Bello, 1998:45). 
Having addressed the history of the Thai economy in the lead up to the crisis, one can 
now focus on the crisis, and the recovery. Upon arrival in July 1997, the IMF 
2 The Baht was in fact pegged to a basket of currencies, made up of the Japanese Yen and the Deutsche 
Mark as well as the US dollar. However the dollar was by far the most heavily weighted currency. 
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assumed a very active role in the Thai economy, establishing first a programme of 
stabilisation, to control the crisis, and secondly, a deeper structural overhaul of the 
Thai financial sector, to solve the key causes of the crisis. Their arrival was 
welcomed with open arms, with most of the urban population displaying an anti-
government sentiment. General belief was that the Chavalit government (elected in 
1996), had mismanaged the onset of the crisis (Phongpaichit, 2000:37). These views 
also stemmed from the perception that 'cronyism', that is excessive government 
intervention in the Thai economy, had been a fundamental cause of the crisis. This 
too favoured the arrival of the IMF, whose policies focus on minimum government 
involvement, and supply-and-demand based resource allocation. 
The IMF was an integral feature of the Thai economy during the following two years 
due to their two-tiered programme of stabilisation and reform. This was developed in 
negotiations involving the Thai government and the Bank of Thailand, through 
'Letters of Intent (Lol)'. The first Lol was signed on August 14 1997; there were 
eight Lol's in total, with the last dated September 21 1999. These Lol's were the 
primary means by which decisions, made between the IMF and the government, were 
communicated to the general public. They outlined targets, reforms and guidelines 
for the whole reform process, from social security safety nets, to monetary and 
exchange policies, and legal reform. 
As in the 1980s, the IMF demonstrated their support of the Thai economy with a 
financial reform package, this time of US$17 .2 billion. The IMF itself was 
responsible for US$4 billion, with the remainder generated mainly by Asian sources 
(Phongpaichit, 2000). Whilst the financial package was substantially less than the 
package offered to Mexico during the Peso crisis of 1994, it was very much an 
adaptation of those policies applied earlier in Latin America3. Pasuk explains: "in the 
Latin American experience, there would be some initial capital flight, but 
international confidence would return in six months. The IMF confidently predicted a 
similar effect in Thailand. It believed that the strict IMF package would itself 
contribute to stability by restoring confidence, stemming the capital outflows, and 
halting the currency's slide" (Phongpaichit, 2000:39). 
Unfortunately for both the IMF and the Thai economy the unfolding cns1s was 
undeterred by this restorative package. Many of the reforms outlined in the Lol's are 
either unaddressed, or still pending in Parliament, such as the privatisation of EGAT4 
as described in the Lol dated February 24 1998. Some of the reforms which have 
been initiated have been watered-down, for example the reform of bankruptcy policy. 
Some policies, such as further economic liberalisation, have simply been rejected. 
The truth is that despite the IMF encouraging these reforms, and achieving co-
operative signatures from Thai government ministers, they have not been efficiently 
channelled into the political and social economies. Various factors have played a part, 
although these have yet to be discussed in the academic literature. It is thus the role 
of the following research to ascertain why there have been such obstacles to reform, 
and what they are, with particular focus on the Thai banking sector. What has already 
been established in this chapter is that resistance to IMF policies existed at top 
government levels. This has been indicated by the government's implementation of 
3 See the Mexican crisis ( 1994) and the Chilean crisis ( 1982) for specific examples. 
4 EGAT (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) 
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market-'unfriendly' policies, such as the pegged exchange rate. Further obstacles, 
which will be discussed at length in the following chapters, are in the form of 
informational barriers and the Thai culture. It is therefore imperative to understand 
how the banking sector in Thailand has evolved since the 1990s to the current day. 
2.3: Banking on Thailand 
Although the Thai economy began its revolution in the 1980s, this change was 
predominantly structural, and the subtleties of policy change didn't undergo radical 
reform until the early 1990s; this is certainly the case with the banking sector. The 
acceptance of Article VIII in 1991 was arguably the cornerstone for Thai banking 
reform. Increasing domestic and new foreign demands on the Thai banks began to 
pose questions that the highly regulated, relationship-banking 5 network could not 
answer. Financial sector liberalisation was thus of paramount importance to the IMF, 
and indeed was regarded as underpinning the success of their export-orientated 
programme. 
As a result of Article VIII, and directed by the IMF and the Anand government, the 
banking sector underwent complete reform. Bello explains 
"a number of significant moves to open up the system were undertaken, 
including the removal of ceilings on various kinds of savings and time 
deposits; fewer constraints on the portfolio management of financial 
institutions and commercial banks such as replacing the reserve 
requirement ratio for commercial banks with the liquidity ratio; looser 
rules on capital adequacy; the expansion of the field of operations of 
commercial banks and financial institutions; the dismantling of many 
foreign exchange controls so that the public could freely purchase 
foreign exchange from the banks without prior approval from the 
authorities; and the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking 
Facility (BIBF)" (Bello, 1998:19-20). 
The establishment of the BillF was perhaps the most influential single event in the 
liberalisation of the Thai economy. The BIBF was set up in March 1993; its purpose 
was to transform Bangkok into an international centre of finance, increasing 
competition in the financial sector. It allowed both local and foreign banks to deposit 
and borrow foreign currencies, encouraging activities with concessions such as 
"reduction of corporate income tax, exemption from special business tax and 
withholding tax on interest income" (Vichyanand, 2000:8). The BIBF later extended 
credit availability nationwide, once the government approved the creation of branches 
across Thailand in May 1994. 
Further to this, the Securities and Exchange Act was passed in May 1992. Whilst 
there were many other reforms in banking policy, this, in conjunction with the 
establishment of the BIBF, played a major role in the economic boom of the 1990s. 
This new act entitled limited companies to issue common stock and debt instruments, 
such as bonds, to gain access to equity finance. As a result, foreign investment 
5 To fully understand what relationship banking is, see Arnold Boot's 2000 paper 'Relationship 
Banking: What do we know?' in Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, pages 7-25. 
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flooded into the Thai financial system. "In 1993, the inward flow of portfolio capital 
leapt to over ten times the average of the past five years" (Phongpaichit, 1996:39), 
and "in six years the number of listings had risen from 141 to 370 and market 
capitalization from 234 to 3,297 billion Bahf' (ibid.). With new sources of capital, 
and easy access to foreign finance through the BIBF, Thai domestic firms were awash 
with funds. "In 1989 the commercial banks' net borrowings abroad were only 15 
billion Baht. In 1994, with the advent of offshore banking, they jumped to 545 
billion" (ibid.:40). Table 2.1 below highlights the extent of the growing government 
debt problems. 
Domestic Debt (Baht bn) 
Central Government 
State Enterprises 
Foreign Debt (US$ bn) 
Public Sector 
Monetary Authorities 
fotal (Baht bn) 
1\.s% ofGDP 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
278.9 296.0 293.6 311.0 322.6 325.5 727.5 
202.7 161.1 103.2 72.7 44.3 31.8 426.9 
76.2 134.9 190.4 238.3 278.4 293.8 300.6 
13.1 14.2 15.7 16.4 16.8 17.2 20.3 
- - - - -
7.2 11.2 
611.5 655.5 689.6 720.5 749.4 1091.3 2037.2 
21.6 20.6 19.0 17.2 16.3 23.1 43.9 
Table 2.1: Levels of Government Debt 1992-1999 
Source: Bank of Thailand, cited from (Phongpaichit, 2000: 227) 
Thailand was developing at a phenomenal rate, with GDP in 1977 at US$19.8 billion, 
increasing over eight-fold to US$166.5 billion in 19956; the growth rates of 1994-
2004 are indicated by Chart 2.1 below: 
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Chart 2.1: Thai GDP Growth 1994-2004 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
6 Source: Euromonitor, International Marketing Data and Statistics /997 
13 
1999 
1,075.0 
642.2 
432.6 
23.7 
12.8 
2461.5 
52.5 
To put this level of growth in perspective, between 1980 and 1990 the share in 
developing-economy exports accounted for by Asian economies more than doubled, 
from 21.1 percent to 56.3 percent. Investment as a percentage of GDP, in Asia, 
fluctuated between 15 percent and 25 percent. Between 1988 and 1996, Thailand 
attracted approximately $10 billion per year, cumulatively amounting to over 50 
percent of its 1995 GDP (Khan, 2004). Predictions published in the 1996 Eighth 
National Development Plan forecast that by 2020 poverty in Thailand will be reduced 
to less than five percent of the population, and that the Thai economy will be the 
eighth largest in the world. 
The focus on export-orientation was persistent and in September 1993 the government 
established the Export-Import Bank of Thailand, again demonstrating its commitment 
to the programme of reform (Vichyanand, 1998:7). Further capital market reforms 
took place in 1993-4, with the introduction of a credit rating agency for listed 
corporations, 'Thai Rating and Information Services', and eventually technological 
capabilities facilitated financial transactions electronically with the creation of 
BAHTNET and THAICLEAR, electronic clearing networks (ibid.). 
The structure of the financial sector was heavily impacted by these radical reforms, 
and commercial banks conceded 6.5 percent of the share of household savings 
between 1989 and 1996 to finance companies and savings co-operatives. The share 
held by the Government Savings Bank fell from 8.80 percent to 5.20 percent during 
the same period. Commercial banks switched focus to fee-based activities, and 
endeavoured to cut operating costs in order to compete. 
Nonetheless, liberalisation and the Securities Act of 1992 meant the occurrence of 
banking events that the Thai banking sector had not seen before: surging investment 
spending, market speculation and current account deficits, not least of all imprudent, 
expanding credit availability and reduced risk aversion (Vichyanand, 2000). Thai 
commercial banks and finance companies were under extreme pressure. In many 
cases firms sought financing from abroad from developed countries who were able to 
cope with their demands. This was facilitated by the fixed currency peg, eliminating 
any exchange risk, and the additional benefits of the BffiF. Inevitably external debt 
became a huge problem, reaching US$94 billion in July 1997, from only US$29 
billion in 1990, which equates to total external debt outstanding representing 59 
percent ofGDP, from 34 percent respectively (Vichyanand, 1998). 
Banking failures are argued to be some of the principle causes of the 1997 crisis. 
Most of these failures were driven by the intensely competitive market that had 
emerged since liberalisation, in which few local firms could successfully keep up. 
For those that could not, the Bank of Thailand provided financial assistance. This was 
one flaw in the banking sector which greatly undermined the workings of the market 
system. By offering help, the Bank of Thailand was merely subsidising firms with 
low quality assets, and excessive credit liabilities and non-performing loans. To a 
certain extent the sector was over-banked with poor quality financial institutions and 
insufficient liquidity. 
Further pressure was exerted on the banks due to the increasing burden of foreign debt. 
This was particularly important, as from 1995, the US dollar, against which the Baht 
was pegged, had begun to appreciate significantly. In the two years before the crisis, 
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the US dollar had appreciated 28 percent against the Deutschmark, and 38 percent 
against the Yen. As a result, the Baht surged in value also, which given the level of 
its current account deficit, and the increasing fragility of the banking sector, only 
weakened the Thai export market, and compelled investors to invest more cheaply in 
other foreign currencies. 
The devaluation of the Baht was inevitable, with the cost of defending the over-
inflated currency wiping out all of the Bank of Thailand's foreign reserves. Many 
foreign financial firms famously benefited from this, such as George Soros' Quantum 
Fund, who some argue induced speculative attacks to pre-empt the devaluation. 
However domestically, the impact of both the devaluation, and the collapse of the 
asset bubble which had developed over the previous decade, caused major damage to 
Thai banks. With many investments imprudently tied up in real estate, whose values 
had evaporated over night, non-performing loans (NPLs) surged. 
The banking sector again underwent reshaping, with the creation of government 
restructuring firms to take over ailing banks and finance companies, such as the 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority, the Asset Management Corporation and the 
Property Loan Management Organization. Fifty-six finance companies were ordered 
to close by the government, although speculators believe this was prompted by the 
IMF upon their arrival in July 1997. On the closure of these firms, the Bank of 
Thailand adopted their debts, providing guarantees for both their creditors and their 
debtors. This effectively shifted the debt burden away from the private sector and 
onto the government. 
The IMF' s rescue package of 1997 was conditional on the reform of the financial 
system, as well as fundamental reforms in other sectors. The key financial sector 
reforms were "adoption of international standards for asset clarification, loan-loss 
provisions, capital adequacy, bankruptcy, and deposit insurance" (Vichyanand, 
1998:30). These have been implemented with varying degrees of success, due to a 
variety of factors explained in subsequent chapters. The banking sector in Thailand 
today is vastly different from the antiquated system in place before the crisis. Thai 
banks are increasing in size, value and the number of facilities they offer, to the extent 
that they are able to compete fairly with the foreign banks in Thailand and around 
Asia. Some Thai banks now even have overseas branches in the US and Europe, for 
example the Siam Commercial Bank. However some have also failed to overcome 
the NPL issue after the crisis, and mergers between state-owned banks haven't always 
been successful, the Krung Thai Bank being a good example of this. This is looked at 
in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Much has been written on the changing shape of the Thai financial system; however 
insufficient attention has been paid to the policy implementation within it. Closer 
analysis will provide answers to some of the key broader questions governing this 
research, such as 'to what extent have banking policies prescribed by the IMF been 
implemented directly and efficiently by the Thai government?', and 'what have been 
the consequences of re-worked banking policies within Thailand, in economtc, 
political and social guises?' 
Nevertheless, the sector is still evolving and reforms are on-going. This will be 
discussed much later in the concluding chapters. The lessons to learn from 
15 
liberalising an economy, of which financial liberalisation is an integral part, are 
numerous. There is no 'quick-fit' model to suit any country, and each case study, be 
it Mexico, Thailand, Russia or more recently Argentina, reveals this clearly. 
2.4: Conclusion 
This chapter has looked in detail at three fundamental parts of the crisis history, of 
which an understanding is vital to fully appreciate the context of the following 
research. The theory behind the Washington Consensus helps to explain the rationale 
behind many of the IMF's policies; these will be scrutinised in Chapter 4. 
Understanding the legacy of IMF involvement in Thailand also helps to illustrate the 
bigger picture of the crisis, by considering the role of IMF policies in the initial boom 
period experience in the early 1990s, and not just in the recovery stages of 1997-2000. 
The banking sector will be a central focus of this research, as a case study of specific 
policy implementation. To fully value the crisis-related reforms in this sector, as 
discussed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, it is imperative to recognise the characteristics of the 
pre-crisis banking sector, as outlined in this chapter. 
The three subjects discussed in this chapter represent only a fraction of the issues 
drawn out of the Asian crisis. The objective for this chapter is to provide an overview 
of the three key issues governing this history of the Asian crisis, and the role of the 
IMF, of which an understanding is required to fully appreciate the outcomes of the 
following research findings. 
The first chapter concerning this debate is Chapter 4, which looks more closely at the 
issue of policy appropriateness. Previously it was mentioned that substantial criticism 
exists regarding the extent to which the IMF's policies were sufficiently tailored to 
the crisis faced in Asia, and more specifically Thailand. This chapter will also aim to 
demonstrate that successful changes in the banking sector have predominantly been 
internally driven by banks, and not state-, nor IMF-directed. The following chapter 
will consider the methodology required to investigate the answers to the research 
questions. 
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THE METHODOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGE 
The East Asian crisis is almost eight years old. It is arguably the most important 
event in Asian economic history. A plethora of documentation, literature, analysis 
and debate has been produced pertaining to the events of the late 1990s. Typing 'the 
East Asian crisis' into Google1 returns 3,950,000 results. This perhaps signals that the 
impact of this issue is vast. There is not one conclusive report which condenses the 
event to a few points of discussion, nor a few 'lessons learnt'. The crisis offers no 
text-book analysis of economic policy, no case-study of 'what not to do'. The 
particulars of 'what happened?', 'why?' and 'who is to blame?' are still some of the 
most contentious in modem economic history. 
Narratives of the crisis are have evolved over time. The stories told shortly after the 
crisis scarcely compare to those told a few years later, and even today new 
information and new perspectives are being drawn. Competing interpretations of the 
crisis hardly facilitate piecing together the puzzle that is the chain of events, as there 
is no 'absolute truth' as to what happened. It is the role of the social scientist to 
amalgamate the accounts, to decipher meaning, and offer explanations. This can best 
be done using qualitative sources and comparing these with given empirical accounts. 
Rather than focusing on the East Asian Crisis in its entirety, this research, as outlined 
in the introduction, aims to focus on why International Monetary Fund programme 
reforms have not been efficiently implemented in the Thai banking sector. 
3.1: The Methodological Challenge 
The target seems almost unrealistic: given seven weeks in Bangkok, speaking no Thai 
and armed with a frugal budget, a representative sample of domestic and international 
views on the unfolding of the crisis and the events in the banking sector needs to be 
collected. This methodology chapter will outline the 'why's, the 'how's and 
limitations involved in gathering a wide spectrum of opinion, and will describe the 
issues related to my personal experience of carrying out qualitative research. 
*** 
According to the literature, qualitative research methodologies concern themselves 
with "elucidating human environments and human experiences within a variety of 
conceptual frameworks" (Winchester 2000: 3-4). Indeed there are multiple 
contrasting methodologies associated with qualitative research in human geography, 
as "contemporary human geographers study places, people, bodies, discourses, 
silenced voices and fragmented landscapes. The research questions of today 's human 
geographers require a multiplicity of conceptual approaches and methods of enquiry" 
(ibid.:2). 
Yet by far the most popular qualitative research method of enquiry is the interview. 
Briggs ( 1986) indicates that of all social science surveys, in excess of 90% relied on 
interviewing for their data collection, in order to "explore the feelings, understandings 
and know/edges of others through interviews, discussions or participant observation" 
(Dwyer and Limb 2001: 1 ). Holstein and Gubrium state that interviews provide 
"windows on the world" (1995:2). 
1 Google - The internet based search engine; search ran on Tuesday I Oth May 2005 
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This research requires a thorough understanding of processes and interpersonal 
communication. These cannot be assessed quantitatively and equally, cannot be fully 
evaluated by many other forms of qualitative research methodologies, such as surveys 
or participatory research. To achieve a comprehensive appreciation of past 
occurrences, decisions and atmospheres, there is a need to question people who 
experienced the reforms under debate; hence interviewing is central to this research. 
3.2: To interview. or not to interview? 
Whilst interviewing seems to provide a logical solution to the methodological 
challenge presented by this research, it does have its complications and disadvantages. 
Interviewing as a methodology is documented in a wealth of research literature, 
concerning interview processes (Gorden 1969, McCracken 1988, Oppenheim 1993, 
Rapely 2004), questioning (Dilley 2000, Douglas 1985, Fontana 2000, McCormack 
2004), interview analysis (Brenner 1985b, Cawthorne 2001, Mostyn 1985) and 
positionality (Briggs 1986, Johansen and Steele 1999, Oldfield 1947, Schmalz 2000). 
This section endeavours to give a brief overview of the benefits and disadvantages 
associated with interviewing as a research methodology. By no means is this 
discussion exhaustive, however further treatment is offered by the aforementioned 
sources, and many more besides. 
Described as "a conversation with a purpose" (Eyles 1988), the interview can be a 
rich resource of qualitative data; data which is unreachable with alternative 
methodologies. It provides the opportunity for personal accounts of events, and 
allows the researcher to engage in 'wide-ranging discussion' (Flowerdew 2005). 
Unlike questionnaires, interviews permit the researcher to investigate themes 
thoroughly, rewording and clarifying questions, rather than providing standardised 
lines of interrogation, and thus providing 'a deeper picture' (Silverman 1993, 2001). 
Silverman also highlights the additional benefit that interviewees themselves may 
raise issues of debate which the researcher may not have anticipated (Silverman 1993, 
2001). 
Interviews also allow the researcher to deal with cultural differences and language 
barriers. These issues cannot always be addressed with questionnaires, or written 
communication, as respondents may not be able to read or understand. In the most 
difficult of scenarios, interpreters can be used to help. This very personal approach is 
also important when dealing with delicate issues, which questionnaires or 
correspondence-based questioning may not give enough sensitivity to. Some issues 
may not be particularly sensitive, but may be complex, and interview time gives 
respondents the opportunity to communicate information they may not otherwise be 
able to. 
'To avoid bias, the interviewing must be done non-directively. That is, the interviewer, 
whatever questioning technique he/she may be using, must leave it entirely to the 
informant to provide answers to questions.' (Brenner 1985a). This is critical if the 
data are to be reliable, yet Watson and Weinberg point out the impossibility of 
interviewer neutrality, 'however, actually 'being neutral' in any conventional sense is 
actually impossible- interviewers are always active' (Watson 1982). This point of 
view is upheld mainly by humanist geographers, and those from the post-structuralist 
school, who believe that complete objectivity in research is almost impossible to 
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attain. Thus, when considering the extent of objectivity in research, one must take 
into account the impacts of reflexivity and positionality. 
As a social scientist engaging in in-depth interviews, it is imperative to remember that 
one's own identity will play a role in shaping the interaction with the respondents. 
This is where interviewing becomes a very sensitive process, much more so than 
questionnaire surveying. As Oppenheim elaborates: 
'each interviewer must realize ... that she creates an immediate impression on a 
potential respondent even before she opens her mouth, and that this impression 
may determine the success or failure of an interview or whether an interview 
takes place at all. If an interview does take place, then the first impression 
made by the interviewer will be augmented by her apparent age, her hair style, 
her ethnicity, any cues about her education and social background, and, of 
course, her sex in short, her whole 'presentation of self' will have an influence 
on her respondents' (1993). 
The role of positionality has become increasingly popular in qualitative research 
debate (England 1994, McDowell 1992, Mohammad 2001, Morris-Roberts 2001, 
Schoenberger 1992). 
McDowell stresses the importance of positionality, "we must recognize and take 
account of our own position, as well as that of our research participants, and write 
this into our research practice rather than continue to hanker after some idealized 
equality between us" (McDowell 1992:409). How positionality affected this research 
project will be discussed shortly. 
3.3: To record. or not to record? 
Reality television-shows today illustrate the changing role of an individual when 
placed in front of a camera. Whilst videoing an interview allows one to capture body 
language and voice tones, it influences behaviour; taping interviews does also have a 
similar effect. Taping requires permission from informants, and they may be less 
likely to impart certain information should they believe that one will 'misuse the 
information as this is a 'permanent record' that they could be identified through at a 
later point' (Rapely 2004). It is vital to remember that "the respondent's right to 
privacy and the right to refuse to answer certain questions, or to be interviewed at all, 
should always be respected, and no undue pressure should be brought to bear" 
(Oppenheim 1993). This is especially important in this research, as many of the 
questions ask for possibly controversial opinions on politically volatile topics, the 
sensitivity of which is enhanced by the timing of the interviews, during the Thai 2005 
elections. 
Gorden asserts, "the task of accurately receiving information can be broken down into 
several specific skills. It involves (a) accurately hearing what the respondent has said, 
(b) observing the respondent's non-symbolic behaviour, and (c) remembering 
information received" (Gorden 1969). This is made harder without a taping facility, 
yet the essence of the interviews will be of greater importance to this research than 
individual words and statements, and thus trading-off encouraging the respondents to 
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speak more freely, recording will serve no net-benefit. The consequence of this is that 
effective and efficient note-taking is vital to the data collection. 
Schoepfle and Werner discuss the benefits of ethnographic debriefing as a tool to 
complement interviewing 'in situations or descriptions of events in which recording is 
not possible or permitted' (Schoepfle and Werner 1999). They explain the process of 
self-debriefing as an aid to providing 'valuable contextual information that often 
cannot be obtained any other way' (1999:163), whereby the interviewer records 
details of the sequence of events, and the context in which the initial interview was 
conducted, and then, with use of hand-written notes taken during the interviews, can 
go on to develop a better account and analysis of the details within it. I adopted this 
in conjunction with preliminary memory training, improving memory recall, as 
outlined by Werner in his 1999 paper. This also links to Alexiadou's notion of 
creating a post-interview transcript, which 'involves deconstructing the interview, 
trying to make sense of meanings, and then re-constructing the data into the form of 
an account' (Alexiadou 2001). 
3.4: Interviewing: An Effective Methodology? 
There are many different styles of interviewing, however having assessed the areas 
that need probing and the type of information required from the interviews, it became 
apparent that a form of interview structure is required and well-researched questions 
would need to be asked. Semi-structured interviewing was identified as the most 
appropriate technique to adopt, defined as "an interview agenda shaped by the 
operationalization of the research questions, but retaining an open-ended, and 
flexible nature. The intention is to allow the interviewees to 'define' the situation on 
the basis of their own experience and so to focus on what they consider relevant" 
(Alexiadou, 2001: 1 ). 
To ensure that the interview time was most efficiently used, Kvale's advice was taken, 
recognising the importance of preparation. He outlines three resources required to 
increase the likelihood of a successful interview. Firstly he discusses the benefits of 
sufficient time. This refers to the amount of time available to a researcher for their 
study, and equally the amount of time the respondent will have to give, as these both 
play critical roles in the quality of an interview. In line with this not only are the 
interviews organised after sufficient background research, but the interviews have a 
duration of one hour - enough time to accommodate planned questions and also 
adequate time to stimulate discussion. 
Secondly he explains that funding is also influential for many reasons, yet principally 
it constrains the quantity and quality of interviewees by limiting access to them. In 
this research it is extremely important as the key individuals concerned are 
predominantly based in Bangkok in Thailand. Travelling to, and spending sufficient 
time in, Bangkok, facilitating such interviews, incurs a large expense. Financing also 
restrains the ability to access information, confining the scope of secondary resources 
used in both the planning of interview questions and analysis of interview results. 
Budget constraints have therefore been a significant limitation to this research. 
Kvale's third point is perhaps his most important; the role of expertise. He states 
"good interviews require expertise - in both subject matter and human interaction" 
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(Kvale 1996: 103). Under-preparation pertaining to subject matter can be very 
apparent in the questions asked by the researcher, and the channels they choose to 
follow. If the respondent is very knowledgeable, a lack of expertise will be obvious to 
them and this will likely influence the information given or the extent to which they 
will be willing to help. In the worst case, the researcher may not be aware that their 
line of investigation might not provide the correct answer to their underlying research 
question. This research uses secondary literature resources to develop the questions 
for the interviews, ensuring that both the right questions are posed, and to the right 
people. This is demonstrated by the interview checklist, Table 3.1, below. 
Institution Type Institution Name Name of Interviewee 
Government Bank of Thailand Anonymous (1) 
Bank of Thailand Anonymous (2) 
Democrat Party Professor Kriengsak 
Domestic Bank Siam Commercial Bank Dr Veerathai Santiprabhob 
Foreign Bank Citigroup Tohphan Tuchinda 
NGO Focus on the Global South Chanida Bamford 
Focus on the Global South Soontaree 
Civil Society Democratic Confederation Weng Tojirakam 
Research Council TDRI:l Dr Pakom Vichyanand 
TDRI Dr Chalongphob 
Sussangkam 
Local Press Bangkok Post Miranda Schoonavelt 
The Nation Anonymous (3) 
Academic Chulalongkom University Thitinan Pongsudhirak 
Table 3.1: List of interviewees and their respective institutions 
People management, with professionals, students or senior academics, requires a 
multiplicity of social skills. Experience in this field is a key determinant in both 
finding participants, and indeed is also critical during the interview itself. To ensure 
this is not a constraint, processes developed by other successful researchers were 
employed, and relationships with interviewees were fostered over time. The latter 
was aided by sending out interview questions in advance of interviews, to allow the 
respondents to comprehend the line of research, and accordingly develop their 
answers and opinions. Indeed, to facilitate the interviews further for the respondents, 
the interview locations were at their convenience, ensuring the process was as 
straightforward for them as possible. 
In order to reduce issues of positionality, various methodological precautions need to 
be taken. The attire for the research interviews was formal, as most of the 
respondents were high profile bankers, politicians, or academics. This 
professionalized my appearance to ensure I was taken seriously. This is important as I 
would have been judged as a young, white, European female, however exactly how 
this bias affected my interview data is impossible to assess. Equally bias results from 
respondents too, who represent various organisations and whose thoughts and views 
have been shaped by their backgrounds and educational history. To ensure a 
representative range of views, I have selected my interviewees from a variety of 
2 TDRI: Thailand Development Research Institute 
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institutions, ranging from Government, banks, to civil society groups and charities. 
The onus is then on me as a researcher to analyse their views and experiences 
accounting for their personal attributes, such as employment or academic background. 
It is important to recognise bias occurs outside of the interview as much as within it. 
Content analysis, like the interview process as a whole, is subject to flaws, 
misinterpretation, and subjectivity. This undermines Gorden's definition of reliability, 
as stated earlier, but it is crucial to recognise that different researchers, no matter how 
impartial and objective, will always influence the elucidation of their research 
findings. Crang (2001) learnt from his own research that "any idea that interpretation 
was passive or transparent was quickly dispelled by the graft involved. I could hardly 
claim that the products were pristine or 'untouched"' (Crang, 2001:224). It is 
therefore important to corroborate my findings with existing empirical facts, derived 
from my secondary resource database. 
3.5: Interviewing in Bangkok 
Despite thorough planning and background research into the technique of successful 
interviewing, actually implementing a methodology in the field invariably involves 
constraints, limitations and resulting methodological adaptation. This section will 
discuss how different the process was when interviewing in Bangkok, and how I dealt 
with practical difficulties when collecting my interview data. 
Before arriving in Thailand I had failed to fully appreciate the role of culture in 
undertaking research in a foreign country. Thai culture is very complex and impacts 
on day-to-day activity in ways I had not fully appreciated. Before even arranging 
interviews, let alone carrying them out, I encountered the issue of communication. In 
Europe it is standard practice to receive emails and respond accordingly. Indeed 
electronic communication is now one of the most practised forms of communication 
in many societies. In Thailand however it is not unheard of to never receive replies, 
even if questions have been sent, or organisational matters have been queried. As a 
result much of my interview organisation was done by telephone in the first week of 
my arrival in Bangkok. This obviously meant no interviews could be organised in the 
first week of my fieldwork, which added greater time pressure to data collection. 
The second communication issue that arose was more obviously my lack of facility 
with the Thai language. Not only is this a limitation to the overall research project, as 
it inhibits my potential interviewees, as most workers, peasants and businessmen 
don't speak English, but it was also an organisational hindrance. In many cases high 
profile individuals who did speak English often had non-English speaking secretaries, 
or switchboard operators. More often than not I was eventually put through to an 
English-speaker but in the worst cases Thai speakers at the university I worked at 
explained my requirements in Thai, and arranged the meetings for me. This problem 
restricted access to important individuals. Access was also restricted logistically, with 
many key respondents in difficult locations to reach, and many local taxi drivers were 
unfamiliar with particular areas. Language barriers again played a role, as few taxi 
drivers spoke English, and in many cases individual addresses would need to be 
written out in Thai before I could embark on such journeys. In many cases I could 
work around these issues, and table 1.1 shows the list of people interviewed. These 
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interviewees are representative of the most prominent institutions involved in banking 
sector reform, as indicated by extensive secondary research. 
Once in contact with the individuals, the planning generally worked well. In all cases 
I was able to have at least an hour of the respondents' time, and they had all read the 
questions in advance of the interview, and there was little problem in understanding, 
which was important to ensure reliable responses. Most individuals interviewed 
empathised with myself as a student researcher, and I feel that my identity in no way 
obstructed the information I received. However this highlights that most English-
speaking representatives were well educated and of esteemed background, thus 
inferring that linguistic constraints severely affected the extent of fair-representation 
of excluded groups, who didn't fit this category, yet may have been useful 
contributors to this research. This is where I believe the press and other print 
resources, which reflect views of excluded groups, play an important role in balancing 
my research. 
Since there were cases where the interviewees requested anonymity, I believe it was 
important that I had not chosen to record interviews. Most respondents were keen to 
give their views, regardless of how sensitive, or extreme, but often they reinforced 
that they didn't want any lasting traces of our conversation to be made public. For 
those who did use electronic communication, much conversing was done via non-
corporate email accounts so that they could reduce the risk of being traced. 
3.6: Secondary Resources: Supporting Findings 
Secondary literature necessary for an appropriate evaluation of the Thai economic 
crisis, the reforms, localised opinions and processes, can be subdivided into three 
types. The first secondary literature subset is academic literature, written more 
theoretically, with viewpoints derived from academic backgrounds, and in many cases 
within the intellectual milieu of Western scholarship. This will include a variety of 
Thai and international literature, however as for all my literature analysis, this will be 
limited to literature written in the English language. 
The second subset of literature is that of the domestic and international press. For the 
period of 7 weeks, throughout my research period in Bangkok, the English language 
press was the focus of my 'on-the-ground' analysis, reporting throughout the election 
campaign on reform and post-crisis developments. The Bangkok Post and The Nation 
are the two sources, with The Nation having a reputation of being the more liberal 
paper. The benefits of using local press reports are important. Firstly, they represent 
current public opinion, or a subset of it, in the face of topical political discussions, and 
secondly they are more emotive than academic literature, and perhaps capture a better 
sense of atmosphere and attitude, than facts and theoretical arguments. They also 
offer current statistics, and interviews and opinions from key individuals I myself was 
not be able to interview. 
Finally 'grey literature' is also involved in this research. Unpublished works of 
various academics regarding this research topic have proved very useful, as will be 
discussed in the analysis of the research findings. Other documentation, such as in-
house company publications and presentation slides, has also been collected, and 
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provides information not publicly available, on the role of the crisis and reforms and 
how they influence the way banks are run. 
As the secondary resource dataset is critical in shaping my interview questions, 
helping evaluate who to interview and authenticate facts, I will differentiate data 
sources to balance viewpoints. It is important to understand papers and discussions 
put forward by domestic, as well as international writers, reflecting a range of 
different schools of thought. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank will also have their views represented alongside Asian social welfare 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Focus on the Global South, and the 
Thai-based Democratic Confederation. 
As discussed earlier regarding interviewing, the secondary resources are subject to 
limitations, which play a role in shaping my conclusions. Issues of time and 
accessibility mean that not all resources are available to me at ease, with most of the 
key resources scattered around both the UK, and more restrictively, some are only 
available in Thailand. Indeed as discussed earlier, funding too is a key constraint. 
Thus my secondary resource dataset is not a measure of all the current related texts 
available, and by no means reflects a comprehensive set of opinion-diversity, but at 
least attempts to, given the research boundaries which govern this research. 
In the field accessing libraries varied in difficulty due to appropriate identification 
issues (not being a Thai student). Often language barriers complicated research 
findings, with some libraries being 'closed shelf' and library personnel not always 
having even a rudimentary understanding of English. Some libraries had very limited 
opening hours, and in others access to some documents was only possible after paying 
a fee. 
3.7: Conclusion 
Designing the methodology of a research project is critical; it shapes the data from 
which one draws conclusions. The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate the great 
lengths taken to ensure a suitable and well-researched methodology, learning from 
other social scientists' work and advice. This chapter also explained how things 
needed to adapt once in the field. 
I believe that the methodology outlined in this chapter proved to be appropriate for the 
research project, and any constraints were worked around. With these methodological 
issues and limitations in mind, I hope to demonstrate that my datasets shed light on 
the informational, political and cultural constraints on implementing banking reforms 
in Thailand after the 1997 collapse of the Thai Baht. 
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ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT 
ALL 
"For too long the IMF has gone about its business, dictating economic policy to any 
country unfortunate enough to need its money, without any inclination to engage in 
open debate about what it does, how it makes decisions, and whose interests it is 
serving." (Masina, 2002) 
One of the more common critiques of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
questions the suitability of the conditions included in its recovery packages provided 
to countries in crisis. The citation above from Masina portrays a common sentiment 
that the IMF acts like a 'black box' into which vast streams of information and 
funding are channelled into it, producing unexplained generic policies. Robert 
Kuttner famously described the IMF as 'the premier instrument of deflation, as well 
as the most powerful unaccountable institution in the world '(cited in Johnson, 
1998:653). This chapter will consider the following questions: to what extent are IMF 
policies and conditions tailor-made to each situation? How did the IMF 'tailor' their 
policies to the Thai situation and to what extent were they 'suitable' policies for 
Thailand? This chapter will also investigate whether the policies implemented in the 
Thai banking sector were properly followed through, and how this impacted the 
fragility of the banking system. 
4.1: 'One Size Fits All' 
"IMF-supported programs are probably the institution 's most visible activity and 
affect a wide range of countries. Over the last decade, with the decline in communism 
and the deepening of economic crises in many emerging market economies, some 90 
countries have become involved in various IMF-supported economic adjustment 
programs" (Ramcharan, 2003: 1 ). The IMF should have had much experience of 
diagnosing crisis causes and equally of designing recovery packages. However as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, not all crises are the same, and thus individual 
attention is required in each case to provide specific country-sensitive solutions. 
IMF research papers do emphasise the importance of country-specific programme 
design. In their 2002 paper 'IMF-Supported Programs in Capital Account Crises', 
which assesses eight capital account crises of the 1990s, Ghosh et al. state "given the 
differences in their origins, IMF-supported programs in capital account crisis were 
confronted with challenges that differed considerably from those of more traditional 
IMF programs' (Ghosh et al., 2002:1 ). The paper also highlights awareness of the 
'one size fits all' critique, as it considers whether 'the crisis cases raise issues of 
whether the policy response in the context of IMF-supported programs took adequate 
account of what was distinctive about these crises' (ibid.). 
The IMF does have a 'traditional' 10-point plan for bank crises, made up of an acute 
crisis phase (measures to stop panic), a stabilisation phase (restructuring), and a 
recovery phase (normalising the system). This is very much at the heart of all the 
programmes it implements (IMF, 1999:6). Whilst the IMF acknowledges that this 10-
point plan is the keystone of their crisis recovery policies, they are keen to show that 
individual response plans are developed as a result of interaction with local authorities, 
and after careful analysis of the given situation. In light of the Asian crisis the IMF 
underscores that 'although the IMF was able to draw on both its past experience and 
its analytical work, the specific circumstances of each country added dimensions that 
required careful tailoring of the reform and resolution strategies for each country, 
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often taking into account the authorities' sometimes strong preferences' (IMF, 
1999:7). 
The extent of IMF tailoring and success of their plans are nonetheless heavily 
criticised by many prominent economists: 'structural adjustment caused economies to 
'fall into a hole' wherein low investment, reduced social spending, reduced 
consumption, and low output interacted to create a vicious cycle of decline and 
stagnation, rather than a virtuous circle of growth, rising employment, and rising 
investment, as originally envisaged by World Bank-IMF theory' (Bello, 2000:3) Even 
the IMF themselves agree there would be less debate about their role in the global 
economy if their programmes had more clear-cut success (Ramcharan, 2003). 
Perhaps what makes this issue even more sensitive is that many critics talk of the IMF 
'dictating' such policies, where the crisis countries have little say or influence in 
designing their own reform packages. As Stiglitz explains, 'the IMF is not 
particularly interested in hearing the thoughts of its "client countries" on such topics 
as development strategy or fiscal austerity. All too often, the Fund's approach to 
developing countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler' (Stiglitz, 2002: 40). 
Some critics seek to explain the lack of suitability of the IMF's policy design by 
inferring that the IMF has a hidden agenda: 'the US response to the crises, inherent in 
IMF policy, has been to liberalise trade, deregulate financial markets and enhance 
disclosure rules. All, by happy coincidence, coincide with the broader aims of US 
economic diplomacy in the region' (Higgott and Phillips, 1999). Some critics go so 
far as discussing the idea of a conspiracy theory behind the Asian crisis; this is best 
discussed by Bello (1998). 
Higgott and Phillips discuss the 'textbook' nature of IMF policies, with models being 
at the centre of their policy initiatives, even though many are based on unrealistic 
assumptions, 
'The conceptual biases inherent in the IMF's treatment of Asia are already 
apparent in its emerging Latin American strategy, and the IMF certainly 
has not altered its approach in response to its experiences in Asia. What is 
needed, Latin Americans increasingly argue, is a novel approach to global 
financial and economic governance which displays flexibility and 
imagination -- 'intelligent solutions', in short, 'even if they don't feature in 
Economics books'. The present approach of the IMF and the US 
government departs almost not at all from the line they have been peddling 
for the last decade' (Higgott and Phillips, 1999:40-41). 
Arguments regarding unsuitable policies also take the contrasting view that in fact the 
textbooks were required, simply because the steps taken by the IMF were so lacking 
in common sense, 'why did the high-powered economists near the top of the IMF and 
the Treasury, as soon as they encountered a crisis, throw away the textbooks indeed, 
do almost the opposite of what the textbooks would have suggested?' (Krugman cited 
in Nairn, 2000). Here, Krugman infers that fundamental economic theory suggests 
measures, such as floating the exchange rate and allowing flexible rates of interest, 
which would have eased many of the problems which exacerbated the economic and 
social downturn. For example, flexible interest rates would have made debt burdens 
for bankrupt firms and individuals much less painful than they were. These 
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implications suggest almost a sense of panic on behalf of the IMF; the IMF plan these 
market-friendly initiatives but as soon as a crisis hits, they abandon all the books and 
theories they had previously clung to, implementing recovery programmes based on 
entirely different logic. This lack of consistency, which Krugman argues is more a 
lack of common sense, does little to restore confidence in the work of the IMF. 
Regardless of the exact line of attack, the conclusion to draw from these well-
publicised critiques is that whilst debate still continues over what exactly is wrong 
with IMF policies, the consensus remains that they are definitely not suitable for 
salvaging ailing economies in crisis. This is obviously in direct contradiction to the 
views of the IMF, who publicly declare that their policies are custom-made to each 
cnsts. 
4.2: Thailand: Made to Fit? 
'Stiglitz accused the Fund of seriously misdiagnosing the nature of the East Asian 
crisis and of continuing to design conditionality as if one size fitted all. He argued 
that Fund conditionality had a perverse effect and came close to suggesting that the 
Fund was incompetent and closed to criticism, even when it came from the World 
Bank' (Bird, 2001). 
The East Asian crisis has become one of the most common examples used in critiques 
of the IMF. Many argue that the policies implemented and the behaviour of the IMF 
directly contradicts the claims made by the IMF about their dedication to tailor-made 
reform packages, country-specific expertise and advice, and their claim to work with 
and listen to national agencies. What is also both surprising and extremely important, 
is the high profile of the key critics of the IMF, such as former Chief Economist at the 
World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, and the prominent Professor in International Trade at 
Harvard University, Jeffery Sachs- renowned as a 'transition guru'. However, if the 
East Asian example is so important in challenging the claims of the IMF, then to what 
extent did the IMF really tailor their recovery programme to national characteristics 
and exigencies? 
The IMF emphasises that 'strategies must be adapted to fit countries' circumstances. 
Systematic bank restructuring is a complex medium-term process that requires careful 
tailoring' (IMF, 1999:5). In my interview with the Bank of Thailand, their 
representative spoke of the composition of the IMF team which came to implement 
the Thai reform package; 'they have 'area departments' and so the fund sent 
people who knew Thailand, and were country specialists. Area departments are 
split by geographies, and have desk economists. This was important as the 
process needed to be tailor-made' (Bank of Thailand Interview, 2005). The 
representative continued to describe how the IMF team was made up of senior IMF 
executives, such as Hubert Neiss, director of the Asia and Pacific department at the 
IMF who later stepped down from this position in 2000, as well as his team of 
'Thailand specialists', all of whom arrived dressed in intimidating formal suits in an 
atmosphere of significant tension (ibid.). 
Despite these claims, there is an overwhelming array of critics of the IMF's role in 
Thailand. Even the Bank of Thailand representative contextualised the 'tailor-made 
specialist team' of the IMF, stating 'admittedly when the process started it was the 
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stereotypical belt-tightening associated with the fund. Hence the anecdote "IMF: 
Its Mostly Fiscal" -their policy is always fiscal belt-tightening' (Bank of Thailand 
Interview, 2005). Upon asking about the exact procedure of these discussions I was 
told 'the meetings were not chaired. The IMF set the agenda. They presented 
their policy options and gave the Bank of Thailand the chance to comment on 
them. The IMF stressed the need of international credibility, and thus upon 
queries by the Bank the fund reminded them that they needed to convince the 
international community that Thailand was determined to reform and adhere to 
strict policies expected by the rest of the world, and thus although the Bank may 
have not liked all the policies, it was important they undertook them to regain 
international credibility' (ibid.). This certainly presents the case that there was 
indeed very little 'discussion' between the Bank and the IMF, with the IMF implying 
that without following their painful recovery programmes, Thailand would not regain 
credibility. This is completely contradicted by the success of Malaysia, now a 
booming economy growing at 7.1% in 2004 (GDP estimate1) with few scars left by 
the crisis - all without any IMF intervention. 
These reports are supported by Joseph Stiglitz, as he makes very clear his opinion of 
the IMP's policies in East Asia with his chapter title 'The East Asian Crisis: How 
IMF Policies Brought the World to the Verge of a Global Meltdown' in his book 
'Globalisation and Its Discontents'. Stiglitz demonstrates the extent of dictating 
adopted by the IMF, in accordance with the Bank of Thailand's evidence, when 
imposing their reform package, 'officially, the "ceremony" was the signing of a letter 
of agreement, an agreement effectively dictated by the IMF, though it often still keeps 
up the pretence that the letter of intent comes from the country's government!' 
(Stiglitz, 2002:41 ), and he continues 'the IMF, of course, claims that it never dictates 
but always negotiates the terms of any loan agreement with the borrowing country' 
(ibid.:42). In light of the above accounts of the exact proceedings between the Bank 
of Thailand and the IMF it is easy to see why Stiglitz finds these claims so farcical. 
Many critics argue there was nothing 'new' nor 'custom-made' about the policies 
prescribed by the IMF for Asia, 
'IMF prescriptions for the Asian rescue drew on a western understanding of 
liberalisation, involving packages of domestic austerity and financial 
restructuring intended to cut demand and liquidity. As such, they were not 
new. They were tried and tested initially in Latin America and Africa where 
the principal economic ills were large budget deficits, high inflation and 
massively indebted public sectors' (Higgott and Phillips, 1999). 
In an interview with Dr Kriengsak, the Executive Director at the Institute of Future 
Studies for Development in Bangkok, he stated 'after considering the role of the 
IMF to monitor national fiscal and monetary policy that suffered in the crisis of 
1997 and spread to Russia and Latin America later, my opinion was that the 
IMF had likely applied the same formative policy to every country that entered 
into the financial and academic aid programs of IMF' (Dr Kriengsak 
Chareonwongsak, 2005). He uses this to suggest the potential for a conspiracy, as 
mentioned earlier, 'the IMF focused on inflation controls by implementing 
1 Source: CIA World Factbook 2005 
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economic policies for shrinkage, which further led towards economic recession, 
and business bankruptcy due to loss of liquidity, and high unemployment ... But 
the IMF still carried on as an instrument of the superpowers to coerce the 
member countries to operate the policy under Washington's consensus, which 
would later lead to takeovers made by multinational corporations' (ibid.). Dr 
Kriengsak thus appears to infer a 'hidden agenda' behind the actions of the IMF, 
which, as mentioned earlier, Bello (1998) touches upon in his work. A second point 
to be drawn from this comment is Dr Kriengsak's criticism of the overuse of anti-
inflation policies, which he suggests worsened the state of recession; an indication 
that perhaps the IMF's recovery policies weren't necessarily appropriate. 
Views of this nature are rife and, more importantly, are upheld by pivotal members of 
the academic community. Stiglitz points to the 'one-size-fits-all' approach as a 
seminal cause of the financial crises, with particular emphasis on the mismanagement 
of interest rates; Jeffery Sachs, former advisor to the IMF, World Bank, OECD and 
the UN, took this a stage further inferring the IMF endeavoured to create a favourable 
environment for short-term finance managers, again through the use of interest rates 
(Nairn, 2000:33) - in line with Dr Kriengsak's opinion. Bird summarises the key 
lesson learnt as a result of this apparent mismanagement of the crisis: 'the policy 
response to a crisis needs to be based on a careful diagnosis of the underlying 
economic difficulties. In the Asian case failure to deal with the private sector debt 
overhang, and over-reliance on conventional macroeconomic policy instntments, has 
led to a deep and protracted decline in output' (Bird, 1999). This again reinforces the 
opinion that insufficient attention was paid to the detail of the crisis, and that poor 
recovery measures only made the situation worse. 
It is clear that careful appreciation of the exact nature of problems is required before 
drawing up recovery plans for ailing economies. This brief discussion has indicated 
that despite the IMF making very clear statements about the need for custom-made 
programmes, the programme undertaken in Thailand was reminiscent of those 
employed in Latin America, and demonstrated little sensitivity to the precise problems 
in the Thai economy. The high profile of much of the criticism of the crisis 
programme has been paramount to bringing renewed questioning of the exact role of 
the IMF. The implications of mismanaged restructuring programmes can be 
detrimental, and long-lasting. Discussion therefore must tum to how appropriate the 
programmes were, even though they were not necessarily designed with significant 
input from local agencies. 
4.3: The right medicine? 
Whilst public debate seems to suggest that the IMF did not necessarily tailor-make the 
majority of policies applied to the Thai recovery, the question still remains whether 
the policies which were applied were appropriate for the Thai economy. Did they 
solve the inherent causes of the crisis? Was the pain of the crisis eased by the shock 
therapy prescribed by the IMF? For many the answer to both of these questions is no. 
Indeed as the crisis aged and the IMF's stabilisation policies began to infiltrate the 
economy, the unsuitability of such policies became clearer. It must be said that the 
definition of 'suitable' is very subjective, but it is fair to say that the extreme social 
consequences, and the over-deflationary impacts on the economy suggest that the 
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reforms were far from 'ideal' for Thailand, and in many cases East Asia as a whole. 
Walden Bello of the NG02 'Focus on the Global South' elaborates on this, 
'It was the Asian financial crisis that finally forced the IMF to confront 
reality. In 1997-98 the Fund moved with grand assurance into Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Korea, with its classic formula of short-term fiscal and 
monetary policy cum structural reform in the direction of liberalization, 
deregulation, and privatization. This was the price exacted from their 
governments for IMF financial rescue packages that would allow them to 
repay the massive debt incurred by their private sectors. But the result was 
to turn a conjunctural crisis into a deep recession, as government's capacity 
to counteract the drop in private sector activity, was destroyed by budgetary 
and monetary repression. If some recovery is now discernible in a few 
economies, this is widely recognized as coming in spite of rather than 
because of the IMF' (Bello, 2000: 11-12). 
Bird and Berger join Bello in the view that the visible consequences of the IMP's 
policies did not illustrate well-designed, customised reform strategies. Bird focuses 
on the recessionary problems, explaining 'it is also clear that these problems are 
being exacerbated by some of the policies taken to counter the crisis. In particular the 
high interest rates imposed in order to maintain international investor confidence (in 
Thailand and Korea short-term money market rates rose from around 12% before the 
crisis to nearly 20%, while in Indonesia money market rates reached 60% or more) 
have led to increased problems of loan repayment and further declines in domestic 
investment and consumption' (Bird, 1999). With regards to social disruptions, Berger 
states 'the standard IMF crisis-management toolkit of fiscal stringency, reduced 
spending and the like, has caused massive social dislocation, of which the Bank, or 
more accurately, its current president, James Wolfensohn, has been a significant 
critic' (Berger, 1998:75). 
There were three major policies which were not only inappropriate, but destructive 
for the Thai economy. 
The first of these were the contractionary fiscal policies. Why in an already declining 
economy, with no upward demand pressures, and government budgets in surplus, was 
there a need for deflationary policies, to further spiral the Thai economy into 
recession? The only consequences of these policies were the collapse of the stock 
market, real estate asset prices and the exchange rate, none of which did any favours 
for the already failing economy. Indeed this put further pressure on the budget, as it 
also reduced levels of taxation revenue with so many companies failing to report any 
profits at all, despite increasing VAT 3 from 7 percent to 10 percent. The only 
explanation that can be used in this case is that it worked for Latin America, and the 
IMF were simply implementing their standard crisis package. If this is the case, then 
the IMF failed to appreciate that the Latin American crisis was due to a hyper-
inflationary environment and government deficits, and that the East Asian crisis 
obviously was not. Pasuk suggests 'the Thai crisis bore only superficial resemblance 
to the Latin American model ... the underlying causes ... had been very different' 
2 NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation 
3 VAT - Value Added Taxation 
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(Phongpaichit, 2000:39). The civil society group '50 Years is Enough', who 
campaign for the abolition of the IMF and the World Bank, also discuss the use of 
models prefabricated for the Latin American crises ('50 Years is Enough'). However, 
according to Stiglitz, 'today, the IMF admits that the fiscal policy it recommended 
was excessively austere. The policies made the recession far worse than it needed to 
be' (Stiglitz, 2002:106). 
The second key flaw pertains to monetary policy. After the devaluation of July 2, 
many firms were left bankrupt and deeply indebted, unable to pay large foreign 
liabilities and holding vast portfolios of non-performing loans. Firms were already 
unable to make their current payments, and yet the IMF deemed imposing 
astronomically high interest rates a policy of improvement. The theory behind this 
imposition had been that high interest rates would re-attract foreign capital, and slow 
down capital flight. Needless to say this policy only further exacerbated the debt 
burden. Stiglitz compares this to 'signing a death warrant for many firms - and for 
the economy' (Stiglitz, 2002:104). This view is prominent among public critics, as 
discussed earlier by Sachs, Stiglitz and Bird. 
The final policy which underscores the level of unsuitability attained by some of the 
IMF's policies is the loan conditionality. The US$17.2 billion package given to 
Thailand was primarily for financing the deficit in the balance of payments. This 
fundamentally implied the loan could not be used to help salvage local firms, yet by 
making the private sector debt the problem of the government it effectively saved the 
international firms, by 'socialising' the debt. Thus instead of penalising the 
international investors for poor investment decisions, their deposits were guaranteed 
by the Thai government. Looking at the bigger picture, this suggests that the tax 
payers providing funds for the IMF were simply giving their money to the 
international banks, by-passing the impoverished economy of Thailand completely, 
which acted merely as a facilitator in this process. 
It wasn't long before the Thai public began to show their disapproval of the IMF's 
policies, as Bello describes, 'on the other side of the barricades, street demonstrations 
called for the resignation of the government, with many of them beginning to take on 
an anti-IMF colour. Critics began to be more vocal about their opinions that the 
tight-money, tight-fiscal-policy austerity package was a misguided cure that would 
only worsen the disease' (Bello, 1998:47). Despite this, 'the IMF paid no attention to 
local criticism of the package' (Phongpaichit, 2000:40). 
The IMF does concede that many of its policies, with hindsight, were inappropriate. 
Bird and Milne discuss how the initial IMF programme of fiscal contraction was 
misplaced as domestic saving rates were high and investment was falling (Bird and 
Milne, 1999). This is clear from the development of the Letters of Intent (Lol) as the 
later Lol' s focused more on reform of key legislation, and overhauling the financial 
sector rather than meeting numerical targets. A common suggestion in the wake of 
such public criticism of the policies is that there should have been more involvement 
of the local authorities, in this case the Thai government, in negotiating and designing 
appropriate recovery packages. This has led to the debate over the extent of 
'dictating' by the IMF. 
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At the beginning of this chapter the unfolding of the arrival of the IMF in Thailand 
was recounted by the Bank of Thailand representative. This illustrated a picture of 
the IMF representatives, including Hubert Neiss, consulting the Bank of Thailand, but 
offering little room for negotiation or change. The representative also discussed how 
these consultations impacted the Lois and the sentiment in the Thai government, 'the 
IMF prescribed the Lois effectively, and therefore definitely gave them a lot of 
consideration, and it was the Bank of Thailand who simply had to follow it. The 
IMF had directed the Bank what to do. The Minister of Finance perhaps also 
didn't want to publish the first Loi as it would highlight how much power he had 
surrendered to the IMF' (Bank of Thailand Interview, 2005). A lot can be drawn 
from this evidence, as it offers a clear picture of how the IMF exerted power over the 
Bank. With the threat of jeopardising international credibility, and losing the $17.2 
billion loan it is understandable how the IMF were able to manipulate the Bank into 
agreeing to the Lois. It is not clear if the Bank of Thailand was over-awed by the 
IMF, but they were certainly less than enthusiastic about how much control the IMF 
commanded. This would concur with the Bank of Thailand representative's views 
that perhaps a degree of embarrassment or shame would be associated with 
relinquishing so much power to an international body, and perhaps a loss of national 
pride. Whilst one can only speculate, it is important to be aware that the discussions 
of the reform programmes were not as two-way as the IMF like to lead people to 
believe. 
This sense of vulnerability in the Thai government was also emphasised by Dr Weng 
Tojirakarn, the leader of the civil society group Democratic Confederation. He too 
felt the IMF imposed upon Thailand, which draws on the earlier citation of Bello, 
exposing a player-coach relationship between the Thai government and the IMF. 'Mr 
Chuan protested against the Lois, having seen the experience of privatisation 
failures in Argentina, the US, UK and France. He argued there were no positive 
experiences of privatisation, except perhaps in China ..• Mr Chuan disliked the 
IMF greatly. An anecdote that is often cited refers to Mr Hubert Neiss [of the 
IMF] strolB.ing into Government House and questioning "where is my 
bankruptcy law?" - This arrogance is apparently very representative of the 
attitudes upheld by the IMF' (Dr Weng Tojirakarn, 2005). This suggests that even 
if it was recognised that the policies would be unsuitable before they were 
implemented, there was no significant force against the IMF to challenge their 
prescriptions. This corresponds with the view of Masina, illustrated at the beginning 
of this chapter. 
These feelings of helplessness were felt within the banking sector too. Tohpan 
Tuchinda, a representative of Citigroup, the world's largest financial institution, 
explained how the IMF's policies were seen from the international banking 
perspective. 'Regarding the IMF, there was hardly any impact of the IMF. They 
had no public face of their own and acted from behind the scenes being fronted 
by the Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance. It was from these two 
institutions that regulations and reforms were led (although clearly had been 
IMF directed), including various privatisations. Some of these were accepted by 
the public, and others weren't' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). 
A common denominator of all the experiences is the inadequacy of the IMF policies 
in both addressing the specific problems in Thailand, and involving local opinion in 
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their decisions. There is no surprise therefore, that the policies, especially the short-
term stabilisation policies, did not work effectively, and merely worsened the state of 
recession. There is no further surprise that as a result public criticism came from all 
comers of the globe, and from all strata of Thai society. 
What is particularly important to this research is that whilst the short-term 
macroeconomic adjustment was inappropriate, the long-term financial reforms 
addressed in the IMP's Lois are, to some extent, appropriate. The crisis taught 
everyone that there were serious flaws in the Thai banking system which required 
correction to avoid future crises. These key reforms cover the bankruptcy laws, 
financial disclosure, capital adequacy requirements, and a change in the banking 
structure. There were also many other critical non-banking reforms which haven't 
been implemented, but were stipulated in the Lois. Looking specifically at banking 
reforms, this next discussion will attempt to show that most of the policies 
implemented in the Thai banking sector were never properly followed through, and 
those that were did not help the fragility of the banking system. This will also 
consider the successful changes in the banking sector, and show how these were 
internally driven by the banks, and not state- or IMP-directed. 
4.4: Putting policy into practice: the case of the Banking Sector 
The four key reforms drafted by the IMP in their Lol's are capital adequacy 
requirements, merging and closing of banks and finance companies, bankruptcy law 
reform, and disclosure requirements. This section will give a brief outline of the 
nature of the reforms, how far they have been implemented, and what impacts have 
complicated this process. Assessment of these will help to answer the initial research 
question regarding the process of policy implementation, looking specifically at how 
the IMP channelled its policies to the grass roots of the Thai economy, focusing on 
the banking sector, and equally to what extent this has been done. 
4.41: Capital Adequacy Requirements 
All financial institutions, both public and private, were required to adhere to new 
capital requirements and prudential standards after the crisis. This was pushed fairly 
rapidly between 1998 and 2000, resulting in a malfunction of the financial system. 
Most banks and financial institutions were already facing extreme pressure trying to 
meet their debt repayments due to the recession, made even harder by the depreciation 
of the Baht. The devaluation in particular caused private sector foreign debt to 
increase from US$75.6 billion to US$2.14 trillion in the space of six months. 
The capital adequacy ratios measure a bank's capital as a percentage of its risk 
weighted credit exposure. Standards are set to ensure banks are able to absorb a 
realistic level of losses before becoming insolvent. In times of crisis this is very 
difficult and much harder when requirements of such stringency have never existed 
before. Nevertheless, as Dr Kriengsak explained 'the IMF pressured the 
government to force the sealing of a new Financial Institution Act; pressing the 
increased capital adequacy ratio (CAR) on financial institutions'. (Dr Kriengsak 
Chareonwongsak, 2005). This perception of pressure is concurred by Stiglitz: 'the 
IMF insisted that banks either shut down or quickly meet this capital adequacy ratio. 
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But this insistence on banking quickly meeting capital adequacy standards 
exacerbated the downturn' (Stiglitz, 2002: 116). 
Table 4.1 below illustrates how loss-provisioning requirements changed after the new 
system enforced in 1998. According to Dr Pakorn, these new measures required local 
banks to add a further 80 billion Baht to their provisioning levels by the end of 1998, 
whilst finance companies were required to add a further 42 billion Baht in 
provisioning (Vichyanand, 2000: 16). 
Loan Classification Months Overdue Previous Provisions 1998 System of 
Provisioning 
Pass < 1 month - 1% 
Special Mention 0-3 months - 2% 
Substandard Up to 6 months 15% 20% 
Doubtful Up to 1 year 100% 50% 
Loss > 1 year 100% 100% 
Table 4.1: Changes in provisioning requirements for losses4 
Problems of provisioning requirements existed before the new measures had been 
drawn up. In early 1997, 10 firms were publicly requested to increase their capital -
one of which was Thailand's largest finance company, Finance One. This caused 
bank runs on them, leaving them in turmoil. 'The central bank announced that the 
FIDP would help in providing them with capital, should they fail to raise it. They did 
fail, but no funding was forthcoming' (Siamwalla, 2001 :20). While in the long-run 
capital adequacy is vital for a strong financial sector, it is perceived that these 
stringent requirements were pressured upon the financial institutions too soon after 
the crisis. This again infers that insufficient consideration of the detail of the 
provisioning problems was paid when drawing up the reform package. This supports 
the arguments put forward earlier by Pasuk and Bello that the recovery procedure was 
made harder by the over-stringency of the IMF; 'financial institutions are still now 
struggling to increase capital, even with the government package on 14 August 1998, 
which enabled the government to issue up to Baht 300 billion in bonds to help with 
financial sector re-capitalisation' (Sussangkarn, 1999: 1 0). 
4.42: Changing the Banking Structure: Merging and Closure of Banks 
' ... by the second half of 1996, it became clear that many finance companies were in 
serious trouble, mostly through their exposure to property loans' (Siamwalla, 
2001 :20). The shake-up of the structure of the financial sector was inevitable, as 
banks and finance companies began to collapse one by one. 
After the third attack on the Baht in May 1997, further runs on the 1 0 finance 
companies took place, with 16 finance companies finally being suspended on June 
27th. Despite the government's claims that these 16 would be the only suspended 
finance companies, runs continued on all the companies, demonstrating the lack of 
credibility of the Thai government. Tohpan ofCitigroup explained, 
4 Source: Table 3, page 16 of 'Financial Reforms in Thailand' by Dr Pakom Vichyanond, TDRI, 2000 
5 FIDF- Financial Institutions Development Fund: support institution set up by the Bank of Thailand 
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'Unfortunately the way the Bank of Thailand delivered information on 
finance company closures was inadequate. Initially they stated only ten 
would be closed, then at a later date they said there were more [sixteen 
were then closed] and that would be it, until finally fifty-six were shut. 
The repeated breakings of promises regarding number of companies to 
close caused immense speculation and panic, and even before the full 
fifty-six companies were announced people started making bank runs, 
pulling out wherever they could. It happened so quickly it was like a 
domino effect' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). 
This lack of consistency on behalf of the Bank of Thailand demonstrates the power of 
confidence. The continuous breaking of promises not only illustrated that the Bank 
did not have control over the situation, but also that they must have acted each time 
on less than full information sets, adapting the situation to meet new information as it 
became available. This unreliability is clearly a key cause of the bank runs which 
crippled much of the industry, as runs were also made on perfectly-sound banks, as 
no-one could be sure whether their banks were due to be closed in the future or not. 
This small case study demonstrates that poor policy implementation exacerbated the 
fragility and undermining of an already ailing financial sector. Whilst the Bank of 
Thailand takes much of the blame for this, close consideration of the first Lol written 
by the IMF shows that the IMF were central to the plans to 'isolate a significant 
number of unviable institutions' (IMF, 1997). This concurs with Tophan's earlier 
comments that the IMF acted with no public face, but operated through the Bank of 
Thailand. This event therefore hurt the credibility of the Bank of Thailand, rather 
than the IMF, despite evidence suggesting the Bank was merely the IMF's puppet, 
carrying out its demands. 
The Financial Sector Restructuring Agency was formed in December 1998, to 
harbour the assets of these 56 suspended firms, before auctioning them off. The 
proceeds would then be used to pay off their liabilities. Another newly formed 
agency to aid this process was the Thai Asset Management Corporation (T AMC), 
which helped to price the assets, and also bid for them. Unfortunately due to lack of 
appropriate legal structures to aid the enforcement and foreclosure of loan contracts, 
this process took much longer than planned, inducing further uncertainty. With 
already so much uncertainty regarding legal reform as well as financial reform, asset 
prices were forced very low to encourage people to take on these risks and buy them. 
The average asset was sold at 25 percent of its initial face value at auction6• 
The government salvaged the 'good' assets from the 'bad', paving the way for the 
merging of all the good assets into a good bank, the Radhanasin Bank. This approach 
collapsed after it became too difficult to distinguish between good and bad assets. On 
August 14, 1998, a new financial restructuring package was delivered. This 
permitted foreign takeovers of Thai banks, and eventually seven of the existing 
fifteen banks (not part of the original 56) were sold to foreign buyers (Phongpaichit, 
2000:50). Thirteen of the 56 closed finance companies and one small bank merged to 
become part of the state owned Krung Thai Bank (ibid.). However Tohpan believes 
'that the resulting banks from merged finance companies and other banks, such 
6 Source: Financial Sector Restructuring Authority 
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as the Krung Thai banks are not very successful banks. If anything the overall 
efficiency has improved as instead of many bad banks, there is now only one bad 
bank. The government bought the bad assets of the state owned banks, and the 
private banks dealt with their bad assets themselves' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). 
Tohpan's comments here illustrate that despite the government's plans to salvage the 
weaker banks by merging them together; they rarely produced a new big successful 
bank. It is perhaps little solace that the only efficiency benefits to the financial sector 
as a result of this new financial restructuring is that the relative number of bad banks 
is less than before. This again demonstrates the lack of impact of the government-
directed reforms. 
Of the local commercial banks which survived, Siam Commercial Bank has been the 
most prominent success. Veerathai Sanitprabhob, a Senior Vice President, and Head 
of Equity Investment Division explained to me: 'SCB has changed 
dramatically ... Firstly the attitude towards risk management: they used to have a 
decentralised credit approval system, so that the branch managers decided 
whether to approve loans etc. All loans are now approved by at least three 
different people, and the process is very strict. This was an internal change, 
prompted by internal management and not dictated to them by central Thai 
authorities' (Santiprabhob, 2005). Veerathai also pointed to the role of expertise, 
with the important changes in the SCB board of directors, 'it now includes many 
more professionals, especially strong lawyers and auditors. The other changes 
within it has been the increased number of foreigners, as pre-crisis the only 
foreign representative on the board was Japanese, and he played a very passive 
role. Since the crisis the company now realises the importance of legal 
requirements and reforms to satisfy the shareholders' (ibid.). It is important to 
note that none of these key successes have been state-, or IMP-induced, as this seems 
to be an important distinguishing factor that separates the now successful Thai banks 
from the not -so-successful banks. Veerathai hinted at a requirement of internal 
motivation for successful reform, a drive to be efficient, which is not so clearly 
demonstrated by the family run banks such as Bangkok Bank, and even less so by the 
state-owned banks who enjoy the benefits of government subsidies. 
Veerathai explained that government involvement in the financial sector has added to 
inefficiencies, 'some banks are still state-owned too, and they are subsidised by 
the government, such as the KTCB and Bank Thai and this lowers their cost of 
capital, and can therefore enable them to lend very aggressively' (ibid.). This is 
reminiscent of the pre-crisis days when the focus of banks was more on the size of 
their lending portfolios, rather than project-worthiness and efficiency. He also 
criticised the TAMC: 'the TAMC and the development banks were too late. It 
was six years after the crisis that they started and by then most loans were 
already under restructuring. The TAMC is also not at all transparent. It needs 
strong banking leaders, and is currently run by Bank of Thailand ministers. 
The T AMC has fostered inefficient firms, and this stops competitive firms from 
being able to compete properly' (ibid.). This again helps to demonstrate that the 
restructuring measures designed by the government were implemented in the banking 
sector, however they lacked effectiveness due to mismanaged timing and a lack of 
profit-motivation, more commonly found in private enterprises. 
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The structure of the Thai financial sector is still changing. Government plans to 
salvage the ailing banks which collapsed in the late 1990s have not worked 
effectively, and the most successful Thai banks have been private, and reformed by 
themselves. The limitations of this restructuring have been related to legal reform, 
and company transparency. These have been addressed by the government with 
varying degrees of success, and with the encouragement of the IMF. 
4.43: Legal Reform: The Bankruptcy Law 
'Before 1998, Thai laws relating to bankruptcy allowed the liquidation of a 
company that was declared bankrupt. There was no rehabilitation 
procedure to keep the company intact as a going concern ... the law however 
was merciless toward a declared bankrupt person. For as long as his debt 
remained unpaid, he would suffer from considerable civil 
disabilities ... because of this feature of Thai law, lenders in Thailand had a 
fondness for personal guarantees, even in loans to companies, because they 
felt this was their ultimate threat' (Siamwalla, 2001 :36). 
A bankruptcy law was vital to facilitate the recovery of the economy. Unfortunately 
the existing law was enacted in 1940, and was inadequate to cope with the demands of 
the crisis. The law was reformed in 1998, providing the facility for business 
rehabilitation and in 1999 underwent further amendments, namely the creation of the 
Central Bankruptcy Court. 
In 1998 there were three key changes: firstly it gave more protection for creditors 
helping salvageable firms rehabilitate. This was critical during the crisis period, as the 
liquidity shortage, and high interest rates put pressure on recovering firms. The 
amendments of 1998 meant that creditors had incentives to help firms work through 
such shortages, receiving additional assurance (Santiprabhob, 2003:53). The second 
amendment 'categorized payroll debts owed to workers in the same preferred status 
as those owed to the tax authorities, with a view to encouraging workers to continue 
working for highly indebted firms during their rehabilitation process' (ibid.). Unlike 
before, this allowed bankrupt firms to continue their operations, as previously workers 
would leave upon bankruptcy, as they lacked a prior claim to their wage debts. The 
third key change in the law made it easier to approve rehabilitation plans, as the 
previous method was complicated and did not adequately reflect the seniority 
differences amongst creditors. 
Despite these reforms and further reform in 1999, state manipulation meant the laws 
were not passed exactly as hoped; in Veerathai's (of the SCB) interview he stated that 
'definitely the ministerial set-up impacted reform. The political capital is so vital, 
and there were big infighting factions within the government at the time of the 
crisis. Clear cut examples are evident today even, with the way that the 
parliamentarians managed to water-down the bankruptcy laws by the time they 
were passed' (Santiprabhob, 2005). He also described how the IMF played a role in 
aiding the bankruptcy changes, 'the IMF constantly provided expertise, especially 
regarding legal changes, such as the bankruptcy laws - although the law has 
since been watered down and manipulated and is not how the Thai people 
wanted it to be, especially those people in the financial sector' (ibid.). This 
concurs with the view of Siam walla, who states 'the reform of the bankruptcy ... laws 
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ran into many roadblocks. The most important group opposing the new laws was in 
the Senate, which at that time was an appointive body, and had among its members 
some very vocal debt defaulters. Some of these stood to see their entire business 
empire collapsing' (Siamwalla, 2001). However, others disagree with this point of 
view; Dr Pakom of the TDRI7 believes 'the government was successful in overhauling 
the bankruptcy and foreclosure laws' (Vichyanand, 2001:24). On balance, the current 
bankruptcy laws are a radical improvement on the antiquated acts of 1940. 
A key lesson to take from this is that whilst the IMP can dictate the policies to be 
implemented at a top-tier level, by pressurising government ministries to agree to the 
Lol's with little negotiation, they do not have overriding control of how these policies 
are implemented through different tiers of the political economy. This case study of 
the bankruptcy law illustrates clearly how the personal interests of government 
individuals retain the power to water-down and manipulate these reforms for their 
own personal gain, or in this case to avoid as much personal hardship as possible. 
This understanding is paramount to evaluating the initial broad questions of this 
research project. 
4.44: Transparency and Disclosure 
The availability of information played a huge role in the crisis, from the large-scale 
government-public communication, to the micro-focus on company disclosure. This 
will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. However company disclosure was a 
vital change. The BoT announced the upgrade of financial standards to those of 
international levels on March 31, 1998. The aim was to have them aligned by 2000. 
This also required companies to report quarterly, and not annually as they previously 
had done. Auditing was also now required, with all reports to be submitted to the 
Central Bank, and loan portfolios were also published (Vichyanand, 2001 :8). The 
aim of this was to avoid the moral hazard issues which had plagued the Thai banking 
system for decades. Full investor information was required for a fully flexible 
financial sector. 
The Stock Exchange Commission (SEC) facilitated investor information in 2000 
through the creation of a 'capital market information centre' to provide 'information 
access, education and training, and investor protection'(Vichyanand, 2002:18). In 
2001 they promoted Fitch Ratings to be Thailand's second credit rating agency, 
offering further access to information for investors. However in Vichyanand's 2001 
paper, 'Complicated Difficulties behind Financial Resolution: The Case of Thailand', 
he highlighted the further need to upgrade accounting, detailed information and 
transparency, suggesting that there is still a long way to go before a fully developed 
financial sector is reached. 
7 TDRI - Thailand Development Research Institute 
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4.5: Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the policies implemented by the IMF. It 
considers the extent to which the IMF has a rigid model dictating its policies, and also 
the extent of tailoring in their reform package to national characteristics and 
exigencies. Primary material in this chapter offered a detailed understanding of the 
exact 'negotiation' process which occurred between the Bank of Thailand and the 
IMF, which contradicts many of the IMF's claims of how they work with a country in 
crisis. This evidence has also uncovered the important role of power differentials, 
illustrating a sense of vulnerability of the Thai government in the face of the IMF. 
A key finding of this chapter was that state- and IMP-directed reforms had little 
success in promoting a more efficient and competitive banking sector, and that the 
most successful banking firms had initiated their own internal reforms to achieve 
profitability and restore credibility lost in the crisis. This chapter has also analysed 
the 'suitability' of the IMP-suggested reforms, looking more closely at the four key 
banking reforms. This brief analysis has shown that there are many factors which 
affect the extent of successful reform implementation. For example, the bankruptcy 
laws highlighted political constraints, such as the ability of individuals to rework and 
water-down policies for personal gain, and the disclosure reforms highlighted the 
need for greater information transparency. The next chapter will look more closely at 
the role of information transparency as an obstacle to efficient reform implementation. 
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GOSSIP, LIES AND SMOKE 
SCREENS 
This chapter will consider the problem of information transparency as an obstacle for 
policy implementation. The problems of the information flows between the Bank of 
Thailand (BoT), the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well 
as the availability of public information from the government for the Thai people will 
be the key relationships under debate. This chapter will further explore how 
speculation and rumour, misdirected information, lack of transparency and moral 
hazard issues govern thought processes, decisions and attitudes. Focusing on the Thai 
banking sector, the chapter will demonstrate how the role of information transparency 
affected and intensified the crisis at it unravelled, and how it is currently hindering 
reform. 
5.1: Hot gossip: the role of speculation and rumour 
For many, distorted Thai information flows, in the form of speculation and rumour, 
caused the crisis. As investors lacked a full information-set to form 'rational' views, 
the 'herd-like' behaviour of investors caused them to flock to whichever hearsay they 
deemed the most credible. With financial news wires such as Reuters and Bloomberg 
global investors have access to news, speculative suggestions and statistics at the 
touch of a button, within seconds of public announcements, and twenty-four hours a 
day. In liberalised global financial markets, rapid investor-sentiment shifts are 
accompanied by substantial capital inflows and outflows. Upon liberalising the Thai 
financial system, the government effectively opened the economy up to this volatility. 
As Stiglitz rightly states, 'capital market liberalization made the developing countries 
subject to both the rational and the irrational whims of the investor community, to 
their irrational exuberance and pessimism' (Stiglitz, 2002:100). 
Beaverstock and Doel (200 1) elaborate on this, although numerous writers have 
contributed to discussion on the role of panic in driving the crisis of 1997 (Jayasuriya, 
2001, McLeod, 1997, McLeod, and Garnaut 1998b, Montes, 1998, Radelet, 1998a, 
1998b, Stiglitz, 1998b ): 
'while some writers have presented the East Asian financial crisis as an 
essentially home-grown affair, for others it demonstrated the destructive 
force of fickle, panicky, and madcap global capital amid essentially 
'sound' economies' (Beaverstock and Doel, 2001: 18). 
Such investor panic exacerbated the crisis and this was one of the key findings in the 
Nukul Commission Report of 1998. 'When it became apparent in 1997 that private 
enterprises in those [Asian] nations would not be able to meet their payment 
obligations, international currency markets panicked. Currency traders sought to 
convert their Asian money into dollars, and the Asian currencies plummeted. That 
made it harder for the Asian countries to pay their loans, and it made imports 
suddenly very expensive' ('50 Years is Enough'). It is well documented that financial 
corporations were themselves a source of financial speculation. George Soros 
famously intervened during the three attacks on the Thai Baht with his 'Quantum 
Fund'. Further details came to light regarding this in January 2005, after The Nation 
published an article in which the Chief Executive of Thai Petrochemical Industry Pic 
(TPI) stated that he had been persuaded by Soros to initiate the July 1997 attack on 
the Baht (TN, 2005(48)). 
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'Panic is fed by hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, and the absence 
of viable international bankruptcy proceedings. However, it is a moot 
point whether some actors, such as hedge funds, are reactive in this sense. 
It may be the case that certain actors are capable of precipitating even 
engendering a crisis. Indeed, much of the blame for the financial crisis has 
been set at the door of the hedge funds with their speculative attacks on 
selected East Asian currencies from the summer of 1996 onwards' 
(Beaverstock and Doel, 2001: 18). 
Beaverstock and Doel here highlight the important role of the lacking of appropriate 
financial laws and regulations as a facilitator in undermining the financial system. 
Related to this they go on to discuss the role of confidence and investor pyschology, 
'both rational and irrational behaviour can render capital a destructive force' (ibid.). 
This is exemplified by other analyses: Carden states that the financial crises in the 
capital and foreign-exchange markets were due to a "a sudden loss of confidence" 
(1999, p. 1); Winters writes of 'a psychology among investors that inflates an 
economic bubble and then triggers its collapse' (1999, p. 89) and furthermore, 
Delhaise points to the fact that 'unnecessary panic inflicted far more damage in East 
Asia than the region's ill-management of growth' (1998, pp. 14,15). This sense of 
confidence was maintained, and arguably inflated, by the level of praise the Thai 
economy received from the IMP and the World Bank, as reflected in their 1993 report 
(World Bank Research Report, 1993), naming Thailand as the 'fifth tiger'. This was 
discussed previously in Chapter 3. 
As investors pulled their investments out of the Thai economy, and finance companies 
collapsed, speculation was further incited by the government's lack of transparency 
regarding which firms were due to close. Tohpan, from Citigroup, witnessed this 
directly from a foreign bank's perspective, 
'Unfortunately the way the Bank of Thailand [BoT] (prompted by the 
IMF it is assumed) delivered information on finance company 
closures was inadequate. Initially they stated only 16 would be closed, 
then at a later date they said there were more and that would be it, 
until finally 56 were shut. The repeated breaking of promises 
regarding number of companies to close caused immense speculation 
and panic, and even before the full 56 companies were announced 
people started making bank runs, pulling out wherever they could. It 
happened so quickly - it was like a domino effect'. (Tohpan Tuchinda, 
2005) 
The government did not act sufficiently quickly to quell speculation and further 
hindered this with consistent dishonesty (as discussed in depth in the next section). 
The government is also indirectly additionally to blame for opening up the economy 
too early, and doing so while it lacked vital institutions and regulations. Chang states 
that many 'argue that the Asian crisis was mainly caused by the ''manias, panics, and 
crashes" mechanism (the term is due to Charles Kindleberger) inherent in 
unregulated financial markets' (Chang, 2000:3). This suggests that there is a future 
role for governments to ensure that there is informational transparency not only in 
financial markets, but across all spectrums of the economy. Facilitating the provision 
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of full information sets is critical to allow individuals to make rational decisions, a 
privilege which should not be reserved solely for investors. 
The IMF too induced further speculation and panic, as they represented confirmation 
of an economy in strife, according to Citigroup's representative, 'initially when it 
was announced that the IMF were coming in, the public and indeed the banking 
community became scared, fearing that whatever was to come would be 
incredibly painful' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). 
The Thai government have since formally recognised the role played by speculation 
in creating and deepening the financial crisis of 1997. Measures have since been 
implemented to respond to speculation and quell rash market movements, in an 
attempt to avert another crisis. In February 2005, after the SET1 fell 2.4 percent on 
foreign selling, the Finance Minister Somkid Jatusripitak quickly made a statement 
'to soothe market jitters, saying investors should not ponder only monthly deficits in 
the current account, but rather consider it on a yearly basis'(Chanjindamanee, 
2005(73)). The Nation newspaper also stated that private sector firms also acted 
similarly, 'fund managers and analysts also rushed to put a positive spin on the day's 
trade, saying foreign investors' selling pressure would be a short-lived phenomenon' 
(ibid.) and even the SET's executive vice president Sopawadee Lertmanaschai made a 
statement insisting the 'selling is not worrying .. .it is normal, not sparked by panic' 
(ibid.). 
New SET regulations enforced in January 2005 are specifically designed to impede 
market rumours from inciting irrational investor activity. The SET president Kittiratt 
Na Ranong publicly announced 'the SEC suggested that we invite listed companies 
whose share prices may be significantly affected by rumours to hold a press 
conference to clarify the truth ... this will allow the public to get information directly 
from the source of the rumours' (Chanjindamanee, 2005(55)). This will help restore 
confidence in the Thai financial markets, as currently the crisis is fresh enough in 
everyone's mind that any market abnormalities are likely to make investors more 
nervous than they would in a more mature financial environment, like the US market 
for example. 
Stock exchange settlement changes have also been imposed to facilitate and 
encourage trading. As of June 1st 2005 stock settlement time was reduced from three 
trading days (T+3) to two days (T+2), in line with other international exchanges (TN, 
2005(66)). There has been great pressure to solve the informational issues in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); since the appointment of Thirachai 
Phuvanat-naranubala as secretary-general in December 2003, 'he has tightened 
regulations governing supervision in a relentless effort to calm stock speculation and 
protect retail investors' (TN, 2005(64)). 
This brief discussion of the role of speculation and rumour in inciting the crisis, and 
indeed making it worse has illustrated how key an issue it really is. This section has 
also highlighted successful reforms implemented by the SEC to help solve the 
problems that are caused by investor hearsay. It is important to realise that the flow 
of information can play an integral role in shaping financial systems, as the following 
1 SET: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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sections will illustrate. However even the IMF identified how integral panic was in 
the collapse of the SET, 'the currencies and the stock markets collapsed as a result of 
panic . . . These are the symptoms, not the malady itself (International Monetary 
Fund, 1999:7). 
5.2: Lies. lies and statistics: misleading information 
Both the relationships between the government and the IMF, and the government and 
the Thai people were littered with lies and dishonesty. Inhibiting the flow of accurate 
information not only hampered the IMF's programme for reform, but also created a 
sense of mistrust among the Thai people, arousing further suspicion of reform. In no 
way did any of these lies provide an advantage or benefit to the crisis recovery. The 
sense of trust was critical to the government, and in many ways the lies were 
ironically created to protect the existing levels of trust of the government, and the 
BoT's credibility. With hindsight this did not work, and further damaged both the 
credibility of the government and the BoT. 
For many the dishonesty of the government was apparent in the lead up to the 
devaluation of the Baht, in late June and early July. Speculation surrounding whether 
or not the Baht would in fact devalue was rife, and the government was required to 
make statements to correct this unease. Dr Weng of the Democratic Confederation 
compares the behaviour of the BoT and the government at this time to one of a puppet, 
whereby the BoT dictated what was to be disclosed, and the government acted as the 
BoT's public voice. He outlined the events as follows: 
'26th June: 
29th June: 
30th June: 
2nd July: 
Prime Minister (PM) asked the BoT how and what he 
should tell the Thai people. The BoT stated that the 
PM (Chavalit) must confirm that the Baht should not 
float. 
It was decided internally that there was no choice but 
to float. 
They closed the accounts of Thailand. 
Chavalit had to tell the truth, and the Baht floated. It 
was therefore evident that he had lied to his people on 
June 26th •. (Dr Weng Tojirakarn, 2005) 
While the accuracy of these events cannot be verified, it is surprising that this is how 
the events are interpreted by someone who is so integrated into the political system. 
Dr Weng has much involvement with high profile politicians and meets regularly 
with the current Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. On this basis his account of 
these events cannot simply be discredited. 
Dr Kriengsak MP, the Executive Director of the Institute of Future Studies for 
Development, also felt the government had confused the public in a similar vein. He 
stated: 
'The way the government communicated information to people during the crisis 
was confusing and changed constantly, for example, 
"The government declared its decision not to depreciate the Baht, but 
decided to float the value of the Baht after that; 
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"After closing 16 financial institutions, the government declared that it 
would not close any more financial institutions, but finally another 42 
institutions were closed; 
"The government did not guarantee the creditors' loans for the 16 closed 
financial institutions, but did guarantee the creditors of the 42 that were 
closed later' (Dr Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 2005). 
This reverts back to what Tophan, of Citigroup, believed was a serious 
communication problem of the government; the misleading information regarding the 
bank closures which caused severe panic among both Thai businesspeople, and the 
foreign investors. Concealing the true state of affairs of the banking problem, in 
order to protect the financial sector, was not a wise decision and really undermined 
the sector instead. Similar events still occur in Thai society today, for example with 
the latest outbreak of bird flu, Thaksin concealed the extent of the problem until 
people started dying, in order to protect the tourism and poultry industries (Chaitrong, 
2005). There thus seems to be an issue in Thai political culture of maintaining a sense 
of 'face' until problems get beyond concealment, and thus informational problems are 
not solely a problem for the financial sector alone. 
Revealing the truth about the state of the Thai banks was a serious problem not just 
for the government, but also for the banks themselves. Having spent so long building 
reputations of solid, successful companies, they were anxious not to publicise the dire 
situations many of their debtors were facing, whose assets undetpinned their banks. 
'It was, however, impossible for the banks and finance companies to 
declare so many of their borrowers as problem debtors without calling 
into question their own financial status. It was in the interest of both 
creditors and borrowers to sit tight, keep the real state of things under 
wraps, and resort to 'creative accounting' to maintain the aura of 
financial stability. Indeed the chairman of Bangkok Bank advised against 
publicly disclosing the extent of non-performing loans since this would 
result in a situation where 'many will be unable to continue their 
operations'(Bello, 1998:28). 
It is clear that trust and credibility were very important to the Thai government, as 
they are to all governments. Yet in this instance evidence suggests the government 
was willing to jeopardise their long-term credibility in an attempt to save, or at the 
very least cover up, their financial fragilities. However, trust was an important 
obstacle in their relationship with the IMF. Mistrust of the IMF was apparent from 
the first meeting after drafting in the IMF's help. A BoT representative described the 
situation: 'in the first period there was an atmosphere of mistrust as the BoT 
didn't give out numbers to the IMF. This was because members of the IMF who 
get hold of really important information don't have to face a cooling-off period 
before leaving the IMF and joining the private finance sector, where they could 
use the knowledge of these numbers 2 to their advantage' (Bank of Thailand 
Interview, 2005). This suggests that because of the element of mistrust towards the 
2 By 'numbers' the representative is referring to the actual levels of debt in the Balance of Payments, 
and Foreign Currency Portfolio balance, which would have outlined important information regarding 
Thai currency stock positions and options and also the extent of how much debt Thailand had 
amounted. 
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IMF the BoT held back the true extent of their frailties and debts, as these figures 
were incredibly market sensitive. Just as the government felt the need to cover up 
their problems to save face, this account suggests the BoT also felt the need to conceal 
their problems but to avoid the private sector taking further advantage of the economy 
in crisis, even though this would have hampered the initial reform plans. This 
mistrust was caused by the close relationship between individuals who made up the 
IMF and private sector corporations. Indeed it was the case that after working in the 
IMF many key players would go straight into the private sector, for example Hubert 
Neiss later joined Deutsche Bank and Stanley Fischer went to Citigroup, without any 
gap between positions, so that they could in fact use market-sensitive information 
gathered at the IMF to their corporations' advantage. Even in international banking, 
employees have a three-month 'cooling-off period before they are allowed to join 
another bank to avoid the sharing of sensitive information (i.e. it is likely that in three 
months the information is either public to all or defunct); this is not extended to 
individuals who have come from other related institutions, such as the IMF. 
This mistrust was critical in the early stages of recovery, as it was upon these 
misleading figures 3 that the BoT did give out (which underplayed the extent of 
Thailand's situation of crisis) that the IMF designed their reform targets. Obviously 
the extent to which the IMP's programme was custom-made, and thus reliant on these 
figures, is still a talking point as outlined in Chapter 4. It may be considered quite 
extreme that the BoT were so hyper-suspicious of the IMF that they were already 
considering the next moves of their representatives, however according to the BoT 
representative, 'in the Thai's view, hedge funds and private sector finance 
companies had been responsible for the downfall of the Thai economy, and thus 
why should they be trusted?' (ibid.). This also demonstrates the critical issue of the 
role of individuals, for it was not the IMF as an institution which was so mistrusted, 
but the individuals who represented it. Again, this is important to consider when 
looking at the BoT - for the BoT does not necessarily have a policy of withholding 
information, nor jeopardising reform procedures, but it was simply that suspicions 
existed in a few of their key individuals which prompted such behaviour. Thus it was 
the reactions of a few individuals which later became viewed as 'the behaviour of the 
BoT'. Nevertheless, this comment from the BoT's representative concurs with the 
previous claims of George Soros' role, and those of his equivalents, in the speculative 
attacks which caused the devaluation of the Baht. From this perspective one can see 
how people may have viewed the IMF similarly, and therefore how easily a national 
sense of mistrusting towards the IMF infiltrated Thai society. 
The BoT representative did concede that in time the IMF earned a degree of trust, but 
the initial mistrust clearly hampered the early stages of their relationship, which 
arguably were the most critical stages. This essence of mistrust slowed down the 
progress of recovery plans and much time was taken before the Thai government and 
the BoT spoke openly and honestly with the IMF. However, much of the 
apprehension the BoT had towards the IMF was due to the set-up of the IMF, and the 
close relationship of IMF individuals with the private international financial 
corporations which many believe contributed to the downfall of the Thai economy. 
This is a point which many have picked up on in discussion of potential reforms of the 
IMF (Bello: 1998, 2000, Goldstein: 2001, MacEwan: 2001). 
3 The figures given out by the Bank of Thailand initially are not available for disclosure. 
53 
5.3: Smoke screens: the role of information transparency 
During the 1990s there was a dramatic increase in the availability of information in 
the public arena. This evolution was directly linked to the evolving democracy 
shaping itself in the wake of the Thai military coup of 1992 (Hewison, 1999). This 
put new emphasis on the role of the people's right-to-know, facilitated by 'an 
aggressive daily press, multiplication of new media, [and] cheap book and magazine 
publication' (Phongpaichit, 2004:21). Yet despite these advances in public 
information, the Thai political economy is plagued with a lack of transparency. The 
primary obstacle to free flowing, publicly available information is the government. 
This section will highlight how the government has intervened in the information 
market, and the subsequent impacts on the crisis and its recovery. 
Even as the crisis unfolded, confusion and not-knowing beleaguered the economy. 
This was prominent in the banking sector; Bello recounts the thoughts of a former 
stockbroker, 'We never had any indication we were in trouble, never. I was very busy, 
being in charge of many customers. Then one day the BOT suddenly tells us we have 
to shut down because we're bankrupt' (Bello, 1998:3). This in many respects links 
back to the issue of 'saving face', as discussed previously. While the public were 
unaware of exactly what was happening, there seemed no apparent sense of fear or 
worry. The sentiments of panic seemed only to have been shared by the international 
financial institutions. This lack of transparency had endured a great length of time, to 
the extent that 'nobody really knew that the Thai economy was in a bubble when the 
Democrats were ousted from power in 1995' (Khanthong, 2005 (63)), which in part 
explains why no one expected a subsequent 'bursting' of that bubble. 
Once the Baht had devalued, and the crisis unfolded, characterised by the arrival of 
the IMF, there was further government secrecy. This involved concealment of the 
contents of the first Letter of Intent (Lol), which was the primary means of 
communication between the government and the Thai people. 'The Lol's were ... the 
cornerstone of post-crisis policy. They would be how the foreign world would 
judge Thailand' (Bank of Thailand Interview, 2005), and yet once the Lol was 
signed it wasn't immediately published. In the same interview the BoT representative 
explained, 'this is because they [the government] didn't want to induce panic. It 
was a judgement called at the time, that the confidence of the Thai people was 
important, and they didn't want to incite panic over the strict measures included 
in the Lo:O:. The BoT was still undergoing a learning process and didn't want to 
scare people' (Bank of Thailand Interview,2005). Nevertheless people felt that they 
did not know what was going on and this impeded their understanding of the reforms 
which were publicly implemented, 'the government also failed to help people 
understand the interim policies being foisted on them in the meantime, with the 
result that these policies were largely opposed by people due to their lack of 
understanding in terms of the whole picture' (Dr Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 
2005). This also caused a degree of suspicion, as no-one knew whether the 
government was telling the full truth. To a certain extent Dr Kriengsak MP explains 
that this was due to the technical nature of the reforms, 'people did not know much 
about the reforms because the government under the IMF programs focused 
mainly on the reform of financial institutions which was very complicated and an 
extremely technical issue and distant from them. In addition, the government 
failed to communicate in a simple manner to people, thus those in rural areas 
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could not understand the reform that had already taken place at that time' 
(ibid.). This problem, of mismanaging communication with the Thai people, was 
overcome by the later elected Thaksin government in 2001. Their success has been 
based on the simplicity of their policies, and their open relationship with the public 
(ibid.). Stiglitz also points to the helping role of the new constitution, which pre-
dated Thaksin, stating: 'the new constitution in Thailand promises a stronger 
democracy, (including a provision embracing the citizen's "right to know" .. .), 
promising a level of transparency certainly beyond that of the international financial 
institutions' (Stiglitz, 2002: 131-132). 
While reforms were poorly communicated between the government and the wider 
Thai public, Tohpan explained that they were also poorly directed to the banks. He 
commented on the lack of transparency and the associated uncertainty regarding the 
closure of the finance companies; not only did the government mislead the firms, as 
discussed in the previous section, but they also failed to adequately inform the banks 
which firms had closed: 'it was up to the finance companies to inform the banks 
[e.g. Citigroup] who were supporting them financially whether they were to close 
or not' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). Dr Kriengsak MP also discussed the problem of 
insufficient clarity of events in the financial sector; these uncertainties without a doubt 
brought upon further suspicion and mistrust to an already fragile government: 
'explanations related to measures and accusations were not clearly notified by 
the government and most people have not yet understood them, even until now, 
for example: 
• The government did not disclose its conditions made with the IMF; 
• The explanations were not clear as to why they had to urgently sell 
assets of the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) at a 
very low price; 
• The government did not explain why they sold assets only to 
foreign companies and whether or not those foreign companies 
truly brought foreign currency to purchase the assets, or if it was 
the broker who bought the assets and subsequently sold them to 
Thais in order to gain the price margins' (Dr Kriengsak 
Chareonwongsak MP., 2005). 
Due to the lack of transparency regarding the events leading up to, and during, the 
crisis, the Nukul Commission was tasked with providing an 'Analysis and Evaluation 
on Facts Behind Thailand's Economic Crisis' . In the same document they made 
recommendations to improve the efficiency and management of Thailand's financial 
system (Nukul Commision, N.C. Report 1998). One of their recommendations was 
'to promote exchanges of information' (ibid.) with specific regard to financial 
institutions. 
Increased transparency has been one of the biggest changes in the Thai political 
economy since the crisis of 1997. However, it is by no means perfect. Some argue 
that the government has simply taken steps to conceal information at a more strategic 
level, through manipulation and influence (Dr Weng Tojirakarn 2005, Phongpaichit 
2004). Others are of the opinion that whilst it is still an issue, there has been 
4 Title of the Nukul Commisson report, dated March 31, 1998 
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significant progress in opening up information to the Thai people who are, as a result, 
more informed. 
The BoT speak highly of the changes in information transparency since 1997, to the 
extent that they believe this is perhaps one ofthe most significant legacies of the crisis: 
'the biggest change has been the increase in openness and communication and 
the increasing voice of the press. There has been a huge increase in vigilance. 
Any imbalances are noticed and discussed openly. People are now more probing. 
There has definitely been an increase in transparency' (Bank of Thailand 
Interview, 2005). The BoT also believe this has underpinned the newborn trust in the 
Thai government: 'the government is now seen in good light and in good standing. 
This has been due to the open dialogue it has been engaging in, and their ability 
to deliver to the public exactly what has been going on, by sharing projections 
and forecasts and offering direction' (ibid.). 
On the other hand, Tohpan believes there is still much room for improvement in the 
banking sector, 'the key problem still is disclosure needs improving. There is still 
need for increased company transparency. It has improved since the crisis but 
there is still a long way to go. Banking in Thailand is incredibly inefficient' 
(Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). As spokesman for the Thai Rak Thai party argues, the 
government is currently trying to improve on financial transparency and already has 
made important steps to ameliorating the situation in the banking sector: 'Mr Thaksin 
has tried to improve the transparency of Thai business by strengthening stock market 
regulation and banking supervision' (Economist, 2005b:24). 
The most prominent topic of contention is the role of the press. A demand for an 
increased role of the press developed during the 1990s; however despite this, the Thai 
press is not a 'free press' (Phongpaichit 2004). Evidence of this first came to light 
during the 200 1 election campaign; the press and television media were found to have 
been manipulated to favour the new electoral candidate Thaksin Shinawatra, leader of 
the Thai Rak Thai party; a self-made billionaire thanks to the communications 
industry. Pasuk and Baker report that 'just before the 2001 general election, 
journalists on the channel [the independent TV channel iTV] complained that 
Thaksin was interfering in its election reporting. Twenty-three were summarily 
sacked' (Phongpaichit, 2004:149). Shortly after this, Thaksin's family's holding 
company bought iTV, the only independent television channel in Thailand. 
According to the Economist, this has been a key factor in the loss of vibrancy suffered 
by Thai broadcast media in the last decade (Economist, 2005b ), despite the increasing 
demands ofTJ'tai people to become more politically and economically aware. 
The current Thai government, led by Thaksin, has used this stronghold over the media 
as a means to control public information. With blanket ownership of all the television 
stations (controlled either by his family, the government or the military), Thaksin is 
able to manipulate the Thai people's opinions. The Economist explains how he 
controls the press in the same fashion: 'editors complain that government agencies 
and Shin Corporation subsidiaries withhold advertising from newspapers critical of 
the prime minister. The family of Thai Rak Thai's secretary-general recently bought a 
big stake in the Nation, Thailand's most outspoken paper' (Economist, 2005b:23). 
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Such manipulation infers the level of information transparency is no better than it 
used to be. The difference between now and pre-crisis is that beforehand the 
government did not converse openly with the public at all. Today the government 
speaks out, but only telling people information which shows the current government 
in good light. Thaksin openly admits to promoting such news; Pasuk and Baker 
demonstrate this with extracts from The Nation newspaper, 'Thaksin demanded that 
TV channels "cut down on negative news and bring out more positive news to boost 
businessmen's morale" (TN, 6 May 2003). The army sent a memo to all its radio and 
TV stations instructing them to focus news coverage on the work of the government 
(TN, 13 July 200l) .... One such memo stated: "opposition to privatisation of state 
enterprises is not allowed to be broadcast" (TN, 4 March 2004)' (Phongpaichit, 
2004: 150-1 ). This problem has been recognised within press circles, and in 2003 the 
Thai J oumalists' Association went as far as releasing a statement to publicise the 
extent of the issue, ' "It has become well known among print journalists that 
advertising incomes from companies under powerfitl people in the administration, 
and from government agencies and state enterprises, have been used to bargain 
against publishing stories that could negatively affect the government's image" (TN, 
29 December 2003)' (Phongpaichit, 2004). 
Thus information transparency is still an issue which requires addressing in Thailand; 
however with the main culprits being the top level government, there is no reason to 
expect an improvement in the near future. As a result the government has the facility 
to promote policies and opinions by simply reworking information to put in the media. 
This will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter, which will illustrate the 
extent of government intervention as an obstacle to policy reforms. What is so 
prominent about the level of government control of information is that some 
individuals go as far as arguing that such controls are reminiscent of communism 
manifestoes, and World War propaganda (Dr Weng Tojirakam 2005). After being 
sacked for referring to Thaksin's 'arrogance' in an editorial in 2004, the former editor 
of the Bangkok Post stated: "'In 30 years, there has been no political meddling as 
shocking as this ... What is happening now is worse than under military regimes" (TN, 
27 February 2002)' (Phongpaichit, 2004:153). 
5.4: The issue of not knowing: moral hazard inefficiencies 
One of the biggest problems characterising the Thai economy, and more specifically 
its financial sector, was the issue of moral hazard. This can be defined as 'a risk to an 
insurance company resulting from uncertainty about the honesty of the insured5', or to 
apply it more to the Thai situation, a risk to the financial institutions resulting from 
the acceptance of poor investments, due to a lack of information. The key issues that 
will be closely looked at in this section are why moral hazard occurred, and what its 
impacts were, and how the Bank of Thailand and the IMF facilitated this. 
Moral hazard was mainly caused by the over-competitiveness of the banking sector. 
Economic theory describes perfectly competitive markets as those in which firms 
cannot generate abnormal or supernormal profits as so many firms offering an 
identical service to the others are competing for business. Unfortunately theory also 
5 Definition from The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 2000 
by Houghton Mifflin Company, Published by Houghton Mifflin Company 
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dictates that any attempt to undercut this market can only be short-lived, as eventually 
market forces will require the undercutting-firm to increase their prices, or it will 
become bankrupt. This theory can be directly applied to the events of the Thai 
banking sector during the 1990s. T ohpan, the Citigroup representative, explained his 
view of the situation, 'the crisis was caused because Thailand has too many banks. 
As a result clients are over-banked and therefore banks compete heavily and 
their spreads become irrational. All risk-management control is lost. 
Companies offer stupid rates to create business because without the business 
they won't survive. As a result the banks and finance companies don't look at 
who they're investing in; they just accept it as business' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). 
This view is also supported in existing literature (Chang, 2000, Krugman, 1998a). 
If the problem is simply a matter of too many banks, then surely it would seem 
financial common-sense to close down or merge? Having put this question to Tohpan, 
he explained that this was more a problem of culture than a problem of inactive 
regulation and monitoring: 'private banks are family owned and there is no way 
one family is likely to merge with another, that's not how family business culture 
works in Thailand. In this case merging private banks would not increase 
efficiency' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). Tophan explained the ownership structure of 
Thai banking, offering a crude breakdown of their respective cultures and incentives: 
there are three main categories of bank ownership in Thailand: state-owned, family-
owned, and stakeholder-owned (i.e. public limited companies). Each type of 
ownership has its own incentives and only in stakeholder-owned firms is profit the 
sole, or dominant, motivation. State-owned banks are instructed to provide banking 
services to the masses, such as rural and peri-urban populations, as well as the more 
profitable urban sector. Their services are subsidised to ensure even the very poor can 
have access to credit, which would not be provided by private, profit-motivated firms. 
Family-owned banks, however, operate to ensure the provision of credit for their 
family, and related businesses and friends. They too aim to be profitable, but this is a 
secondary priority to offering investment opportunities to their close-knit family 
community. They pay less attention to the profitability of investments, but rather 
more to who the individuals asking for credit are. Thus the opportunity for moral 
hazard is much greater in state-owned and family-owned banks, and it is these that 
have been the slowest to recover since the crisis. The Siam Commercial Bank will 
provide a case study of this issue, illustrating the successful recovery of a stakeholder-
owned bank, later in Chapter 7. 
The IMF was a further source of moral hazard, this time however, on the side of the 
lenders (Frankel, 1998, McKinnon, 1998), as the implication of their bail-out package 
was that international lenders had their loans repaid. The moral hazard issue here is 
that banks are thus encouraged to lend to 'misconceived or speculative projects' 
(Chang, 2000). This was also supported by the Thai institutions, through deposit 
insurance, which McKinnon and Pill (1998) single out as the main source of moral 
hazard in Asian economies. Because of a lack of a private deposit insurance agency, 
to promote and encourage investment, the Bank of Thailand acted as a lender-of-last-
resort. This meant, if the financial institution failed to pay back its liabilities to the 
investors, then the Bank of Thailand would repay them instead. This policy has since 
been heavily criticised for the extent to which it encouraged over-borrowing. 
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Developments are currently in the pipeline for the creation of formal deposit 
insurance. However this, as with many of the financial reforms, has been subject to 
delay in parliament. Dr Pakorn, of the TDRI, suggested that deposit insurance wasn't 
the issue that needs resolving and believes it is an integral role of a central bank to 
provide this. He sees the BoT has having two key roles, 'the first role is taking care 
of monetary policy, and the second role is the supervising, monitoring and 
examining of financial institutions' (Bank of Thailand Interview, 2005). His view 
is that with an appropriate independent governing body, resembling the Financial 
Services Authority which exists in Britain, the issue of deposit insurance shouldn't be 
problematic, as with appropriate regulation and monitoring the Bank of Thailand 
shouldn't have to be called in to pay off company liabilities. 
The existing plan to replace the BoT being a full lender-of-last-resort suggests only a 
proportion of investments will be guaranteed. This puts the onus back on the lender 
to be more prudent with their choice of investment. Tohpan explains that there have 
been suggestions about private deposit insurance schemes involving the government, 
whereby investors pay a premium to the government in exchange for an explicit 
guarantee. However these plans are far from seeing fruition. 
The need for an appropriate system to avoid, or at the very least reduce, the existing 
problems of moral hazard is seen by many as a key reform for the future (Siamwalla, 
2001, Vichyanand, 2000, 2001). Implicit guarantees generated by relationship 
banking, and explicit guarantees offered by the Bank of Thailand have meant that 
investors have failed to look in detail at investment proposals and have acted on 
insufficient information. This 'not-knowing' was a key cause of the capital flight 
which was induced by speculation and rumour after the collapse of the first finance 
company early in 1997. Investors simply did not know whether they could rely on 
recouping their investments, as they rarely knew their specifics. As a result many 
investors pulled out blindly and, perhaps to a certain extent, unnecessarily. The exact 
truth will never be known because of a total lack of information and prudence. 
Veerathai, of the Siam Commercial Bank, explained in depth the new risk-
management standards in his bank, after they had experienced moral hazard issues: 
'the risk managers used to also work closely with the marketing department and 
therefore looked more at attracting business than the quality of their investments. 
Since the recapitalisation process this is no longer branch approved, but 
approved centrally by head office, where they have separated credit risk people 
and the marketing people' (Santiprabhob, 2005). 
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this is that there is real need for 
appropriate investment supervision and new financial standards. It is also important 
to realise that the onus is on the financial institutions as much as it is the government 
to overturn their previous inadequacies regarding risk management. The issue of 
uncertainty needs to be addressed, and government plans are under way to amend the 
current situation. 
5.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the multi-faceted impacts of informational inadequacies. 
Not only have speculation, uncertainty and untruths been critical issues in the causes 
of the crisis, but also in its unravelling, and the subsequent recovery. This chapter has 
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illustrated the importance of the role of individuals in shaping perceptions of 
institutional culture in the IMF and the Bank of Thailand and how these cultures 
impacted relations between the institutions, and the recovery programme. One of the 
most interesting points of this chapter has been the focus on how politics has 
influenced the degree of information availability. Not only does this finding disclose 
much about the flaws in government policies, but also demonstrates why corrective 
measures have not been so rapidly enforced. Indeed many policies are still stuck in 
the quagmire of the political system. This next chapter will elaborate on the specific 
obstacles to reform caused by political inefficiencies. 
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PARLIAMENTARY 
PREDICAMENTS 
' ... there is a separation between policy formulation and policy implementation, 
leading to weak enforcement' (Bello, 1998: 127). 
The crisis-recovery policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMP) 
could only be introduced into the Thai economic system via the Thai government, and 
these policies acted as the conditions for the US$17 .2 billion recovery package. 
However, the Thai political system proved to be a key obstacle to the execution of 
these policies. Evidence of disregard and a lack of support for the IMP-prescribed 
policies, insufficient government credibility and a convoluted political system proved 
to be the primary reasons for the poor policy implementation. These political 
obstacles are also credited with initiating the crisis, for example by way of the 
infamous 'Asian model of cronyism'. This chapter will consider 'to what extent have 
policies prescribed by the IMP been implemented directly and efficiently by the Thai 
government?', aiming to show that political reasons were central to neglect of the 
IMP policies, and that little has changed to correct this. Consideration will also be 
paid to the subsequent research question: 'what have been the consequences of re-
worked policies within Thailand, in economic, political and social guises?' 
6.1: The black hole of bureaucracy 
At the time of the crisis and the introduction of the IMP's recovery package the Thai 
government, led by Chuan Leekpai, was publicly accused in the press of being too 
compliant with the demands of the IMF (Bello, 1998). The Bank of Thailand 
representative described how the Minister of Finance at the time of the signing of the 
first Letter of Intent didn't want to publish it, for fear of demonstrating too much 
compliance with the IMP (Bank of Thailand Interview, 2005). These accusations 
escalated after the approval of many IMP-led foreign investor-friendly reforms, such 
as allowing 1 00 percent foreign ownership of Thai banks; protest emerged labelling 
the IMP 'imperialist' and 'neocolonial' (Phongpaichit, 2000). As the stabilisation 
programme initiated by the IMP began to show increasing signs of failure, parties 
gradually distanced themselves from the IMP, as demonstrated by Chuan's statement 
in November 1998 that 'the IMF cannot order us about as it wishes' (ibid.:59). This 
section will look at how the Thai government dealt with the proposals of the IMP. It 
will also consider how courtesy of labyrinthine bureaucracy the IMP reform policies 
disappeared into a political black-hole, and how this was impacted by the rise of a 
new political party, the Thai Rak Thai. 
'Bureaucracy' is much like 'globalisation' in that it has a multiplicity of definitions. 
For the purpose of this discussion, the basic dictionary offering will suffice: 'a rigid 
system of administration based upon organisation into bureaus, division of labour, a 
hierarchy of authority, etc ... an( administration in which action is impeded by 
unnecessary official procedures' . This is a fair reflection of the Thai government, 
which is made up of an Executive (the senior members of parliament), an upper house 
of parliament: The Senate, a lower house of parliament: The House of Representatives, 
and 16 ministries 2 , as well as additional judiciary bodies (the Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Court, Appeal Courts and Trial Courts). 
1 Definition provided by Collins Paperback English Dictionary, 4th Edition, 1999 
2 As of 1997 (six new ministries were created under the 1997 [B.E.2340] Constitution) 
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The problems associated with bureaucracy have plagued Thailand for many years and 
are in no way accredited to an individual government party, but to the whole political 
system. Teamwork problems have been long standing features of Thai bureaucracy, 
as the ministerial system fails to give appropriate authority to key individuals in the 
government set-up. Dr Kriengsak explains: 'they [the Thai government] lacked in 
efficiency and were unable to work in unity. Despite the second term of Chuan's 
government, with an economics team composed of Dr.Supachai Panichapakdi 
and Mr.'fharin Nimmanhemin, expecting to recover confidence to a certain 
extent, the problem of unity in the economics teamwork still remained due to the 
chain of command in the economics team not supporting consultation or joint 
decision-making among its personnel' (Dr Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 2005). 
An example of this is Dr Supachai's role as Vice Prime Minister and head of the 
Ministry of Commerce. Despite the former title, he held no overriding authority with 
other ministers, such as Mr Tharin, Minister of Finance, and thus financial sector 
reform discussions through the 1990s were laborious and time-consuming processes. 
This is clearly a problem embedded in the structure of the ministerial set-up, which 
hampered the early reforms and played an integral part in the later post-crisis reforms. 
Dr Kriengsak MP elaborated on other political hindrances to reform, 'during the 
economic crisis, the cabinet adjustment and some organizational change had any, 
but not much, impact on the speed of reform because the bureaucracy, as a 
reform stimulator, still lacked efficiency as before' (ibid.). This again points to 
bureaucracy as an important impediment to the reform process. 
Conversely, from the perspective of the Bank of Thailand's (BoT) representative, 'the 
ministerial set-up didn't really impact it [the reform process] at all ... during the 
period of crisis, the ministers were co-operative and behind the Minister of 
Finance completely. Everyone was behind him; including the Prime 
Minister ... there was no intra-government problem' (Bank of Thailand Interview, 
2005). Admittedly the BoT is a government agency, and thus could be presumed to 
be supportive of the government, however it is important to consider that some views 
suggest that the government worked co-operatively, and efficiently. 
In light of the comment by the BoT representative, it is beguiling to note that even the 
current Thai premier Thaksin believes bureaucracy was a key player in hindering 
Thailand's development, and equally played a role in fostering the crisis, ' ... the Thai 
bureaucracy was too powerful, too torpid, and too ignorant of the business world. It 
lacked not only the will but also the capacity to help Thailand develop and progress. 
As a result, Thailand remained backward compared to many other countries .... both 
politicians and bureaucrats were simply, "not modern". They failed to keep up with 
the pace of change in the world, and with globalization. The crisis of 1997 ... resulted 
from this simple and wholesale failure to understand the world' (Thaksin ( 1999) cited 
in Phongpaichit, 2004: 172). 
Bello further emphasises structural political issues as obstacles to post-crisis reform. 
He talks of 'the real problem of bureaucratic conflicts and inertia', exemplifying this, 
'there are, for instance, over fifty government agencies responsible for planning and 
decision making on fiscal matters and investment projects' (Bello, 1998: 100). Within 
the Thai government, policies are organised and scrutinized not only by the Executive, 
but also the related ministries, via their respective ministers, and further approval is 
also required by the legislative branches of the government, who have the powers to 
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reject and amend proposed bills and budgets. Since 1997, as a result of bringing in 
the 'People's Constitution', the new Constitutional Court rules on the validity of laws, 
regulations and government decisions; a further barrier between policy formulation 
and implementation, which as Bello described in the opening citation, leads to weak 
policy enforcement. 
This section has demonstrated that for some, the complexities of the organisation of 
the Thai government were in part to blame for constraining and restricting the 
implementation of IMF policies. Issues of poor direction and inadequate leadership 
ran alongside the convoluted ministerial set-up, which, with respect to the research 
questions, suggests the implementation of IMF policies was not efficient. Claims of 
such inefficiencies can be sourced to high profile political representatives, and thus 
cannot be discredited. Evidence also suggests that recognition by the new Premier, 
Thaksin, of these bureaucratic inefficiencies may lead to improvements in the future. 
6.2: Political Strength and Popularity Contests 
An important point to emerge from close analysis of IMF policy critiques and 
government policy implementation is that 'acceptance' and 'popularity' of policies 
play an integral role in determining the efficiency with which they are implemented. 
This section will suggest that initial IMF policies failed to be effectively applied as a 
result of a lack of political acceptance. What is most interesting is that the originally 
proposed IMF policies were both relevant and necessary, as in many cases they have 
been re-proposed as key policies in the second term of Thai Rak Thai rule in Thailand, 
after its re-election landslide in February 2005. Under the new guise of Thaksin's 
popular rule these policies are set to be implemented with, previously lacking, vigour 
and efficiency. To effectively show that these policies are only now likely to be 
efficiently implemented as a result of being launched by a prominent and highly 
popular government, unlike the Democrats in 1997, one must briefly understand how 
Thaksin' s party became so popular. 
The Thai Rak Thai (TRT) has revolutionised Thai political history. Not only was the 
TRT the first democratically elected Thai party to last a full four-year term for over 
two decades, but they were the first to then get re-elected. Even its emphatic re-
election made history with the TRT party winning enough votes to earn them 
significant parliamentary dominance. Such political strength has been seriously 
lacking for over two decades, and with it has come new-found credibility and 
confidence previous governments have not been able to command. 
The Thai Rak Thai party was founded on 14 July 1998. Despite their anti-IMF stance, 
they did not use this to launch the party initially, and in fact initially Thaksin 
commended the Democrat government, stating they were successfully dealing with 
the economy in the wake of the crisis (Phongpaichit, 2004). The focus of the TRT 
party shifted as its members, comprising prominent businessmen and entrepreneurs, 
began to suffer at the hands of the collapsing economy. With global media and 
important figures blaming 'crony capitalism' inherent in the Thai model for the crisis, 
local businessmen felt the global community were pointing their fingers at them for 
the turmoil they were now facing. This incited national resentment within the TRT, 
and this resentment later became a dominant force for the party in attracting support, 
picking up on the similar feelings of the Thai people. 
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When the TRT inherited the Thai economy, growth was sluggish with the economy 
expanding by a mere 2.1 percent in 2001. Fourteen percent of the population were 
living below the poverty line. Many businesses showed no sign of growth, many 
suffering still with debt issues, and none recruiting. The legacy of the crisis of 1997 
was obvious. In 2004, after Thaksin's first term in charge, growth was 6.8 percent, 
and poverty was already below 10 percent. Time Magazine writes that 'Thaksin 's 
policies have turned him into something of a popular hero, hailed by his fans as the 
decisive, no-nonsense leader who has lifted Thailand from the doldrums of the Asian 
financial crisis, restored Thai pride, and lavished cash on the forgotten backcountry' 
(Schuman, 2005:16). As mentioned previously, this revival of the Thai economy 
came from a two-pronged programme focused on industrial promotion and increasing 
credit availability, both stimulating the economy to pre-crisis levels of growth. 
Morgan Stanley expects Thailand's GDP to reach 5.7 percent growth this year, 
despite December 2004's tsunami which is believed to have caused in excess ofUS$1 
billion worth of damage (ibid.). 
It is therefore clear why many believe the work of the TRT is for the benefit of Thai 
people - unlike Chavalit's and Chuan's governments who, as discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter, were accused of being too IMP-compliant, serving only in 
the interest of foreign investors. In an interview with the civil society group 
Democratic Confederation Dr Weng explained the 'the government didn't listen to 
people who didn't want to go into the IMF programme. Chavalit signed the 
opening contract with little conferral. Chuan then came into government and 
signed the 2nd Lol of the IMF. Many of the same changes were proposed, all 
benefiting foreigners and further troubling the Thai people and their economic 
status' (Dr Weng Tojirakam, 2005). 
The election of the TRT in 2001 effectively marked the end of any IMP-policy 
implementation, especially the larger-scale programmes such as privatisation of state 
industries. Despite being a multibillionaire businessman, the atmosphere ofThaksin's 
party and its policies was one of protectionism, and nationalism - somewhat 
reminiscent of the import-substitution days of the 1970-80s. 
It is no secret that the TRT party and Prime Minister Thaksin owed their initial 
success to their anti-IMF stance and in the 'overturning of some hurtful International 
Monetary Fund policies that had been prescribed to his predecessor' (The Straits 
Times, 2005). Indeed the TRT enforced a model which shifted away from the IMF's 
neo-liberal model and focused on what Pasuk and Baker call the 'developmentalist' 
view, 'that in catch-up economies, government has to play a positive role in 
protecting and promoting firms and sectors to overcome the disadvantages of 
competing against more advanced economies' (Phongpaichit, 2004:1 00). Thaksin 
used the analogy of requiring a handicap should one want to play golf with Tiger 
Woods, in the same way that Thailand requires protection and support in order to 
perform and compete fairly in a global economy (ibid.). 
Thai Rak Thai party was made up of capitalists, capitalists who had survived the crash 
of 1997 and wanted to harness the power of the state to bring back their wealth, and 
the wealth of the Thai economy. No one wanted to live in a state of recession, and the 
Thai Rak Thai party saw this as an opportunity to implement their methods to 
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regenerate the Thai economy. They simply did not believe that reforming in-line with 
IMF demands was the way to do this. 
Thaksin was essentially a businessman, and a successful one. His vision for Thailand 
was to run it just like a business, as he explained in a speech in 1997: 'A company is 
a country. A country is a company. They are the same. The management is the same. 
It is management by economics' (Chumphon, 2002), hence the notion as Thaksin as 
'Thailand's CEO'. With this attitude he adopted a similar approach to the better-
known Asian developmentalist economies, Japan and Taiwan. The two-pronged 
initiative focused on industrial development, promoting and nurturing specific sectors, 
and also the availability of credit, directing government funds to stimulate the 
economy. At the same time Thaksin built new walls between the Thai economy and 
the global economy, restricting the role of foreign firms and taking away the foreign 
ownership facilities that the IMF put in place via the Chuan government. This 
directly contradicted many of the conditions and policies outlined in the Letters of 
Intent. 
What was crucial about Thaksin's first term in government was the absence of any 
major reform which might have incited a division in public sentiment, and reduced the 
TRT party's popularity. This means that no controversial policies, nor policies which 
undermined his nationalist stance, such as those suggested by the IMF, were proposed 
throughout the first term. By the end of the first term, Thaksin had appeased the 
crisis-stricken population and become a national hero. In February 2005 the TRT 
party won a second land-slide victory giving themselves an overwhelming majority in 
parliament. This will permit the government to pass more controversial reforms, as 
there is no significant opposition, paving the way, perhaps, for more radical reform. 
Thaksin stated after confirmation of his victory in 2005, 'I will aim to restructure the 
economy over the next four years. (In the first term), the government did not have 
time to do it because we were busy getting the economy out of the economic crisis' 
(Chaitrong, 2005(20)). 
The Nation newspaper produced an article on February 9th 2005 outlining the plans 
for the second Thaksin term. One of the integral policy headings was 'Economic and 
Financial Reforms', which is remindful of the initial policies outlined by the IMF in 
the Lol' s. Table 6.1 shows the policies planned by Thaksin and the Letters of Intent 
which state the same policies. 
Thaksin Government Policies 
Second Term 2005 
Privatisation of state enterprise 
Letters of Intent Description 
(1997-1999) 
Lol 2,3,4,5 IMF planned to privatise energy, 
public utilities, communications and 
transport sectors. Plans also included 
reducing state ownership of the 
national airline (in conjunction with a 
partnership with a foreign investor), 
as well as the Bangchak petroleum 
company and part of PTT 
Exploration and Production. Plans 
were due to be submitted by June 
1998. 
67 
Liberalisation of telecoms 
sector 
Financial sector restructuring 
Loi 3 IMF planned an amendment of the 
Establishing Acts of the Telephone 
Organisation of Thailand (TOT) and 
The Communication Authority of 
Thailand (CAT) to facilitate 
corporatisation and privatisation by 
end ofl999. 
Loi 1,2,3,5,6,7 Key reforms suggested by the IMF: 
tightening of loan classifications, and 
attaining international best practice 
standards of accounting, 
recapitalisation programmes, 
streamlining of bankruptcy 
procedures, improving disclosure 
standards, and liberalisation of 
foreign equity investment - with full 
liberalisation to be achieved within 
ten years. 
Table 6.1: Thaksin government second term policies and their respective Lois 
In 1997 the above policies were key-stone reform policies of the IMF. However 
suggestion of further privatisation and liberalisation in the wake of the crisis only 
incited further public rage against the IMF, as Thai people believed that with these 
policies the IMF were 'selling-off Thailand to foreign investors (Pongpaichit, 1998). 
These policies, unlike the policies implemented by the TRT during their first term, 
were heralded as not in the interests of Thai people. Indeed during the ensuing period 
of nationalistic fervour ( 1997 -1999), characterised by public backlash and 
governments distancing themselves from the IMF, it would have been unthinkable to 
promote the privatisation of state-owned industries; indeed, it would have been 
political suicide. Nevertheless, these policies have returned to the public arena, in the 
guise of TRT policies, in an environment with little political opposition to challenge 
TRT decisions. Whilst trade unionists have been vocal in the press, public outcry 
regarding these proposals is currently subdued and there seems little evidence to 
suggest the TRT will face significant barriers to the implementation of these policies 
during their second term. 
In conclusion, this section has pointed to political strength and political acceptance of 
policies as important requirements for successful and efficient execution of 
controversial policies. These currently proposed reform policies, when advocated by 
the IMF, did not appear to have sufficient political and public support, and thus they 
disappeared from the reform agenda. Eight years have since passed and the political 
situation faced today is in stark contrast to that of 1997, providing the current TRT 
party with a strong position from which to launch policies in an environment lacking a 
sufficiently significant opposition. A further point to note is that Dr Kriengsak MP 
also explained that the IMF's policies, when initially proposed, tended to be 
technically complicated, further failing 'to win understanding and acceptance by 
policy operators and people' (Dr Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 2005). These 
more unpopular policies therefore remained stuck in the quagmire of the political 
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system. The TRT seem to have learnt from this, and unlike the IMF, have effectively 
'sold' their policies to the public in simple and popular language. 
6.3: Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the two main political issues which arise when carefully 
analysing obstacles to policy implementation. Firstly, this highlighted the problems 
of government bureaucracy, demonstrating the inherent lack of efficiency in the Thai 
political administration, contributing to slow decision making. Secondly, this chapter 
discussed the role of political strength as an important and in many ways, necessary, 
tool for the employment of controversial policies, focusing on how the Thai Rak Thai 
party gained such a dominant political status, and how this promises to execute 
policies once proposed by the IMF. 
Unfortunately for the IMP's policies, this chapter has helped to prove that the 
government was an essential barrier to their progress. Evidence suggests that if a 
government has sufficient political will, and in the case of controversial policies, 
political popularity, policies can be implemented quickly and efficiently. What made 
so many of the IMP's policies 'controversial' was that they lacked simplicity, and 
thus few people were able to comprehend them, let alone support them. With the 
failure of the IMP's initial stabilisation programme society became suspicious of their 
recovery programme, and nationalistic fervour swept through Thailand. The issues of 
social acceptance and the impacts the crisis had on Thai society will be explored in 
the following chapter as further reasons for the rejection of the IMF recovery policies. 
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WAVING THE THAI FLAG: 
THE ROLE OF SOCIETY 
Social acceptance of policies is almost as vital as political acceptance. Social revolts 
and mass protests bring key debates into the public forum. Social rebellion puts a lot 
of pressure on governments, and can make the difference between a government 
staying in power and having to step down. This was very much the case in Thailand 
from the 1990s to the current day. It was not long after the Baht collapsed and with 
ensuing recession that International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies became very 
unpopular. At the same time, both Chavalit and Chuan governments were deemed 
incompetent and too subservient to the IMF (Phongpaichit, 2000); the situation was 
made even worse by the economic failure of the IMF stabilisation package. This 
chapter will consider how Thai society was shaped by the crisis, inducing an anti-IMF 
sentiment; consideration will then be paid to the role of nationalism in the rejection of 
globalising policies, such as privatisation and liberalisation. The chapter will 
conclude by focusing on the specific role of anti-foreigner laws in the Thai banking 
sector, and how these have evolved since the crisis. 
7.1 : Fragmentation of society 
This discussion will look at how the Thai economic boom of the early 1990s caused 
massive cultural change, in part caused by the new dominance of the high earning 
secondary and tertiary industries which offered incomes unparalleled by the 
previously dominant agricultural sector. It will also demonstrate that as a result of 
this change, Thai society, especially in Bangkok, became even more vulnerable to a 
change in the economic climate. This was also because the concept of wealth, and its 
manifestations, became central to urban Thai culture. This new consumerist 'spend-
culture' illustrated how people had grown to enjoy and expect their extravagant and 
materialistic way of life. This will help to contextualise the pain that was felt during 
the subsequent recession, as many urban Thais went from having everything, to 
nothing. However, both the boom and the bust contributed to a significant 
fragmentation of society shaping peoples' attitudes and this eventually led to an anti-
IMP and anti-globalisation backlash once the crisis hit. This is discussed shortly. 
This section will also point to some of the ways in which the subsequent social effects 
of the crisis made further IMF policy implementation difficult, and that the views of 
society played an integral role in putting pressure on the Thai government to resist 
further globalising policies. 
After the military coup of 1991, Thailand, led by Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, 
began to 'globalise'. Thai society underwent radical transformation during the period 
of liberalisation and privatisation, evolving from a predominantly rural population, to 
surging middle-classes, wealthier upper-classes and a youth dominated by aggressive 
consumerism (Phongpaichit, 1998). Nowhere was this more obvious than in Bangkok. 
'Globalisation' was the new buzz-word for the economy, with Thai businesses both 
expanding nationally, and internationally through foreign investment, generating a 
boom. This can be seen as a fairly radical move, for a country who had escaped any 
previous colonial rule (Bechstedt, 2002). As a result of this history of sovereignty, 
Thailand is often reputed to have strong characterisation of 'Thainess' from 
prominent ethnic values to a strong traditional heritage, still maintained by most strata 
of Thai society today. 
The extent of this shift towards 'globalising' policies is perhaps best reflected in the 
sudden increase in consumerism exhibited by most of the urban dwellers during the 
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boom. The boom gave most Thai city workers access to levels of income they had 
not before imagined. Reynolds uses the example of traffic as an indication of the 
speed of wealth accumulation, stating that expensive international cars turned from 
status-symbols to regular household assets almost overnight, to the extent that 
Mercedes-Benz enjoyed its second largest market share, following Germany, in 
Thailand (Reynolds, 2002). Peoples' jobs and what they earned now adopted an even 
more important role than ever before, with the focus on high earning banking and 
construction jobs, the two most booming sectors. 
Thai youth are documented as reflecting this new wave of consumerism more than 
any other part of society. Chulalongkom University students, the most intellectually-
privileged students in Thailand, are the best example of this, stereotyped by their 
Gucci handbags, platform shoes, cellular phones and BMWs (Bello, 1998). Fashion 
and music genres soon also reflected Western styles and tastes, which Pasuk and 
Baker describe as 'thoroughly urban and thoroughly globalized' (Phongpaichit, 1998: 
158). Rap, rock and reggae eclipsed the folk music which had been part of Thai 
culture for so long, and the music industry, much like the whole economy, boomed. 
The role of television also increased during the boom period, and by 1996 practically 
every urban household had a television, and 90 percent of rural homes had one too 
(ibid.). Television programmes further reflected this sense of consumerism as 
characters were clothed in fashionable Western clothing and settings were typically 
lavish. 
Modem Bangkok still reflects increasing materialism with regards to consumption 
trends. During fieldwork in Bangkok it was evident shopping remains the national 
sport as it was during the days of the boom. The main road in Bangkok city centre, 
Thanon Rama I, houses Gucci, Burberry, Louis Vuitton and other international 
fashion-houses which symbolise affluence. I witnessed students and school children 
playing with their super-slim mobile phones whilst carrying Chanel bags on the sky-
train, and nothing is more emblematic of this nouveau-riche youth than the eight-story 
tall Mahboonkrong (MBK) shopping centre targeted specifically for teenagers and 
students, filled with boutiques, shops and stalls and located fittingly next-door to the 
Chulalongkom University campus. 
The benefits of the boom did not filter down through all of Thai society, however. 
Pasuk states that 'half of all the income gains of the boom went to just one tenth of the 
population' (ibid. :285). Inequality soared and in 1994 Thailand found itself in the top 
five countries in terms of inequality, alongside countries like Guatemala and 
Honduras (ibid.). This was before the crisis. 
The social implications of the boom were dramatic, however the social impacts of the 
cnsts were even more so. Unemployment was one of the most evident initial 
consequences and unsurprisingly with its concentration of banking and construction 
enterprises (the industries hardest hit), Bangkok suffered the most. Table 7.1 
demonstrates the change in Bangkok labour statistics between 1997 and 1999. 
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Key Indicators 
Unemployed 
Total Labour Force 
Unemployment Rate 
1997 1999 
56,015 210,081 
3,945,068 4,082,053 
1.4 5.1 
Table 7.1 Bangkok Unemployment Statistics 1997-1999 
Source: Labor Force Survey, National Statistical Office (NSO) 
In an interview with the civil society group Focus on the Global South, their 
representative Chanida Bamford explained that realisation of the fragility of the 
labour market was one of the biggest impacts of the crisis. She explained that the 
perception of job security had played a big part in Thai culture, especially since the 
agricultural sector had begun its decline in the 1980s: 
'Rural populations had always perceived the secure jobs were those in the 
factories, and this is why they sent their children there, and made them so 
dependent on them. This is because Thai agriculture is now stagnating. During 
the crisis the factories closed and have since moved to Laos and Cambodia and 
the Burmese borders to exploit Burmese workers. Initially rural people had 
viewed the service sector as the only way out, and now they realise that it's not 
secure either. Wages fell dramatically in this sector after the crisis, and they've 
increased a little now. Even the policies of the government have meant that 
prices of goods have fallen, especially with the Chinese border opening up. This 
has had a big impact as goods are much cheaper, and all goods are, so all sectors 
have been affected by this, not just the agricultural sector' (Bamford, 2005). 
This shows how the crisis left large portions of society very vulnerable, not solely 
because of unemployment resulting from the recession, but also because the export 
markets upon which they had relied were now more open, and more competitive, and 
thus made recovery even harder. One can therefore see why rural populations felt a 
degree of resentment towards not only the causes of the crisis, but also the liberalising 
policies which had been implemented before and after the crisis. 
What is also significant, and somewhat ironic, is that the representative of Focus on 
the Global South explained that rural populations saw the secondary and tertiary 
sectors as offering more job security, when Tohpan at Citigroup explained that those 
in the banking sector who were forced into unemployment 'in worst case scenarios 
they moved back to the country and re-engaged in agriculture' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 
2005). This implies that the primary sector actually had a greater level of resistance, 
and thus job security, in the time of economic crisis despite a stagnating market for 
agricultural goods. This is corroborated by Bello, who states that 'an average of five 
migrants had returned to each of the country's 60,000 villages by December, 
according to NGO estimates' (Bello, 1998:3). Dr Kriengsak MP explained that this 
urban-rural migration 'later caused a huge hidden unemployment problem' (Dr 
Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 2005). However, many Thai rural specialists argue 
this wasn't entirely the case (Pamwell, 2002; Rigg, 2002). 
The poverty implications of the crisis were also profound. According to the World 
Bank, the number of those in poverty rose by 3 million (World Bank Research Report, 
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2001). Rural poverty accounted for 97.63 percent of all Thai poverty in 1998, 
according to the NSO's Socio-economic survey, but the share of poverty in Bangkok 
more than doubled from 0.23 percent to 0.58 percent from 1996 to 1998 respectively. 
Poverty analysis by employment sector also demonstrates how badly the agricultural 
sector was hit, as shown in Table 7.2: 
Industry of Head of Percentage of Poverty Percentage of Poverty 
Household Incidence 1996 Incidence 1998 
Agriculture 17.89 21.06 
Manufacturing 6.27 5.78 
Construction 11.05 14.45 
Trade 10.98 7.45 
Transport 9.37 5.49 
Services 11.35 10.13 
Inactive 15.06 12.58 
Table 7.2 Poverty by industry of employment of household head in 1996 and 1998 
Source: Socio-economic survey, NSO 
As Table 7.2 shows, construction and agriculture were severely hit by the crisis. The 
construction figure is generally due to the collapse of the sector after the crisis, as the 
real-estate boom and property oversupply had been important contributors to the 
causes of the crisis. Agriculture suffered after the devaluation of the Baht in 1997 as 
this meant imported production inputs increased in price. The industry was also not 
helped by the global decline in commodity prices. Net poverty in Thailand increased 
as a whole when measured using the Gini poverty coefficient, increasing from 0.477 
in 1996 to 0.481 in 1998 (Chongthomdi, 2000). 
According to Bello depression was one of several consequences of the economic 
freefall, as was 'a breakdown in community trust' (Bello, 1998:5). Chanida, from 
Focus on the Global South, spoke also of another social ill which derived from the 
economic and social breakdown caused by the crisis: the problem of drug use and 
trafficking. Chanida explained 'people who lost their jobs turned to drug selling. 
The price of five methamphetamine pills was the equivalent to the daily 
minimum wage so there was no incentive to work!' (Bamford, 2005). 
Unfortunately the growth of the drug problem has caused further social unrest, due to 
the hard-nosed response of the government in an attempt to deal with the issue. 
'Thaksin was quick to pick up on this issue, and announced a huge "war on 
drugs". However his methods of control were barbaric, and over 2000 people 
were killed on huge raids, of people accused of selling drugs. Police argued it 
was only 1000 and the others were killed by fellow drug suppliers, but it is 
commonly accepted that the government was responsible for all of them' (ibid.). 
Indeed the government has since been condemned by the National Human Rights 
Commission - although this condemnation has had little impact on government policy. 
One of the most interesting points of the drug issue is the extent to which 
uncharacteristic members of society were involved. Chanida described 'to highlight 
the desperation of people to the extent that they indulged in drug trafficking, old 
women and whole families were found to be caught up in it, who are the people 
you would least expect' (ibid.). This very clearly demonstrates the extremity of the 
social response to the crisis, as people were desperate to survive. Equally a similar 
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pattern was witnessed in the field of prostitution, as NGO estimates show that it has 
increased substantially since the crisis, Chanida explained. This is 'easily noticeable 
in the area around the main train station in Bangkok (Hua Lum Phong), where 
the migrants enter. The public are not so keen to stop this, as they see it as a way 
that women can work as there is always a customer' (ibid.). This implies that 
prostitution is seen as more socially acceptable than the drugs trade. 
Prostitution is an infamous part of the Thai tourist culture, and Patpong district, 
suitably positioned next to the financial district of Bangkok (Sala Daeng) has long 
been an attraction for businessmen and tourists alike. Since the boom the incidence of 
prostitution has spread to the other side of the city, along Thanon Sukhumvit, which 
houses most expatriate workers, and wealthier sectors of the urban population, 
cumulating around the Nana district. The government has turned a blind eye to this 
industry and unlike the drugs war, has not clamped down on it. Despite its illegality, 
Bello states that 'commercial sex work provides young women and the families who 
depend on them with more income than any other unskilled job in Thailand' (Bello, 
1998:221). 
Considering the extent to which most people were affected by the crisis, especially the 
dominant rural population who were hit hard not only by the collapse of the industrial 
sectors, but also the collapse of the agricultural sector due to the liberalisation policies, 
it is unsurprising that there was a social backlash after the crisis. In 1998, 1999 and 
2000 farmers actively demonstrated against further financial liberalisation policies, 
demanding that a new government focus be directed at the poor rural sector 
(Phongpaichit, 2004). The civil society group The Assembly of the Poor renewed 
their stance against large-scale infrastructure projects and paddy growers and cattle 
raisers stampeded the Bangkok suburbs to protest against the lack of rural support 
(ibid.). The governments of Chuan and Chavalit were seen in particularly bad light 
once they became tarred with the same brush as the IMP's globalising policies which 
crippled their economy. Assessing the experience of the majority of society it is 
understandable why the new Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, whose focus was on the 
people and the rural population, were welcomed with open arms. They were simply a 
breath of fresh air from the neo-liberal Democrats. Even the TRT's slogan 'Think 
new, act new, for every Thai' and name, meaning Thai Love Thai, echoed a sense of 
social welfare, something the previous governments had lacked; 'the party's name 
and symbol expressed the theme of national defense' (Phongpaichit, 2004). 
This section has shown that the whole of Thai society was seriously shaken-up by the 
crisis of 1997, as the impacts rippled out of Bangkok, through to industrial and peri-
urban areas, reaching as far as the rural areas. The more visible impacts were the 
increasing level of urban-rural migration, as people found living in urban areas 
increasingly financially unviable, and the increase in informal sector activity, such as 
drug trafficking and prostitution. Poverty and unemployment both increased in the 
wake of the crisis, yet the extent of underemployment and hidden unemployment will 
never really be known. It is therefore understandable why individuals were keen to 
stop further liberalisation policies from going ahead, and why there have been 
increasing calls for more social safety-nets to protect the fragile Thai economy, and to 
renew the focus on domestic development, rather than globalising the economy 
further. 
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7.2: Nurturing the inside: the role of nationalism 
The finger of blame for the crisis which hit Thailand was pointed at the Thai people, 
the Thai government, the global financial market, and the IMF, all at different stages 
in time. Indeed the direction at which the blame is pointed still varies. The common 
feelings which emerged progressively within Thai society were anger, and through 
blaming the crisis on foreign institutions, a sense of nationalism was born; a need to 
protect themselves and focus on the welfare of Thai people rather than playing on the 
global financial playing field. This can be characterised by the emergence of the Thai 
Rak Thai party, which launched itself with policies of self-sufficiency and safety-nets 
for the rural population. This section will consider the role of nationalism, as outlined 
in Chapter 5, as a barrier to the implementation of IMF policies of further 
liberalisation, privatisation and appealing to foreign investors. 
Paul Krugman famously once stated that the Asian crisis was 'punishment for Asian 
sins, even if the punishment was disproportionate to the crime' (Krugman, 1998). 
Initially even the Thai people were of this opinion. The Bank of Thailand 
representative explained, 'at the beginning of the crisis the presence of the IMF led 
to the popular perspective of "It's My Fault". This was a very Buddhist 
approach, as there was a sense of repent, and that this was their own fault for 
indulging in their excesses, and that they must have done something wrong 
previously to deserve this. It was a very pacifist attitude, a real sense of modesty' 
(Bank of Thailand Interview, 2005). This conveys that for many the crisis was 
perceived as a punishment for their over-indulgence in sin: materialism and 
consumerism. It is important to note that Buddhism plays a key role in Thai society, 
and governs attitudes towards government institutions and the respect of the King. In 
essence this emphasis on religion at a young age helps to foster national pride, as 
'nationalism and Buddhism are closely interlinked' (Terwiel, 1975:63). However 
despite this initial Buddhist sense of responsibility, the Bank's representative 
continued to describe how, with the increasing social impacts of the crisis, this 
attitude soon changed: 'overtime however, as more and more people lost their jobs 
and the credit lines were cut, there was a real sense of anger in the Thai people, 
and shocks were felt across the board. Despite the initial reactions, people ended 
up very angry' (ibid.). 
One of the main strands of nationalism which came to light after the crisis was the 
concept of localism, which reasserts the importance of rural values and traditional 
village communities. This emerged as a populist and nationalist reaction to neo-
liberalism, and reflected Thai society's general unease toward globalisation (Hewison, 
1999). Localism was in part launched by King Rama IX, in his birthday speech of 
1997, as he voiced the importance of self-sufficiency and the irrelevance of being a 
'tiger' economy (Hewison, 2001, Phongpaichit, 2000). In conjunction with the anger 
and frustration faced by much of the Thai population, the words of the King 
stimulated an anti-market sentiment which acted as the foundation for public 
nationalist outcry. According to Dr Kriengsak MP, 'people in society had the idea 
of an anti-liberal economic system with free competition and the idea of 
concentrating more on economic and social development in local communities, 
and turning to more self-reliant production' (Dr Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 
2005). In response to these public views the IMF attempted to increase focus on 
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social safety nets in their reform policies, however the mere presence of the IMF only 
continued to arouse further nationalist resentment (Hewison, 1999). 
This sense of nationalism was encouraged by the atmosphere of 'them' and 'us' 
created by many of Thailand's public intellectuals. Tienchai Wongchaisuwan, a 
famed Thai academic, launched a series of informative books in conjunction with the 
Thailand Research Fund (TRF) promoting this sense of nationalism and a division 
from the rest of the global society. Titles such as Thailand in the Age of Cultural 
Slavery, The Global Crisis and the World Bank's Plan to Take Over Thailand and 
Declaration of Independence from the IMF incited feelings of national vulnerability 
and striking resentment towards the IMF and the World Bank. 
Dr Kriengsak MP explained how most Thai academic literature portrayed a very anti-
IMP sentiment, and how extreme these views became: 'most documents in Thai 
language during the crisis were negative reviews on the role of the IMF. The 
major criticism of the IMF was that it served as a superpower instrument to take 
over Thailand's economy. This was reasoned from the fact that policies applied 
by the IMF to many countries, e.g. selling government property, privatization, 
investment liberalization, and the relaxation of restrictions, were promoted 
among foreigners so that they could take over more enterprises in Thailand. 
Moreover, another document analyzed that this superpower, plus the IMF, the 
World Bank and the Hedge Fund all worked as if in one process (conspiracy 
theory), planning to attack the value of the Thai Baht and other Asian currencies 
in order to bring the economy into decline. This would then let the IMF enter to 
pressure Thailand into amending laws and eventually to take over Thailand's 
economy' (Dr Kriengsak Chareonwongsak MP., 2005). Obviously most of these 
views are very speculative, as there is little evidence available to substantiate some of 
the more extreme theories. However Dr Kriengsak offers an important perspective on 
how Thais' views may have been shaped by the literature available. These would no 
doubt have re-enforced already negative views of the IMF and other international 
institutions. International academic literature has also heavily influenced the global 
perception of Thailand, and understanding how it has evolved over the past decades. 
Due to the lack of availability of Thai publications for the international community, 
most views have been developed based on research done by international intellectuals. 
Public protest made further IMF recovery policies very unpopular. The key issues 
they campaigned against were those of liberalisation and privatisation. The issue of 
privatisation of state-owned companies has become an important and very public 
issue in Thailand. Since the suggestion was first put forward by the IMF in 1998, in a 
Letter of Intent (Lol), general public sentiment has been against it. Many of the 
reasons against these proposals stem from the fear of foreign firms or investors taking 
over their livelihoods. The case for not privatising the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) has been made very public by their Trade union. The 
head of the union, Sirichai Maingam, asserts 'Egat should not be privatised because 
electricity generation is a national asset that involves all Thais and should not be sold 
to the private sector'(Thongrung, 2005). 
Dr Weng, of the civil society group Democratic Confederation, described how he has 
discussed plans for privatisation with the current Premier, Thaksin. Dr Weng showed 
me a document signed by Thaksin stating that he agreed to the following suggestions 
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if privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOBs) went ahead. This ts a rough 
translation of the document given by Dr Weng: 
'State Owned Enterprise Act 1999: agree to introduce new laws to 
improve efficiency and development of SOEs. The national act is to 
replace the old act for SOE funds act, to allow the reconstruction of the 
structure of SOEs to increase the efficiency of management and quality 
of service provided and to reduce the government's budget burden. 
The aim is also to promote Thai people to take ownership of Thai SOEs 
so they would truly be public.' (Dr Weng Tojirakam, 2005) 
This statement (roughly translated) was signed off by the Prime Minister's President 
of the Advisory Board designed to repeal the 11 acts implemented by the IMF in the 
gap between the Chavalit and Chuan governments. Thaksin also signed the document 
agreeing that EGAT should not be privatised. Dr Weng therefore voiced significant 
frustration towards the current proposals for EGAT privatisation announced as part of 
the TRT's second term policies, as discussed in Chapter 6. As Dr Weng clarifies, 
Thaksin has simply reversed his decision. 
Dr Weng and his civil society group have also been ardently against current 
liberalisation plans. His view is that 'the government needs to protect the benefits 
of people - or they do not have the legitimacy to be considered a government. 
For example, if Thailand was fully liberalised into the global economy, all the 
small grocery shops would be destroyed by foreigners. This would be a traitor's 
policy for the country' (Dr Weng Tojirakam, 2005). This concept of auctioning off 
the country to outsiders is central to most Thai anti-liberalisation campaigns. 
Hewison explains 'libera/isation is firmly opposed, with the government accused of 
selling out the country to foreigners, at the behest of the IMF' (Hewison, 1999: 11 ). 
Dr Weng also explained that Thailand is still very immature, and adopts a 
developmentalist view as outlined in Chapter 6, that the Thai economy needs 
nurturing before it is ready to compete effectively on a global platform; 'it would be 
stupid to liberalise especially now, the economy is still developing. Perhaps a 
five-year plan is required, the Thai people need to build up bargaining power, 
and then free-trade can be considered' (Dr Weng Tojirakam, 2005). 
Much like Hewison, Dr Weng is aware that these liberalisation plans originated with 
the IMF, however he is sceptical that the specific liberalisations mentioned in the 
Letters of Intent would be viable in practice; 'there was significant emphasis on 
liberalisation in all of the Lol's. The health sector, for example was mentioned 
as was education, but this is a stupid idea, as it would deprive people of health 
care. Farmers don't even earn lOOOBaht per month, how could they afford to 
pay for schooling for their children?' (ibid.). This is perhaps taking the Lois 
slightly out of context, although suggestions for reformed social provisions are 
frequently documented, and according to Focus on the Global South talks of 
privatisation in healthcare and education frequently made the headlines. Underpinning 
Dr Weng's views on liberalised healthcare is his fear of price augmentations on staple 
provisions. He argued that within the next five to ten years alone, should such 
liberalisation occur, one could expect the price of the drug Paracetamol to increase 
20-fold. As a practicing doctor running his own surgery Dr Weng is horrified that this 
could be the future of Thai healthcare. 
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This section has demonstrated that initially Thai society felt responsible for crippling 
their economy and finding themselves in increased unemployment and poverty. 
However, as time has progressed there has been an increasing sense of victimisation 
of Thailand, calling for a return to more self-sufficient ways - although these appeals 
are commonplace in nationalist rhetoric. This view has become increasingly popular 
due to public support from influential individuals, such as the King, public 
intellectuals and civil society groups. Questions have since been raised publicly about 
the right to privatise utilities companies, and the viability of other liberalisations once 
outlined by the IMF. Neo-liberal subservience was a key factor leading to the 
stepping down of the Democrat governments, and it will be interesting to watch the 
current unfolding of unpopular policies recently prop_osed by the TR T party, as 
described in Chapter 6. 
7.3: Keep the foreigners out: nationalism in the banking sector 
It is no secret that the Thai banking sector is an arena of restriction and regulation for 
international banks and finance providers. Despite a brief period of relaxation of 
international rules at the time of the crisis (as enforced by the IMF), the banking 
sector has always been characterised by a degree of 'anti-foreigner' practices. This 
section will illustrate how anti-foreigner and populist sentiment occurred in one sector, 
looking more closely at the difficulties faced by foreign banks operating in Thailand, 
and how this has become harder since the crisis of 1997. 
7.31: Family Banking 
The relaxation of restrictions on foreign finance during the 1990s is arguably one of 
the many causes of the crisis. The creation of the Bangkok International Banking 
Facility (BffiF) encouraged borrowing from abroad, making the process of borrowing 
easier and attracting investors through the implicit guarantees on investments from the 
Bank of Thailand. However, besides this brief period of influx of international capital, 
it seems that it is the nature of the Thai banking sector to remain as closed and as 
'Thai' as possible. Many Thai banks are family owned, and this, as the Citigroup 
representative mentioned in Chapter 5, helps explain the lack of merger activity and 
concentration in the banking sector. Even the national taxation structure lends itself 
to private-ownership, as corporate tax regulations favour debt-financed firms, rather 
than equity-financed operations. This is because interest payments are considered 
deductible expenses for corporate income tax, unlike share dividends, which are not 
(Drysdale, 2002). By having a debt-financed, rather than equity-financed firm, full 
ownership and management can remain in the family, rather than being spread across 
shareholdings. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, competition is a big issue in the Thai banking sector, again 
due to the family banking connections. Tohpan, the Citigroup representative 
explained 'there are too many banks in Thailand, and they won't merge ... as 
there are lots of private banks which are family owned and run' (Tohpan 
Tuchinda, 2005). This means ultimately there are fewer opportunities for foreign 
banks to enter the market. Banking competition was even harder before the crisis, as 
initially Thai commercial banks and finance companies had been very restricted in the 
specific services they could offer, but in 1992 this was changed to permit them to 
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carry out new businesses, unrelated to their initial core business (Drysdale, 2002). 
Examples of these new businesses are consulting, fixed income trading (the buying 
and selling of bonds) and fund management. This meant that international finance 
companies couldn't even comer new areas of the financial market, in services they 
had offered for years internationally with proven experience. 
Veerathai Santiprabhob, of the Siam Commerical Bank (SCB) explained that recent 
developments in Thai banking have highlighted the difficulties of being family owned 
because this may detract from the profit-maximisation goal, and be influenced by 
inside interests. The crisis demonstrated clearly the problems caused by adopting 
investments on grounds other than profitability, for example the wanton property 
loans which were accepted despite property supply entering a surplus and thus were 
unlikely be profitable. Due to the lack of regulation regarding loan requirements pre-
crisis, the extent of inappropriate investments was fairly large-scale. This was 
reflected by the extent of bankruptcy once the property bubble had burst. 
Santiprabhob states: 'SCB are lucky that they are not family owned, as for 
example, Bangkok Bank when leasing companies and providing loans they have 
to make sure that decisions are made which are in the families' interests and not 
the banks so to speak' (Santiprabhob, 2005). 
7.32: Capital Controls 
Well before the crisis, capital controls played an important role in Thai banking. 
These were significant barriers to foreign bank integration in the Thai market. There 
were four main capital controls: 
1. Interest rate ceilings - limits to both the borrowing and lending rates of 
interest, adjusted during economic shocks 
2. Direct capital controls - strictly controlled outgoing capital to ensure the 
credibility of money supply controls. Outgoing foreign exchange payments 
required strict approval, and no Thai investors were permitted to hold foreign 
exchange in overseas investments. 
3. Foreign exchange controls - limits on commercial banks on net foreign 
exchange positions. Sine 1984 no net position could exceed+/- US$5 million, 
or 20 percent of net assets held by the bank (whichever was smallest). 
4. Taxation on foreign borrowing- this was at times withheld by the Ministry of 
Finance to vary the levels of foreign capital inflows, in order to act as a 
stabiliser. 
(Adaptation of Drysdale, 2002) 
These controls severely restricted destabilising capital movements and transactions 
based on speculation. The limits however significantly inhibited capital movements 
in and out of Thailand, and acted as a deterrent for foreign investors. These controls 
were all relaxed during the period of financial liberalisation, and this relaxation of 
control was followed by an obvious increase in the role of the foreign banks and 
finance companies in Thailand from 1990 (Phongpaichit, 1998). 
After the crisis capital controls returned to favour and the Bank of Thailand 
implemented a series of controls governing foreign exchange, transactions ceilings 
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and loans to non-Thai residents. This again, restricted the role of foreign banks. 
Success of capital controls is best witnessed in Malaysia where a complex package of 
ceilings and exchange limits helped to resolve many of their financial frailties 
highlighted by the Asian crisis of 1997. 
7.33: The Financial Master Plan 
In 2002 the Governor of the Bank of Thailand, M.R. Pridiyathorn Devakula 
announced a new Financial Sector Master Plan in his speech 'Commercial Banking 
and Financial Services: our Vision for Thailand'. In this speech the Governor 
emphasised the importance of the banking sector to the Thai economy, with its share 
of GDP increasing from three percent to eight percent in the last 20 years, 
representing its fifth largest industry. 
The Plan outlined areas of weakness in the Thai banking sector, for example the lack 
of banking activities in rural and low-income areas, citing that 54 Thai districts lack 
both a branch of a commercial bank or financial institution (M.R. Pridiyathorn 
Devakula, 2002). The Governor drew on foreign experiences, such as the unique role 
of the South African Standard Bank in the provision of banking services to the poor, 
and the Canadian Financial Services Taskforce's ability to provide quality services to 
all members of its population, regardless of income or location. 
The Master Plan was accepted as a renewed step by the government to further 
disadvantage foreign banks, whilst providing new opportunities for Thai banks 
(Tohpan Tuchinda, 2005). Key initiatives are outlined in the master plan to 
revolutionise the role of the Thai Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC), and provide new services designed for low-income households. The role for 
foreign banks is simply to fill the gaps left behind, for example by encouraging 
further rural banking. 
Tohpan explained how a foreign bank like Citigroup would have to change in order to 
achieve a greater role in Thai banking, and why Citigroup would not be adopting 
these new alternatives for Thai expansion: 
'If Citigroup's presence in Thailand was to change and become a subsidiary, 
then they would be allowed to have four branches. Only one of them could be in 
Bangkok. Currently they are allowed no branches. If they become a subsidiary 
however, they will have to give up governance to a third party 'to become more 
transparent' in the eyes of the Thai government. However this has been 
discussed at Citigroup, and if their Bangkok presence changes, their credit 
rating in Bangkok would then reflect the credit rating of Thailand, and not the 
triple A rating of their company, ie. Citigroup. Many of Citigroup's clients said 
this would impact on them negatively and thus they would leave, and as a result 
Citigroup will not be altering how they work in Thailand' (Tohpan Tuchinda, 
2005). 
This is a result of the post-crisis shake-up instigated by the Finance Minister. As a 
result of this, it can be argued that there has been a reversal of liberalisation in the 
financial sector and a re-entrenchment of the sector. This is very different to the pre-
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crisis era, when more liberal policies allowed foreign firms much greater access to the 
Thai financial sector. 
The only real evidence of the potential for further foreign competition in Thai banking 
is the Plan's statement that 'after three years and contingent on suitable economic 
conditions: new commercial banking licenses may be issued to new foreign investors 
to increase competition and efficiency in the financial sector' (Bank of Thailand, 
2004:5). 
7.34: Activating the Developmentalist View 
In line with the developmentalist view as discussed previously by Dr Weng, and also 
in Chapter 6, there has been a recent focus on nurturing Thai banks to become of 
international calibre, and fit to compete on the global stage. This nurturing has been 
done by protecting these firms from foreign competition using the previously 
described restrictions on foreign activities. Veerathai, head of the Equity Investment 
Division at SCB, explained in an interview how the role of foreign banks in the 1990s 
highlighted key lessons for the existing Thai banks, emphasing the importance of the 
role of scale. He also described the change experienced in Thai banking since the 
crisis, initiated with the benefit of hindsight. While local banks grew, foreign banks 
were simultaneously suppressed by regulations and controls: 
'For the last few years SCB has implemented a "change programme", where 
they have gone through strengthening their distribution channels, as this is their 
only advantage over foreign firms. They've analysed their most valued channels. 
They then embarked on strengthening the SCB brand, by updating their logo, 
and at the same time their core banking IT system, so that hopefully credit 
scorings will be able to be calculated on the spot. There has been significant 
emphasis on increased technological investment, and now a new SCB branch is 
opened every 3 days nationwide. These are often in places where they used to 
operate, but closed down to streamline' (Santiprabhob, 2005). 
The success of this nurturing is now clear in the renewed dominance of the domestic 
banks versus foreign banks: 'there has definitely been increased competition 
between the banks, as despite having only 1 branch in Thailand (due to 
regulation) Citibank was the credit card leader in Thailand for over 10 years. 
Now KTCB (Krung Thai Commercial Bank) and SCB have surpassed them 
within the last 3-4 years, increasing their card users from 150,000 to well over 1 
million' (ibid.). 
Veerathai also explained that their successes are multi-faceted: 'SCB are now the 
investment banking leaders in Thailand and also number one in the Thai 
mortgage market ... SCB is now set up like an international bank, and in recent 
years has become very aggressive. SCB saw last year (2004) their biggest ever 
profits since the company was formed 98 years ago' (ibid.). Obviously the change 
programme has had a dramatic impact on the efficiency, and thus success of SCB, 
which is an encouraging sign for other Thai banks undergoing internal reform and 
restructuring. 
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Can Thai banks achieve the status of international competitors? Perhaps yes, and 
certainly with time. Veerathai outlined however that streamlining was one of the key 
policies involved in their restructuring and offices had closed in London, the US and 
China, so that SCB could focus on their success in the Indochina market. This is 
characterised by current joint ventures in Vietnam, Cambodia, and also further a-field 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. The case of SCB, whilst only one example from the 
many Thai banks in existence, is proof that with the right motivation and sufficient 
protection to allow for restructuring and development, Thai financial institutions can 
overthrow the burden of the 1997 crisis and become efficient, profitable companies. 
The extent to which this success will be reflected in other industrial sectors will 
become more obvious as reform emphasis shifts away from the financial sector. 
7.4: Conclusion 
In conclusion this chapter has demonstrated that the financial and banking crises of 
1997 had a much wider impact than simply those experienced by the Thai banking 
sector. Social impacts rippled across provinces and employment sectors in the guises 
of poverty and unemployment. Informal activities emerged as a popular means to an 
end. For many reasons, such as the depth of the recession after the crisis under the 
stabilisation package of the IMF, the backlash of society evoked nationalistic 
sentiments; as highlighted also in Chapter 6 with the rise of the Thai Rak Thai party. 
This rise of nationalism forced governments to focus on internal development and the 
nurturing and promotion of the domestic economy; this change of direction was led 
publicly the King Rama IX. Evidence of this shift in government focus was seen 
clearly in the Thai banking sector with the launch of the 2002 Financial Master Plan. 
The case study of the Siam Commercial Bank symbolises the extent to which success 
can be achieved given appropriate stimuli and protection, which offers much promise 
to the future of the Thai banking sector. 
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CONCLUSION 
This research project has provided an in-depth analysis of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)-policy prescription process in the Thai banking sector, since 1997. The 
previous chapters have pointed to a multitude of reasons why IMF-policies did not 
stimulate a quicker economic recovery in Thailand, and why in many cases the policies 
prescribed by the IMF did not come to fruition. The Thai banking sector has provided a 
clear case-study for evaluating the difficulties associated with recovering from a crisis, 
and also the difficulties of implementing appropriate policies. The term 'appropriate' is 
very subjective and this research has illustrated that the related issues of 'tailoring' and 
'suitability' regarding policies are indeed grey areas. Nevertheless, this research has 
demonstrated that despite the ambiguities related to the appropriateness of IMF policies, 
there have been a variety of barriers to the efficient and effective recuperation of the Thai 
economy. 
The methodology outlined in Chapter 3 was successful in providing the project with an 
effective means of data-collection, and this is demonstrated by the material provided in 
Chapters 4-7. As a result of this success, the conclusions made here were done so with 
the confidence that accuracy and detail were not jeopardized in the data-collection 
process. Thus to evaluate the success of this research project one must consider the 
original research questions and, drawing on the evidence provided in the previous 
chapters, provide answers not before offered by existing research. 
8.1: To what extent did the IMF prescribe suitable, tailor-made policies for the Thai 
recovery, and what mistakes have been made? 
The IMF is keen to demonstrate that all their crisis recovery programmes are designed 
with local characteristics and exigencies in mind, and also as a result of discussion and 
negotiation with national authorities. IMF publications frequently cite the importance of 
tailor-made policies for individual crises; this was discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
Nevertheless the IMF does have a 'traditional' 10-point plan at the heart of all its 
programmes, a plan the IMF neither denies nor promotes. Whilst the IMF admits that it 
draws on past experience and analytical work for the benefits of hindsight and expertise, 
it emphasises that programmes are often designed accounting for local authorities' strong 
preferences and using area-specialists. The IMF state that Thailand's recovery 
programme was no different to any other, in that it too received careful tailoring. 
Despite these persistent claims by the IMF, the Thai experience has provided further 
evidence in support of those who criticise the IMF for their lack of local tailoring in their 
programmes. Chapter 4 showed that although the IMF did employ 'Thailand-specialists' 
in its recovery team, the initial recovery programme, to help stop panic and to aid 
stabilisation, consisted of stereotypical fiscal belt-tightening, which has come to be 
expected in all IMF programmes. What is even more frustrating for the critics is that 
many argue this was an inappropriate policy for the Thai economy, further supporting 
their claims that the IMF paid little, if any, consideration to the specific requirements of 
the Thai economy. Evidence from the interview with the Thai politician Dr Kriengsak 
MP suggested the IMF had simply applied the same policies as they had in all the prior 
crises they had worked on. This view is in accordance with many prominent academics, 
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who also believe there was nothing 'new' nor 'custom-made' about the policies applied 
to Thailand, but that they were in fact reminiscent of policies employed in Latin America 
and Africa in earlier crises. 
Chapter 4 also helped to reveal the distinct lack of discussion and negotiation with local 
authorities involved in tailoring the recovery policies. This, again, is in direct 
contradiction to the claims made by the IMF in their publications. Evidence revealed by 
the Bank of Thailand (BoT) representative points to an IMF who were closed to criticism, 
questioning and debate. The evidence further suggests that the IMF used the threat of 
reduced international credibility, as well as the $17.2 billion loan, should Thai authorities 
not conform to their pre-decided policies. This infers that the Thai authorities were not a 
significant enough force against the IMF to facilitate proper discussions. Unfortunately 
for Thailand, the experience of Malaysia has since shown that such threats are not the 
case should economies decided to create their own recovery programmes without the help 
of the IMF. These intimations, of the IMF dictating their policies, are widely supported 
in the academic community, and more importantly by high profile individuals such as 
Joseph Stiglitz and Jeffery Sachs. 
The question of 'suitability', as mentioned previously, is difficult to evaluate because of 
the subjective nature of the true definitions of 'suitable', or 'appropriate'. However, 
evidence from this research, with help of supporting secondary resources, does point to a 
series of mistakes which were made by the IMF. These are clearly defined as 
'unsuitable' because of their implications. This research states that there were three key 
mistakes made by the IMF in their recovery programme. Firstly, the aforementioned 
fiscal belt-tightening is regarded by many as an unsuitable policy for a country already in 
a serious state of recession, with no significant fiscal debts and showing no future signs 
of growth. Nonetheless, the IMF employed this as one of their initial policies in an 
attempt to put a halt to further panic, and to re-stabilise the economy. Chapter 4 
illustrates that this had the direct opposite effect, further entrenching the Thai economy in 
recession by restricting social spending and reducing consumption. The second mistake 
made by the IMF was their misaligned monetary policy. Instead of aiding a debt-
burdened economy with their debt repayments, which would have eased the impacts of 
the recession, the IMF used a strict policy of high interest rates in an attempt to re-attract 
foreign capital. With an increasing number of Thai firms declaring bankruptcy as a direct 
result of this policy, there was insufficient local encouragement for foreign investors to 
risk investing in Thailand for the benefit of the high rate of interest. This policy was 
heavily criticised by Dr Kriengsak MP, Stiglitz, Bello and many more well-known 
academics. The third and final policy, which for many was deemed 'unsuitable', was the 
conditionality of the $17.2 billion loan. This caused the socialising of billions of Dollars 
of private sector debt, causing further problems of moral hazard - whereby international 
investors were not punished for their poor investment decisions and were able to recoup 
their investments at the expense of the Thai government, and ultimately the Thai people. 
Further IMF conditions, such as the stringent enforcement of new capitalisation standards 
on already beleaguered Thai firms, put even more contractionary pressure on the 
economy. Thus it is clear why these policies can be singled out as 'inappropriate' despite 
an ambiguous definition of 'appropriate'. 
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The backlash and response of the Thai people as outlined by Walden Bello (cited p.36, 
Chapter 4) reiterates the above points that important parts of the IMF recovery 
programme were in fact 'misguided' and only 'worsened the disease'. This helps to 
explain why the Thai economy failed to recover as quickly as initially hoped once the 
IMF programme had been put in place. Whilst the IMF does still argue that its policies 
are custom-made to each crisis situation, it has since conceded that its fiscal policy in the 
Thai crisis was excessively austere, exacerbating the crisis, rather than solving it. 
8.2: What was the process of policy implementation- how did the IMF channel its 
policies to the grass roots of the Thai economy, specifically the banking sector? 
This question has two parts to it, firstly considering how the IMF initiated and 
implemented its policies in the Thai economy, and secondly focusing more on the process 
of channelling the policies through the Thai banking system. Whilst the issue of 
channelling policies in a specific sector may differ from the processes in other sectors, it 
offers a good insight to potential barriers to efficient policy infiltration through to the 
grass roots of a sector, after the policies have been implemented at the top level. 
Upon arrival in Thailand, the IMF exerted its policies on the Thai economy after little 
discussion with the Thai authorities, as mentioned previously. The policies were first 
introduced into the Thai arena at the highest level in an atmosphere of tension and fear, in 
un-chaired meetings led by the IMF. Many of the IMF's policies were conditions for the 
$17.2 billion loan. The main means of communication of these policy decisions were 
Letters of Intent (Lois). Whilst the IMF attempt to convey that these are documents 
drawn up by local governments and then agreed by the IMF, this research has 
demonstrated that this is in fact not the case; a point Joseph Stiglitz makes clear in his 
own work. The Letters of Intent are designed and to a certain extent, prescribed, by the 
IMF; in the case of the Thai experience, the local authorities were given little choice but 
to co-operate and sign the documents. The first Thai Lol, dated August 14th, 1997, was 
not published upon being signed by the local authorities. For many this suggested the 
Thai government was ashamed to disclose how much they had acquiesced to the IMF, 
thus confirming the Thai government hadn't invented the document themselves. These 
Lol's contained specific descriptions of the targets and plans for fiscal policy, monetary 
policy, foreign exchange policy, and medium-term reforms, such as legal and financial 
reform. 
Other more urgent policies were not committed to paper before being enforced. This 
research showed that the key initial policies, regarding bank closure and the floating of 
the Baht, were very poorly communicated by the IMF, and as a result, their 
implementation was haphazard and incited much speculation and rumour. This was to 
the detriment of the Thai economy, which is ironic as these policies were apparently 
essential to the 'recovery; programme. The closure of banks was prompted in several 
stages; however the ineptitude with which this was done created a sense of panic, causing 
investors to pull out of sound banks unnecessarily. For those banks and finance 
companies who were suspended, it was up to them to inform the banks which supported 
them and their employees - for many, these closures came as complete surprises. Whilst 
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the bank closures seemed to be dictated by the Thai government, although many believed 
this was the work of the IMF and this was later confirmed in the Lois. The IMF had no 
public face of its own, and thus anger was directed at the government. The floating of the 
Baht again reflected poor organisation from both the IMF and the government. This 
research has provided evidence to infer that within three days of a public statement that 
the Baht would not float, it was decided internally that it would. This was one of the 
many inconsistencies which contributed to confusing and angering the Thai people. 
Many other policy decisions which took place failed to be either published or 
communicated orally to the Thai people; they simply occurred with little public 
awareness. Dr Kriengsak MP outlines in Chapter 5 three issues which have yet to be 
explained, governing in most cases the extent of favouritism shown to foreign investors. 
This verifies the lack of clarity provided by both the IMF and the Thai government 
regarding the policies put in place after the crisis. This lack of transparency in the 
behaviour of these two institutions was critical in prompting the Nukul Commission's 
investigation of 1998, in an attempt to illuminate what actually happened in the wake of 
the crisis. 
The second focus of this question concerned the process of channelling the policies from 
the top government level, through to the foundations of the banking system. As is clear 
from the above discussion, the efficiency and clarity with which the IMF policies were 
introduced at the top level were not consistent, and this impacted the infiltration of 
policies through the banking system. 
Evidence from the previous chapters suggests that larger-scale policies, which affected 
the banking sector as a whole, were executed more rapidly and more obviously, than the 
more micro-scale policies, such as intra-corporation reforms. Policies, such as the capital 
adequacy standards, bankruptcy reform and bank closures, were very quick to be 
implemented, and the banking industry was required to respond immediately to these 
changes. Whilst these are considered by many IMF critics to have been poorly 
conducted, the policies themselves did infiltrate the sector quickly. 
On the other hand, the more micro-scale reforms to help reorganise and restructure Thai 
banks were less successful. These included the salvaging of 'good' banking assets from 
suspended finance companies, and the merging together of suspended firms in an attempt 
to create new successful banks. Evidence provided by the Siam Commercial Bank (SCB) 
representative infers that these not only took a long time to take place, but have had little 
effect on rejuvenating the banking sector. This research has also demonstrated that the 
most successful regeneration of the banking sector has actually been internally-driven, by 
the profit-motivated Thai banks, such as the SCB, and not the IMF nor the Thai 
government. This was evaluated in more depth in Chapter 7. 
The conclusions to be drawn from this lead nicely to the next research question for 
evaluation, suggesting that policies are most efficiently implemented when sufficient 
motivation within both the government and the related industry sector exists. It is also 
apparent from this research that the policies which can be enforced more immediately 
90 
have a much greater chance of being executed than those which require time, as they 
have less chance of being swallowed by the political quagmire before they are fully 
implemented. 
8.3: To what extent have banking policies been prescribed by the IMF been implemented 
directly and efficiently by the Thai government. and what have been their biggest 
obstacles to their implementation? 
For each of the IMF policies to be applied in the Thai economy, they had to first pass 
through the Thai government. The efficiency of their implementation, once they entered 
the Thai political arena, varied from policy to policy. This research has exposed a 
number of factors which dictated the speed and efficiency with which the reforms were 
implemented. In some cases, as one has already seen, IMF policies were implemented 
with speed, but poorly conducted, and this reduced the overall policy effectiveness. More 
commonly, as demonstrated by this research, the implementation of banking policies was 
much slower, but better communicated, for example being outlined in the Lois, which 
aided their effectiveness. In some cases policies became lost in the labyrinthine political 
system and have not been implemented at all. 
This research has elucidated four key impediments to efficient policy implementation. 
The first pertains to the political system, as Chapter 6 showed that many flaws in the 
political set-up have restricted the decision making process, and significantly slowed the 
development of reform policies. These flaws relate to a lack of teamwork in the 
Parliamentary Executive, and a convoluted decision making process involving several 
government agencies. Central to the political inertia faced by many of the reform 
policies were inside political interests. Chapter 4 exemplified how debt defaulters within 
the Senate abused their positions to manipulate reform measures in their favour, 
characterised by the watered-down bankruptcy law reforms. 
This research also points to policy implementation being somewhat contingent on 
political and public acceptance. Chapter 6 detailed the current proposals for the Thai Rak 
Thai party's second term, and demonstrated how many of these are former IMF policies 
which were not implemented in 1997 due to public outcry, yet are now likely to see 
fruition as a direct result of renewed political strength and muted opposition. Chapter 7 
discussed in more detail the reasoning behind this outcry, and the causes of the public 
resentment of the IMF and its policies. 
Evidence of mistrust of the IMF was a third impediment to the reform process. This was 
responsible for delaying the initial recovery measures, as individuals in the BoT were 
reluctant to uncover the true extent of the Thai crisis for fear of this information reaching 
the private sector through close links held by many of the IMF team. This is critical in 
demonstrating the influential role of individuals in the reform process, as the actions of 
few dictated the public perception of the institutions they represented, for example the 
mistrust of the IMF upheld by the general Thai public was in part generated by their 
mistrust for the international private sector (shown in Chapter 5). 
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Lack of proper understanding of the IMF policies further hampered the implementation 
of the reforms. This is arguably the fourth impediment drawn out by the findings of this 
research. The lack of understanding was critical at the level of the general public, as such 
absence of clarity aroused issues of suspicion; people were unaware of the specifics of 
the financial reforms, and it was not made clear to them exactly what was going on. This 
was discussed in Chapter 5. This contributed to further public resentment of the Chavalit 
and Chuan governments as people felt that reforms were being foisted on them. This was 
also an issue at government level, as discussed in Chapter 6, whereby IMF policies failed 
to generate the support of the policy operators due their technical complexities. This 
relates back to the second impediment, implying that policy acceptance at a political level 
is a requirement for effective policy execution. 
Whilst banking reform policies have been implemented, each policy's process has varied 
in speed and efficiency as a direct result of many of the aforementioned impediments. 
The suspension and closure of banks and finance companies in the early stages of the 
crisis is a good example of a policy which was implemented with speed, yet which lacked 
proper and efficient execution, and thus the policy was less effective than initially hoped, 
causing additional fragility to the already weakened banking sector. In a similar guise to 
the bank closure, the implementation of capital adequacy standards was rapid and 
stringently enforced. Some critics argue that the early emphasis on this policy put too 
much pressure on the heavily-indebted banks, worsening the situation in the banking 
sector. The reform of the bankruptcy laws has also been one of the quicker reforms to 
fully infiltrate the sector, however this was subject to political manipulation, and this 
research has suggested that it is not how the Thai people wanted it to be; hence the speed 
of implementation does not infer the success of a policy application. 
Banking disclosure and transparency have been the more slowly integrated policies, and 
whilst some areas of banking have witnessed fairly rapid improvements, such as 
informational transparency on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), others still warrant 
more attention, such as accounting disclosures. Other policies suggested by the IMF, 
such as deposit insurance schemes to eliminate the moral hazard issues caused by the 
Bank of Thailand, have failed to make it passed the complex scrutiny of Parliament. This 
therefore suggests that the policies which were able to successfully channel through 
Parliament down to the foundations of the banking sector were the more politically 
acceptable and less complicated reforms, as discussed in Chapter 6. There is also a 
directly proportional relationship between the speed of implementation and the level of 
urgency given to the policy in the early stages of IMF presence. Once the IMF was 
forced to withdraw from Thailand, and reforms were left up to the government, fewer 
reforms were implemented across the board - not just banking related; this again appears 
linked with political and public acceptance, empirically supported by the latest proposals 
of the Thai Rak Thai party for their second term in government. 
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8.4: What have been the consequences of re-worked banking policies within Thailand. in 
economic, political and social guises? 
Although Thailand had formally exited the IMF programme in 2000, the BoT made the 
final repayment of US$1.6 billion to the IMF and other international creditors on July 
301h, 2003 - two years ahead of schedule. This represented the closing of a painful 
chapter which had shaken Thailand, and much of South-East Asia, with lasting impacts. 
To celebrate, the announcement was made publicly by the Premier, Thaksin, with the 
Thai national flag as his backdrop; emblematic of a national victory. The 30th July, 2003 
was pronounced a public holiday; illustrating the sense of euphoria within the Thai 
government and the Thai people; they were now free of the IMF. 
The state of the Thai economy at the time was, on the whole, sound. According to the 
governor of the BoT in 2003, M.R. Pridiyathorn Devakula, even with this final 
repayment, foreign reserves had reached a solid $37 billion, or three times the country's 
short-term foreign debt (BP, 2003). At the time he made it clear that despite the 
restoration of the economy's health, further reforms were required, essentially within the 
Thai legal framework, to ensure a broad-based recovery (ibid.). 
The representative from Focus on the Global South, Chanida Bamford, explained in her 
interview that the IMF reforms were not a legacy, but had a fairly short term impact, 
achieving very little. The key reforms, she suggests, are those introduced by the current 
government, led by Thaksin Shinawatra. She also concedes that whilst to a certain extent 
policy reworking has taken place, neo-liberal policies are happening, despite the former 
anti-IMF colour of the Thai Rak Thai party (Bamford, 2005). The current economic 
focus in Thailand is growth, not equity. 
There is little doubt that the political meddling at the time of the crisis did not help the 
recovery process. With regard to economic performance, the re-worked banking policies 
had a detrimental effect. The dilution of the bankruptcy laws is the best example of this, 
as inside political interests meant that the laws which were finally passed had not been 
processed with solely the best interests of the economy at heart. The poorly conducted 
restructuring reforms also complicated the recovery of the banking sector, harbouring 
inefficient firms. However the most significant detrimental impact to the Thai economy 
was not caused by the re-working of policies; it was caused by the three main policy 
errors conducted by the IMF: the excessively austere fiscal policy, the maintenance of 
high interest rates, and the over-stringent and wrong conditions applied to their loan. 
This not only exacerbated the economic downturn, but shifted the burden of debt, caused 
by misguided private investments, onto the shoulders of the Thai government, further 
entrenching it into crisis. As a direct result of these policies the Thai economy did not 
show the expected signs of recovery the IMF had originally hoped for; this was discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2. What is most interesting about the revival of the banking sector is 
that the real reforms behind it have not been the result of IMF nor government plans, but 
the motivation of individual firms to regain credibility and profitability. 
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For many, such as Dr Kriengsak MP, the Democratic Confederation group, Focus on the 
Global South, as well as the general population, the biggest consequences of the crisis 
have been political. Thailand is not renowned for a legacy of political stability, yet the 
emergence of the Thai Rak Thai party in the wake of the crisis has provided Thailand 
with a popular and stable government for over four years now. Its re-election victory in 
February 2005 was overwhelming. Led by billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, the party 
promises to make important structural changes during its new political term, having spent 
its last four-year term lifting the Thai economy from the depths of recession to pre-crisis 
levels of growth. Whilst Thaksin and his party are not short of critics, it cannot be denied 
that they have acted with the benefit of hindsight from the crisis, recognising the 
importance of communication and the need for social safety nets. Thaksin's 'CEO-style' 
of management has brought new confidence to the Thai economy, although rumours of 
longstanding Thai 'cronyism' are still rife, as are suggestions of continuing political 
meddling and nepotism; all reminiscent of the pre-crisis days. Recent work by Pasuk and 
Baker (2005) demonstrates that policy re-working and manipulation is not over, and in 
fact exists across a broad spectrum of sectors, not just in banking. They also infer that 
this is most prominent in the highest ranks of government, which offers little hope for any 
change in the near future. 
Re-worked banking changes have had little social impact, although those who associate 
closely with the Thai Rak Thai party have benefited enormously from political 
favouritism. Former government ministers, once shamed by the crisis, have been able to 
find new positions in the government; close relatives of Thaksin enjoy some of the most 
powerful positions in government- his cousin is currently Head of the Armed Forces, 
and his brother-in-law is the Deputy National Police Chief. 
The bigger social picture, regarding the general population, has been less affected by re-
worked policies, but has suffered significantly since the crisis. As outlined in Chapter 7, 
there has been a dramatic increase in informal sector involvement, as a result of the large 
impact of unemployment during the crisis era. Unfortunately for former Thai factory 
workers who lost their jobs after 1997, most factories that have since experienced a 
revival have relocated to the Laos, Cambodia and the Burmese border to take advantage 
of cheaper labour. Many individuals caught up in the Thai drugs trade since the crisis 
have been subjec~ to the government's recent policies to 'crack-down' on drugs, with 
reports of over 2000 people being killed as part of the government's policy in 2003. 
According to a World Bank report in 2002, there were three times as many drugs on the 
Thai black market in 2001 than in 1998, prison populations had doubled and 75 per cent 
of new inmates are brought in for drugs-related offences; this represents only a fraction of 
the social breakdown experienced in Thai communities as a result of the crisis. 
Despite significant economic growth in the last four years, issues of equity and inequality 
are still a concern in Thailand. The Thai Rak Thai party has been very active in 
establishing more social safety nets, through cheap health care, village credit schemes for 
rural areas, and a rural debt moratorium. These have been quick to tum Thaksin from a 
successful businessman to a national hero, although there have been growing concerns 
about how the Thai Rak Thai party have been able to fund such populist policies, 
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especially as some newspaper reports infer that 'about 30 per cent of the [village] loans 
may have been lost' (TN, 2005 (59)). With the current levels of growth, many urban 
dwellers have been able to return to their former consumerist behaviour, and in January 
2005 imports grew by a record 33.6 per cent, accounting for $9.17 billion, with the 
current account reporting large deficits as a result. Reports in the press suggesting 
'Highest Deficits Since 1997 Crisis' (TN, 2005(77)) are already unnerving many Thai 
economists, with one press report suggesting the excuses given for this deficit are those 
given before the crisis (TN, 2005(76)). 
Nevertheless whilst the crisis hurt Thai confidence, credibility and collapsed their 
economy, there have been long term benefits as a result. Despite a misguided collection 
of short-term policies emplaced by the IMF, their long-term recommendations for 
structural change and reform of key pieces of legislation, and the promotion of new 
internationally recognised banking standards are vital to establish a mature and stable 
economy, facilitating the growth of national corporations so that in time they can 
compete fairly in the global market. The case study of the Siam Commercial Bank has 
illustrated the success of one firm already, and no doubt many other successfully 
reformed corporations exist, and certainly more will in the future. The only 
disappointment in this case is that the grass-root reforms had to be internally motivated 
because of a lack of direction and efficiency from government ministers. 
The outcomes of this research have offered important lessons regarding why reforms 
prescribed by the IMF did not channel efficiently into the Thai economy - with a focus 
on the banking sector, and why the Thai economy took longer than planned to recover. 
This research is not intended to provide a global framework for how to implement 
recovery programmes in crisis economies, but to elucidate why the need for acute 
attention to detail is critical in planning and executing reform policies, as is a thorough 
understanding of the workings of a nation's political system and culture. 
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